

AMERICA'S SIBERIAN ADVENTURE 1918-1920



WILLIAM S. GRAVES

Major General, United States Army



AMERICA'S SIBERIAN ADVENTURE 1918-1920



WILLIAM S. GRAVES
Major General, United States Army





General William Sidney Graves



General William Sidney Graves conversing with Admiral Austin Melvin Knight

AMERICA'S SIBERIAN ADVENTURE 1918-1920



WILLIAM S. GRAVES

Major General, United States Army
Retired
1931



TO

THE HONORABLE NEWTON D. BAKER

Former Secretary of War

Whose cooperation, support and sense of justice made it possible for
American Troops to perform their duties without anxiety as to the
consequences of misrepresentation and hostile criticism.

FOREWORD

Early in 1918, President Wilson told me that he was being urged to contribute American military forces to combined Allied expeditions to North Russia and Siberia, and asked me to consider what reply he should make to the French and British representations in that behalf. The reasons given him, and by him to me, for these proposals were, with regard to North Russia, that vast accumulations of military stores had been made in the neighborhood of Archangel which would fall into German hands unless they were protected by the Allies and that there were great bodies of North Russian people loyal to the Allied cause and eager to form themselves about an Allied military nucleus for the purpose of reestablishing an Eastern military front or at least obliging the Germans to retain great bodies of troops in the East. With regard to Siberia one reason was that a large body of Czech soldiers had broken away from the Austrian Armies on the Russian Front and were making their way overland to Vladivostok with the intention of going by sea from that port to France and reentering the War on the Allied side. These Czechs were said to be inadequately armed and without subsistence, except such as they could gather on the march, and to be in need of protection from organized bodies of German and Austrian prisoners who, after the November Revolution in Russia, had been released from the restraints of their prison camps and organized, by German officers, into effective military units for the purpose of making Russian resources available to Germany and Austria, and, where possible, harassing Russians favorable to the Allied cause. In addition to this it was urged that Russian sacrifices in the War entitled her people to whatever sympathetic aid the Allies could give in the maintenance of internal order while they were engaged in the establishment of their new institutions. This consideration had already led to the dispatch of the so-called Stevens Commission to Siberia to assist in the rehabilitation and operation of the railroads upon which the life of the country depended.

Some days later, the President and I discussed the matter very fully. I urged the view of my military associates that the War had to be won on the Western Front, that every effort should be made to concentrate there the

overwhelming force necessary to early success, and that all diversions of force to other theaters of action merely delayed final success without the possibility of accomplishing any relatively important result elsewhere. The President was impressed with this view to such an extent that he sent for the Chief of Staff and discussed with him both the possibility of reestablishing any effective Eastern Front and the effect of the proposed expeditions upon the strength of the Allied Armies on the Western Front. At a third conference the President told me that he was satisfied with the soundness of the War Department's view but that, for other than military reasons, he felt obliged to cooperate in a limited way in both proposed expeditions. The reasons moving the President to this determination were diplomatic and I refrain from discussing them. The circumstances, as represented to him, seemed to me then and seem to me now to have justified the decision, although subsequent events, in both instances, completely vindicated the soundness of the military opinion of the General Staff.

The Siberian Expedition described in *America's Siberian Adventure* by Major General William S. Graves, who commanded the American Forces there, was the more important of these two undertakings and it presented, almost daily, situations of the greatest delicacy and danger. To some extent, though I must confess not fully, these possibilities were foreseen, and the selection of General Graves to command the American contingent, suggested by General March, Chief of Staff, met with my instant and complete approval. General Graves was Secretary of the General Staff when I became Secretary of War and I was thus brought into constant contact with him. From this contact I knew him to be a self-reliant, educated, and highly trained soldier, endowed with common sense and self-effacing loyalty, the two qualities which would be most needed to meet the many difficulties I could foresee. Now that this strange adventure is over, I am more than ever satisfied with the choice of the American Commander. A temperamental, rash, or erratic officer in command of the American force in Siberia might well have created situations demanding impossible military exertions on the part of the Allies, and particularly of the United States, and involved our country in complications of a most unfortunate kind. These possibilities are suggested on every page of the straightforward narrative in this book.

President Wilson personally wrote the so-called *Aide Memoire* which General Graves sets out on page five of his story, a copy of which I personally delivered to the General, as he says, in the railroad station in Kansas City. As I was thoroughly aware of the limitations imposed by the President upon American participation in the Siberian venture, and of the whole purpose and policy of our Government in joining it, I was unwilling to have General Graves leave the country without a personal interview in which I could impress upon him some of the difficulties he was likely to meet and the firmness with which the President expected him to adhere to the policy outlined in advance. I, therefore, made a trip of inspection to the Leavenworth Disciplinary Barracks and directed General Graves to meet me in Kansas City, thus saving part of the delay in his preparation which would have arisen if he had come all the way to Washington. Unfortunately, his train was late and our interview was briefer than I had planned, but it was long enough. From that hour until the Siberian Expedition returned to the United States, General Graves carried out the policy of his Government without deviation, under circumstances always perplexing and often irritating. Frequently in Washington I heard from Allied military attachés, and sometimes from the State Department, criticism to the effect that General Graves would not cooperate, but when I asked for a bill of particulars, I invariably found that the General's alleged failure was a refusal on his part to depart from the letter and spirit of his instructions. In June, 1919, I saw President Wilson in Paris and he discussed with me representations made to him from French and British sources to the effect that General Graves was an obstinate, difficult, and uncooperative Commander. When I recalled to the President the policy laid down in the *Aide Memoire* and gave him the details of similar complaints made to me in Washington, I was able to reassure him of the complete fidelity of General Graves to his policy, in the face of every invitation and inducement on the part of the Allied Commanders to convert the Siberian Expedition into a military intervention in Russia's affairs against which the President had set his face from the first. At the conclusion of our interview, the President smiled and said, "I suppose it is the old story, Baker, men often get the reputation of being stubborn merely because they are everlastingly right." At all events, the President then and later gave his full approval to the conduct of General Graves, and if the Siberian Expedition was in fact unjustified and if it really failed to accomplish substantially helpful results,

this much is true of it—it was justified by conditions as they appeared to be at the time, it refrained from militaristic adventures of its own, it restrained such adventures on the part of others, and it created a situation which made necessary the withdrawal of all Allied forces from Siberian soil when it was withdrawn, thus making impossible territorial conquests and acquisitions on Russian soil by other nations whose interests in the Far East might easily have induced them to take over for pacification, and ultimately for permanent colonial administration, vast areas of Russia's Far East.

Detached from its world implications, the Siberian adventure seems mystifying. Indeed, even General Graves himself has “never been able to come to any satisfying conclusions as to why the United States ever engaged in such intervention.” But if one looks at the world situation, the explanation is adequate if not simple. The world was at war. The major focus of the terrific military impact was on the Western Front, from the English Channel to the Swiss Frontier, but the shock of the conflict reached throughout the world, and in outlying places, everywhere, strange collateral adventures were had. All of these “side shows” were, in one way or another, peripheral spasms from the profound disturbance at the center of the world's nervous system. Some of them were deliberately planned to distract enemy concentrations of force or to interrupt the flow of enemy supplies. Some of them were designed to sustain Allied morale, during the stagnation of the long-drawn-out stalemate on the Western Front, with the thrill of romance, as when Allenby captured Jerusalem and swept the infidel from the holy places of Palestine. Some of them were mere surgings of restrained feeling, in semi-civilized populations, due to the withdrawal of customary restraints by remote governments which were centering their efforts on the battle in Europe and had neither time nor strength to police far-away places. The successive revolutions in Russia had withdrawn effective authority from Moscow over the Far East and had given free rein to the ambitions of predatory Cossack chieftains like Ataman G. M. Semenov and Kalmykov. The fringes of Siberia had long been the scene of commercial and military adventure and conflict by the Germans, English, French, and Japanese. Siberia itself was inhabited in part by original natives and in part by political exiles and there were now added great bodies of liberated prisoners of war. The changing governments at Moscow had changing attitudes toward the World War, and toward Russia's part in it, and these conflicting

opinions, but dimly understood in remote Siberia, confused there the already faint sense of Russia's national purpose. On the Western Front the nations engaged were dominated by a single objective, but in places like Siberia both the comprehension and concentration of European opinion was absent. Siberia was like Sergeant Grischa, who had no conception of what it was all about but knew that the once orderly world was in a state of complete and baffling disorder.

The intervention of an Allied military force, under such conditions as have been described, was not unnaturally beset by the difficulties which belong to such situations. It was very easy for the nations interested to find, from day to day, new circumstances inviting if not requiring changes in their policy. Most of the nations having armed forces in Siberia were too much occupied at home to pay very much attention to what went on around Lake Baikal. As a consequence, their military commanders were left largely free to determine questions of political policy and if General Oi or General Knox conceived the notion that, by taking advantage of some new development, they could make a bold stroke in behalf of the Allied cause, and, incidentally, further the commercial and territorial aspirations which their governments ought, in their opinion, to entertain, it is not to be wondered at. Indeed, there is evidence in General Graves' book that even in the United States similar ideas every now and then took root in official minds. I cannot even guess at the explanation of the apparent conflict between the War Department and the State Department of the United States with regard to the Siberian venture, nor can I understand why the State Department undertook to convey its ideas on Siberian policy, as it seems occasionally to have done, directly to General Graves. Perhaps the State Department was more impressed than I was with some of the Allied views as to the desirability of cooperation beyond the scope of the *Aide Memoire*. Possibly some of these comments were mere reflections of Allied criticism, forwarded for what they were worth, but without being first presented to the Secretary of State or considered by him as affecting the maturely formulated policy of the United States in the adventure. No doubt some day all this will be carefully studied and research scholarship will find documents and papers, reports of conversations and invitations to new policies, based upon supposed new facts, but when all has been disclosed that can be, Siberia will remain Sergeant Grischa. The Siberian situation

will always illustrate the eccentricities of a remote and irrational emanation from the central madness of a warring world.

I cannot close this foreword, however, without expressing, so far as I properly may, the gratitude of our common country to those soldiers who uncomplainingly and bravely bore, in that remote and mystifying place, their part of their country's burden. Even the soldiers of a Democracy cannot always understand the reasons back of strategic situations. Political and military reasons are worked out in cabinets and general staffs and soldiers obey orders. Thus those on the White and Yellow Seas did their part equally with those on the Marne and the Meuse. And if it should turn out that there is wanting some detail of justification, from the nation's point of view, for the Siberian adventure, nevertheless, those who took part in it can have the satisfaction of knowing that the American force in Siberia bore itself humanely and bravely under the orders of a Commander who lived up to the high purpose which led their country to attempt to establish a stabilizing and helpful influence in remote wastes inhabited by a confused and pitiful but friendly people. They can too, I think, have the reassurance that if there was a defect of affirmative achievement, history will find benefits from the negative results of American participation in Siberia; things which might have happened, had there been no American soldiers in the Allied force, but which did not happen because they were there, would have complicated the whole Russian problem and affected seriously the future peace of the world.

Newton D. Baker

47th United States Secretary of War,

March 9, 1916 – March 4, 1921.




Newton D. Baker

CONTENTS

PURPOSE OF MILITARY INTERVENTION IN SIBERIA	<u>1</u>
AID TO THE CZECHS	<u>34</u>
BEFORE THE ARMISTICE	<u>55</u>
AFTER THE ARMISTICE	<u>96</u>
MOBILIZATION OF RUSSIAN TROOPS	<u>143</u>
THE RAILROAD AGREEMENT	<u>175</u>
KOLCHAK AND RECOGNITION	<u>208</u>
JAPAN, THE COSSACKS AND ANTI-AMERICANISM	<u>248</u>
THE GAJDA REVOLUTION	<u>275</u>
THE DEBACLE	<u>317</u>

ILLUSTRATIONS

GENERAL WILLIAM S. GRAVES	<i>Frontispiece</i>
	FACING PAGE
AMERICAN TROOPS ON THE MARCH IN SIBERIA	40
ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES IN SIBERIA	84
ARMORED CAR TO MEET THE NEEDS OF RAILWAY PATROL	188
ONE RESULT OF THE RAILWAY AGREEMENT. BODIES OF AMERICAN SOLDIERS KILLED IN ACTION AGAINST ANTI-KOLCHAK FORCES.	188
KOLCHAK SICK, NEGLECTED, AND DYING ACROSS THE RIVER FROM OMSK, KOLCHAK'S HEADQUARTERS	238
SUPPLIES FOR THE TROOPS OF THE KOLCHAK ARMY	238
ANNANKOFF, LEADER OF THE SEMIPALATINSK COSSACKS, AND HIS ADJUTANT	266
GENERAL KNOX, GENERAL GRAVES, AND AMERICAN CONSUL, J. K. CALDWELL	272
GENERAL OI, JAPANESE COMMANDER	328



Armored Cruiser USS Brooklyn moored at Vladivostok




Armored Cruiser USS Brooklyn moored at Vladivostok



31st Infantry marching near Vladivostok, April 27, 1919




AEF Siberia December 1918



American troops in Vladivostok parading before the building occupied by the staff of the Czecho-Slovaks Japanese marines are standing to attention as they march by Siberia August 1918.









AEF Siberia patch



AEF Siberia campaign ribbon



AEF Siberia Polar Bear patch

INTRODUCTION

It is difficult to write or even to speak of Russia without being charged with having some bias relative to the Soviet Government. During my service in Siberia, the Russian Far East was completely cut off from any part of Russia controlled by the Soviet Government. I, therefore, had no dealings with the Soviet Government or with any individual claiming to represent that Government.

The only Government with which I came in contact during my entire service in Siberia was the Kolchak Government, if that may be called a Government. Without the support of foreign troops, I doubt if Kolchak or his Government ever possessed sufficient strength to exercise sovereign powers. In what was known as the Inter-Allied Railroad Agreement, relating to the maintenance and operation of the railroads in Siberia, all nations with troops in Siberia recognized Kolchak as representing Russia, and this is as far as any recognition of the Kolchak Government ever extended. No nation ever recognized Kolchak as being the head of any *de facto* or *de jure* Government of Russia.

My principal reason for recording the facts and circumstances connected with intervention is the belief that there is an erroneous impression, not only in the United States but elsewhere, as to the orders under which American troops operated while in Siberia. Another reason for recording the facts is that an Englishman, Colonel John Ward, M.P., has written a book which gives and, in my judgment, is intended to give, erroneous impressions as to the conduct and faithful performance of duty of American troops in Siberia. This book can be found in American libraries, and I do not believe it is just to the Americans whom I had the honor to command, to let such unjust implications be handed down to posterity without refutation.

I have not written this book with the object of justifying any act of mine or of the American Military in Siberia. Indeed, the Secretary of War, Honorable Newton D. Baker, and the Chief of Staff, General Peyton C. March, who were in office during the entire period the American troops

were in Siberia, have, as shown by the following communications, made any justification superfluous by giving their generous and unstinted approval to the acts of the American Military. Under date of August 31, 1920, I received the following personal letter from the Secretary of War:

“I have just finished reading your comprehensive report of May 26, covering the operations of American Expeditionary Forces in Siberia, from July 1, 1919, to March 31, 1920. The Expedition having been completely withdrawn from Siberia, and its final operations now being a matter of record, I give myself the pleasure of congratulating you upon the tact, energy and success, with which you, as the Commanding General of this Expedition, uniformly acted.

“The instructions given you were to pursue the objects set forth in the Aide Memoire issued by the State Department, announcing to the world the purposes and limitations on the American use of troops in Siberia. In a vastly confused situation your duties were frequently delicate and difficult; because of the remoteness of your field of action from the United States, you were thrown completely upon your own resources and initiative, and because of the difficulties of communications and publicity, and particularly because of interested misrepresentations affecting conditions in Siberia, and the activities of your command, the situation was made more complex.


“You will be glad to know that from the beginning the War Department relied upon your judgment with complete confidence, and I am happy to be able at this time to assure you that your conduct throughout has the approval of the Department.”

The Chief of Staff, in his report to the Secretary of War for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1920, stated with reference to the Siberian Expedition:

“The situation which confronted the Commanding General, his subordinate commanders and troops was a peculiarly difficult and hazardous one. The manner in which this difficult and

arduous task was performed is worthy of the best traditions of the Army.”

W. S. G.



I

PURPOSE OF MILITARY INTERVENTION IN SIBERIA

On April 6, 1917, the date on which the United States entered the World War, I was on duty in the War Department, as Secretary of the General Staff. I was, at that time, Lieutenant Colonel, General Staff, and had been Secretary since August, 1914, and also had previously been Secretary, from January, 1911, to July, 1912.

In common with all officers of the War Department, I hoped to be relieved and given duty in France, but my request was disapproved by the Chief of Staff, Major General Hugh L. Scott. On September 22, 1917, General Scott reached the age where the law is mandatory that an Army officer pass from the active to the retired list of the Army, and General Tasker H. Bliss, who had been the Assistant Chief of Staff, took his place. General Bliss retired December 31, 1917, and Major General Peyton C. March soon thereafter became Chief of Staff. He was in France, when notified of his selection, and assumed his new duties about March 1, 1918.

As soon as General March arrived he told me that he wanted me to remain in my present duties for about four months and then he intended to permit me to go to France; but in May, 1918, he said, "If any one has to go to Russia, you're it." This remark rather stunned me, but as it was spoken of as only a possibility, I made no comment, as I knew General March was aware of my desire for service in Europe, and any opportunity I had to devote to anything other than the duties of my desk, was given to study of the conditions and operations in France. I had not even thought of the possibility of American troops being sent to Siberia, and after General March made this remark, I gave it very little consideration, because I did not believe any one would be selected to go.

The latter part of June, 1918, General March told me I was to be made a Major General, National Army, and that I could have the command of any Division in the United States, that did not have a permanent Commander. This made me feel quite sure that the idea of sending troops to Siberia had

been given up, or that I would not be sent, and the next morning I told him I would prefer the 8th Division at Camp Fremont, Palo Alto, California. He assented and soon thereafter my name was sent to the Senate for confirmation as Major General, National Army. I was confirmed on July 9, 1918, immediately told General March I wanted to join the Division to which I had been assigned, and on the 13th of July, I left Washington. I assumed command of the 8th Division on July 18, 1918, began familiarizing myself with my new duties, and felt very happy and contented as I knew the 8th Division was scheduled to leave for France in October.

On the afternoon of August 2, 1918, my Chief of Staff told me that a code message was received from Washington and the first sentence was —“You will not tell any member of your staff or anybody else of the contents of this message.” I asked the Chief of Staff who signed it and he said “Marshall.” I told the Chief of Staff Marshall had nothing to do with me and for him and the Assistant Chief of Staff to decode the message. The message directed me “to take the first and fastest train out of San Francisco and proceed to Kansas City, go to the Baltimore Hotel, and ask for the Secretary of War, and if he was not there, for me to wait until he arrived.” I look upon this telegram as one of the most remarkable communications I ever saw come out of the War Department, and if it had not been for the mistake that the designation for signature stood for Marshall instead of March, I would have been put in the embarrassing position of disobeying the order or leaving my station without telling anyone my authority for absence or my destination.

The telegram gave me no information as to why I had been summoned to Kansas City, the probable time of absence, or whether or not I would return. Some of this information seemed essential for my personal preparation. I did not know what clothing to take, and I was also in doubt as to whether the order meant a permanent change of station. I looked at a schedule, and found the Santa Fe train left San Francisco in two hours, so I put a few things in my traveling bag and a few more in a small trunk locker and started for San Francisco. I made the train, but could get no Pullman accommodations. On the way to Kansas City, I telegraphed Mr. Baker, Secretary of War, at the Baltimore Hotel telling him what train I was on. During the trip, I tried to figure out what this very secret mission could be,

and feared it meant Siberia, although I had seen nothing in the press indicating that the United States would possibly send troops to Russia.

When I arrived in Kansas City, about 10 P.M., a red cap man met me and told me Mr. Baker was waiting in a room in the station. As Mr. Baker's train was leaving very soon he at once said he was sorry he had to send me to Siberia. As always, he was very generous and expressed his regrets and said he knew I did not want to go and he might, some day, tell me why I had to go. He also wanted me to know that General March tried to get me out of the Siberian trip and wanted me to go to France. He said: "If in future you want to cuss anybody for sending you to Siberia I am the man." He had, by this time, handed me a sealed envelope, saying: "This contains the policy of the United States in Russia which you are to follow. Watch your step; you will be walking on eggs loaded with dynamite. God bless you and good-bye."

As soon as I could get to the hotel I opened the envelope and saw it was a paper of seven pages, headed "Aide Memoire" without any signature, but at the end appeared, "Department of State, Washington, July 17, 1918." After carefully reading the document and feeling that I understood the policy, I went to bed, but I could not sleep and I kept wondering what other nations were doing and why I was not given some information about what was going on in Siberia. The following day I read this document several times and tried to analyze and get the meaning of each and every sentence. I felt there could be no misunderstanding the policy of the United States, and I did not feel it was necessary for me to ask for elucidation of any point. The policy as given to me was as follows:

AIDE MEMOIRE

The whole heart of the people of the United States is in the winning of this war. The controlling purpose of the Government of the United States is to do everything that is necessary and effective to win it. It wishes to cooperate in every practicable way with the allied governments, and to cooperate ungrudgingly; for it has no ends of its own to serve and believes that the war can be won only by common council and intimate concert of action. It has sought to study every proposed policy or action in which its

cooperation has been asked in this spirit, and states the following conclusions in the confidence, that if it finds itself obliged to decline participation in any undertaking or course of action, it will be understood that it does so only because it deems itself precluded from participating by imperative considerations either of policy or fact.

In full agreement with the Allied Governments and upon the unanimous advice of the Supreme War Council, the Government of the United States adopted, upon its entrance into the war, a plan for taking part in the fighting on the western front into which all its resources of men and material were to be put, and put as rapidly as possible, and it has carried out this plan with energy and success, pressing its execution more and more rapidly forward and literally putting into it the entire energy and executive force of the nation. This was its response, its very willing and hearty response, to what was the unhesitating judgment alike of its own military advisers and of the advisers of the allied governments. It is now considering, at the suggestion of the Supreme War Council, the possibility of making very considerable additions even to this immense programme which, if they should prove feasible at all, will tax the industrial processes of the United States and the shipping facilities of the whole group of associated nations to the utmost. It has thus concentrated all its plans and all its resources upon this single absolutely necessary object.

In such circumstances it feels it to be its duty to say that it cannot, so long as the military situation on the western front remains critical, consent to break or slacken the force of its present effort by diverting any part of its military force to other points or objectives. The United States is at a great distance from the field of action on the western front; it is at a much greater distance from any other field of action. The instrumentalities by which it is to handle its armies and its stores have at great cost and with great difficulty been created in France. They do not exist elsewhere. It is practicable for her to do a great deal in France; it is not practicable for her to do anything of importance or on a

large scale upon any other field. The American Government, therefore, very respectfully requested its Associates to accept its deliberate judgment that it should not dissipate its force by attempting important operations elsewhere.

It regards the Italian front as closely coordinated with the western front, however, and is willing to divert a portion of its military forces from France to Italy if it is the judgment and wish of the Supreme Command that it should do so. It wishes to defer to the decision of the Commander-in-Chief in this matter, as it would wish to defer in all others, particularly because it considers these two fronts so related as to be practically but separate parts of a single line and because it would be necessary that any American troops sent to Italy should be subtracted from the number used in France and be actually transported across French territory from the ports now used by armies of the United States.

It is the clear and fixed judgment of the Government of the United States, arrived at after repeated and very searching reconsiderations of the whole situation in Russia, that military intervention there would add to the present sad confusion in Russia rather than cure it, injure her rather than help her, and that it would be of no advantage in the prosecution of our main design, to win the war against Germany. It cannot, therefore, take part in such intervention or sanction it in principle. Military intervention would, in its judgment, even supposing it to be efficacious in its immediate avowed object of delivering an attack upon Germany from the east, be merely a method of making use of Russia, not a method of serving her. Her people could not profit by it, if they profited by it at all, in time to save them from their present distresses, and their substance would be used to maintain foreign armies, not to reconstitute their own. Military action is admissible in Russia, as the Government of the United States sees the circumstances, only to help the Czecho-Slovaks consolidate their forces and get into successful cooperation with their Slavic kinsmen and to steady any efforts at self-government or self-defense in which the Russians themselves may be willing to accept assistance. Whether from Vladivostok or from

Murmansk and Archangel, the only legitimate object for which American or allied troops can be employed, it submits, is to guard military stores which may subsequently be needed by Russian forces and to render such aid as may be acceptable to the Russians in the organization of their own self-defense. For helping the Czecho-Slovaks there is immediate necessity and sufficient justification. Recent developments have made it evident that that is in the interest of what the Russian people themselves desire, and the Government of the United States is glad to contribute the small force at its disposal for that purpose. It yields, also, to the judgment of the Supreme Command in the matter of establishing a small force at Murmansk, to guard the military stores at Kola and to make it safe for Russian forces to come together in organized bodies in the north. But it owes it to frank counsel to say that it can go no further than these modest and experimental plans. It is not in a position, and has no expectation of being in a position, to take part in organized intervention in adequate force from either Vladivostok or Murmansk and Archangel. It feels that it ought to add, also, that it will feel at liberty to use the few troops it can spare only for the purposes here stated and shall feel obliged to withdraw these forces, in order to add them to the forces at the western front, if the plans in whose execution it is now intended that they should develop into others inconsistent with the policy to which the Government of the United States feels constrained to restrict itself.

At the same time the Government of the United States wishes to say with the utmost cordiality and good will that none of the conclusions here stated is meant to wear the least color of criticism of what the other governments associated against Germany may think it wise to undertake. It wishes in no way to embarrass their choices of policy. All that is intended here is a perfectly frank and definite statement of the policy which the United States feels obliged to adopt for herself and in the use of her own military forces. The Government of the United States does not wish it to be understood that in so restricting its own

activities it is seeking, even by implication, to set limits to the action or to define the policies of its Associates.

It hopes to carry out the plans for safeguarding the rear of the Czecho-Slovaks operating from Vladivostok in a way that will place it and keep it in close cooperation with a small military force like its own from Japan, and if necessary from the other Allies, and that will assure it of the cordial accord of all the allied powers; and it proposes to ask all associated in this course of action to unite in assuring the people of Russia in the most public and solemn manner that none of the governments uniting in action either in Siberia or in northern Russia contemplates any interference of any kind with the political sovereignty of Russia, any intervention in her internal affairs, or any impairment of her territorial integrity either now or hereafter, but that each of the associated powers has the single object of affording such aid as shall be acceptable, and only such aid as shall be acceptable, to the Russian people in their endeavor to regain control of their own affairs, their own territory, and their own destiny.

It is the hope and purpose of the Government of the United States to take advantage of the earliest opportunity to send to Siberia a commission of merchants, agricultural experts, labor advisers, Red Cross Representatives, and agents of the Young Men's Christian Association accustomed to organizing the best methods of spreading useful information and rendering educational help of a modest sort, in order in some systematic manner to relieve the immediate economic necessities of the people there in every way for which opportunity may open. The execution of this plan will follow and will not be permitted to embarrass the military assistance rendered in the rear of the westward-moving forces of the Czecho-Slovaks.

*Department of State,
Washington, July 17, 1918.*

The following part of the policy will bear repeating as it governed the American troops during our entire nineteen months in Siberia; viz., the

solemn assurance to the people of Russia, in the most public and solemn manner, that none of the Governments uniting in action in either Siberia or in Northern Russia contemplates any interference of any kind with the political sovereignty of Russia, any intervention in her internal affairs. . . .

This clearly committed the agents of the United States to a specific line of action as long as this solemn assurance held good and one of these two questions or both came up in the consideration of practically every dealing I had with the different Russian factions. These assurances of our Government were always brought to the forefront in the consideration of all controversial questions with other nations. In fact they entered into the consideration of all controversial questions in Siberia.

In order to give proper consideration to any history of the Siberian Expedition it is necessary briefly to summarize the conditions in Russia which led to the decision for Allied intervention.

With the fall of the Romanoff dynasty in March, 1917, the Russian people, so long oppressed and suppressed by their Government, showed little interest in the continuation of the War. Russian soldiers under the corrupt leadership of the Czarists had suffered greater hardships and privations than those of any nation, had lost more in killed and wounded, and were weary of the horrors of War which they had experienced in such measure.

Although the revolutionary spirit had long been alive in Russia, the War greatly accelerated the disintegration of the Czarist regime and with the final collapse grave anxiety was felt by the Allies as to the result of this debacle on the outcome of the struggle.

The usual line of propaganda given out by the Allies as to the imminence of autocracy and the loss of "Self Determination of Government" in case the Central Powers were successful, could not be used in Russia before the Revolution as the Czar's Government was the most autocratic in the world.

After March, 1917, this propaganda was partly successful for a short time among intellectuals but ordinary people could not have been induced

to continue the struggle unless the War was regarded by them as a revolutionary conflict which was not the case.

The revolutionary movement in Russia, which started in the first quarter of the nineteenth century, culminated in the revolutions of 1905 and 1917, with the opposition to the Czarist Government widespread, including even a part of the propertied classes.

The peasant had been kept in ignorance and poverty by the landed nobility and the worker mercilessly exploited. Naturally, under these circumstances, the most influential groups with the mass of the people were the various socialist parties, that showed an interest in improving their lot as most of these parties demanded free land for the peasants, and improved conditions for the workers. The advocates of these changes in the Government had been compelled to work in foreign countries, or under cover in Russia, but apparently had had greater success in instilling their socialistic ideas in the minds of the bulk of the Russian people than the world realized.

The Government established after the downfall of the Czar, known as the Kerensky Government, was liberal and democratic and very popular in the beginning, but due to delay in the solution of the land problem, so important to the Russian peasants, and to the announcements that this Government intended to continue in the War, it became less and less in favor until it was easily overthrown by the socialists of the extreme left, the Bolsheviks.

The initial anxiety of the Allied representatives was somewhat ameliorated by the announcement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Kerensky Government, on March 18, which read:

Faithful to the pact which unites her indissolubly to her glorious Allies, Russia is resolved like them to fight against the common enemy until the end without cessation and without faltering.^[1]

This statement of the New Government of Russia was consoling, but the Allied representatives began preparing for eventualities, as the workers and soldiers began to assert themselves.

On March 22, 1917, the United States extended recognition to the Kerensky Government, and a mission composed of prominent Americans, headed by Elihu Root, was sent to Russia for the announced purpose of discussing “the best and most practical means of cooperation between the two peoples in carrying the present struggle for the freedom of all the peoples to a successful consummation.”

Mr. Root, as head of the American mission, assured the representatives of the New Provisional Government of Russia, that that Government could count on the steadfast friendship of the United States. Other Allied Governments, as well as the United States, were trying to show their friendship for the New Provisional Government of Russia, but subsequent events have shown that these representations were of little avail as they were too conservative for the revolutionary agitators.

The more radicalism appearing in the Russian ranks, the greater the anxiety felt by the Allies and the United States.

The most important feature of the situation was the demoralization of the Army and the entire economic life of the Country which was clearly shown by the appeal of Prince G. E. Lvov, Prime Minister of Russia, who stated on April 9, 1917:

Citizens: The Provisional Government, having considered the military situation of the Russian State, and being conscious of its duty to the Country, has resolved to tell the people directly and openly the whole truth. The overthrown government has left the defense of the Country in an utterly disorganized condition. By its criminal inactivity and inefficient methods, it disorganized our finances, food supply, transportation, and the supply of the Army. It has undermined our economic organization.^[2]

More than six months later on November 1, 1917, when rumors were current that Russia had withdrawn from the War, Kerensky gave a desperate picture of the situation in an interview with the representative of the Associated Press, in part as follows:

“Russia has fought consistently since the beginning. She saved France and England from disaster early in the War. She is worn out by the strain and claims as her right that the Allies now shoulder the burden.”

The correspondent called attention to widely contradictory reports on Russian conditions, and asked the Premier for a frank statement of the facts.

“It has been said by travelers returning from England and elsewhere to America that opinion among the people, not officially but generally, is that Russia is virtually out of the War.”

“Is Russia out of the War?” Kerensky repeated the words and laughed. “That,” he answered, “is a ridiculous question. Russia is taking an enormous part in the War. One has only to remember history. Russia began the War for the Allies. While she was already fighting, England was only preparing and America was only observing.

“Russia at the beginning bore the whole brunt of the fighting thereby saving Great Britain and France. People who say she is out of the War have short memories. We have fought since the beginning and have the right to claim that the Allies now take the heaviest part of the burden on their shoulders.” . . .

The Premier was asked regarding the morale of the Russian People and Army. He answered:

“The masses are worn out economically. The disorganized state of life in general has had a psychological effect on the people. They doubt the possibility of attaining their hopes.”^[3]

This interview which took place six days before the November (Bolshevik) revolution clearly demonstrated the condition of affairs. Although Kerensky stressed the past and avoided the future, his meaning was clear and the impossibility of continuing the War stood out without question. It was fast becoming only a matter of weeks.

On November 7, 1917, the New Provisional Government was overthrown by the Bolsheviks, under the slogan, “All power to the Soviets,” and immediate peace.

On the 9th of November, 1917, the Soviet representatives proposed to all peoples engaged in the War that negotiations be begun for a just and democratic peace.^[4] This proposal, coupled with the radical ideas of the Soviet adherents, presented serious problems for the consideration of Allied and associated representatives. The Russian question had already extended beyond the question of the prosecution of the War. The interests of England and Japan, in the Far East, were likely to be jeopardized by the spread of such radical ideas of Government as were held by the Soviets, while France was very antagonistic and much opposed to the proposal for peace.

This appeal for a “just and democratic peace” resulted in charges, by those opposed to peace on the terms obtainable at that time, that the proposal of the Soviets was not made in good faith, although the announced statements as to their ideas, and their questions as to what help the Allies would give them, in case they refused to sign the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, justified the belief that they were sincere in their proposal. The socialistic ideas of Government, held by the Soviets, were so objectionable to the Allies that it was unreasonable to expect them to work in harmony, even upon such an important question as the continuation of the War.

On the 23rd of November, the Allied Military Attachés, at the Russian Staff, sent the following communication to the Russian Military Commander:

The Chiefs of the Military Missions accredited to the Russian Supreme Command, acting on the basis of definite instructions received from their Governments through the plenipotentiary representatives in Petrograd, have the honor to state a most energetic protest to the Russian Supreme Command against the violations of the terms of the treaty of the 5th of September, 1914, made by the Allied powers, by which treaty the Allies, including Russia, solemnly agreed not to make a separate peace, nor to cease military activity.^[5]

On November 27, 1917, the Military Attaché of the United States, made a similar protest to the Russian Commander.

On December 1, 1917, Mr. Trotsky, at that time People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs, issued a statement that the Soviet Government would not tolerate any military representatives of other Governments sending communications to the Military Commander of the Russian Forces, who by this time had been removed from his Command.

On January 8, 1916, in an address to Congress, President Wilson said:

“Whether their present leaders believe it or not, it is our heartfelt desire and hope that some way may be opened whereby we may be privileged to assist the people of Russia to attain their utmost hope of liberty and ordered peace.” This was the expression of the well-known views of President Wilson. He was opposed to autocracy and to oppression of the people by any Government.

The Government representatives of England, France, and Japan did not have the same ideas as President Wilson as to “self-determination” of peoples as to the forms of their own Governments. Their ideas were accentuated when it came to considering the Soviet Government, because of the fear of radicalism in European countries and especially in the Far East. These different views of Government naturally caused radical divergence in the policies proposed by the four powers chiefly interested in the Far East: viz., United States, England, France, and Japan, when it came to formulating plans to repair the damage due to the withdrawal of the Russian troops from the Eastern front. The four powers, above mentioned, had to depend upon their respective representatives on the ground for information as to conditions, and these representatives, as well as the leaders, had their own ideas as to forms of Government.

General Alfred Knox, British Army, undoubtedly had much influence in shaping the British policy in Russia. He had served as Military Attaché in Petrograd during the Czarist regime; he spoke Russian, and was personally known to many of the former Czarist officials; he was naturally autocratic and could not, if he had desired to do so, give sympathetic consideration to the aspirations of the peasant class in Russia, whom he characterized as swine.

The Czarist Russian Army and Navy officers were naturally very antagonistic to the Soviets and were favorable to any proposition that gave promise of keeping them in their old positions.

These people had convinced General Knox, and I think he was honest in his views, that if the Allies would arm, equip, pay, clothe, and feed a Russian force, the Eastern front could be formed of Russian volunteers. This Eastern Army was to be commanded by Allied and Russian officers, and General Knox thought only a few Allied officers would be necessary. The French were favorable to any proposition that gave promise of keeping the German troops on the Eastern front and thereby relieve the anticipated pressure of the Central Powers on the Western front.

The Japanese were naturally much interested in the Far East but their enthusiasm did not extend beyond Lake Baikal, while the United States did not consider the proposition to form an Eastern front from Russian volunteers a practical one. The objection was based on the long line of communications from a base on the Pacific or on the Arctic oceans to the Eastern front; and on the fear that the Russians would believe, or that the Germans would convince them, that the Allies would never leave their country. If the Russians should believe that the Allies, or any of them, intended to annex any part of their territory, there would be grave danger that their sympathy for the Allied Cause would be changed to sympathy for the Central Powers. The United States Government expressed great compassion for the Russian people who had suffered so much for the Allied Cause, and seemed desirous of aiding them, but was unwilling to take any drastic action, like the proposal to form an Eastern front, because this step was designed to use the Russian people rather than to aid them. Also, if the formation of an Eastern front involved America in providing men or material, it would have been necessary to change the plans formulated, as soon as practicable after we entered the War, and divide our efforts which did not appear to be in the interest of the Allied Cause. An Eastern front involved the expenditure of a great deal of money and could not be very well carried out without the approval and assistance of the United States.

As soon as Japan, France, and England were convinced that the United States would not take part in military intervention in Russia, other plans were tried which it was hoped would culminate in the same result.

It is significant that the British advocacy of the use of troops, always carried with it the cooperation of their Allies, the Japanese. In March the British proposed that Japan send troops as far as the Ural Mountains, and Great Britain expressed a willingness for Japan to be compensated for this move at the expense of Russia. There was some fear in Allied Councils, that if Japan went alone into Russia it might cause more harm than good, as the scars left by the Russo-Japanese War had not entirely disappeared.

Japan was willing to occupy Vladivostok, the Chinese Eastern, and the Amur railways and again there was fear that the Russians would construe this action as an effort by Japan to take part of Siberia. There seemed to be always present some fear or mistrust of supposed friends, when any action with reference to Russia was proposed, and it was evident the suspicions extended beyond the period of War.

With reference to Japan entering Siberia, Colonel R. H. Bruce Lockhart, on March 5, 1918, cabled the British Foreign Office from Moscow, in part, as follows:

1. “. . . If, however, the allies are to allow Japan to enter Siberia, the whole position is hopeless. Every class of Russian will prefer the Germans to the Japanese. . . .”

“I feel sure that you can have no idea of the feeling which Japanese intervention would arouse. Even the Cadet Press, which can not be accused of Bolshevik sympathies, is loud in its denunciation of this crime against Russia, and is now preaching support of any party that will oppose Germany and save the revolution. . . . And now when Germany’s aims have been unmasked to the whole world, the Allies are to nullify the benefits of this by allowing the Japanese to enter Russia. . . .”^[6]

The American Ambassador to Russia, Mr. Francis, was also much exercised about the Japanese intervention in Siberia, and on March 9, 1918, he cabled to the State Department at Washington, in part:

2. “. . . Moscow and Petrograd Soviets have both instructed their delegates to the conference of March 12th, to support the

ratification of the peace terms. I fear that such action is the result of a threatened Japanese invasion of Siberia. . . . Trotsky told Robins that he had heard such an invasion was countenanced by the Allies and especially by America, and it would not only force the Government to advocate the ratification of the humiliating peace but would so completely estrange all factions in Russia that further resistance to Germany would be absolutely impossible. . . .”

In the Congressional Record, June 29, 1919, p. 2336, appears a copy of a note from the Soviet Government given by Trotsky to Colonel Robins for transmission to the American Government. In this note, dated March 5, 1918, appears, in part:

“In case (a) the all Russian Congress of the Soviets will refuse to ratify the peace treaty with Germany or (b) if the German Government, breaking the peace treaty, will renew the offensive in order to continue its robbers’ raid. . . .

“(1) Can the Soviet Government rely on the support of the United States of North America, Great Britain, and France in its Struggle against Germany?

(2) What kind of support could be furnished in the nearest future, and on what conditions—Military equipment, transportation supplies, living necessities?

(3) What kind of support could be furnished particularly and especially by the United States? . . .”

I have no information as to what reply, if any, the United States made to these queries. The flames of hatred and suspicion were so strong at this time, that there was little hope of giving full credence to the sincerity of the question asked by Trotsky, the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

For six months prior to the dispatch of American troops to Siberia, England, France, and Japan applied such pressure, as they could, upon the United States, to consent to some form of military intervention in Siberia. This pressure was applied through the Supreme War Council, through

diplomatic channels, and such agencies as were available for propaganda. The Supreme War Council wanted troops for use in Russia, in fighting Bolsheviks. This is shown by the following quotation from one of General Pershing's articles, in which he says:

“The Supreme War Council was prone to listen to suggestions for the use of Allied troops at various places, other than the Western front. One of these, in which the British seemed to be especially insistent, was to send troops to help the so-called White Army in Russia to keep open the communication through Murmansk in the Archangel” (*Washington Evening Star*, March 7, 1931).

The contention that probably had more to do with sending troops to Siberia than all others was the claim that the Soviets had released all German and Austrian prisoners who had been captured and confined in Siberia, and that these prisoners were being organized into military units with the object of taking the military supplies at Vladivostok, and then the Trans-Siberian Railway. This move, if successful, would not only give the Germans the large quantities of munitions, rubber, cotton, railway materials, and many other articles very valuable as war material, but would give them access to the wheat fields of Siberia.

Evidently the United States questioned the accuracy of these reports, as Mr. Francis, acting through Colonel Robins, his representative in Moscow, asked Trotsky as to the truth of the reports. Colonel Robins told Mr. Francis that Trotsky suggested that the United States send responsible men as far east as Irkutsk, to make their own investigation. He offered to send a Soviet official with them and to insure them every opportunity to make the investigation.

As the result of this interview, Mr. Webster, a representative of the American Red Cross in Moscow, and Captain Hicks, of the British Army, left Moscow March 19, 1918, to make the investigation. At the same time, the United States sent Major Walter Drysdale, United States Military Attaché, in Peking, to the eastern part of Siberia, to make an investigation of the prison camps in the East. On March 31, 1918, Webster and Hicks having made their examination, and having conferred with Major Drysdale,

as to conditions in the eastern prison camps, made the following telegraphic report from Irkutsk:

“Had a long interview Irkutsk Soviet today including Yanson . . . Sternberg and others all of whom were very friendly. They gave us full facts which confirmed our information and which we believe to be true. There are in all Siberia not over twelve hundred armed prisoners, most of whom are from Omsk. . . . They are being used for guarding other prisoners and especially German officers in whom Soviet places no confidence. . . . The Soviet states that they would not think of placing arms at the disposal of prisoners who would take up cause against them when their cause is so categorically opposite to their own. The Soviet further gave us their official guarantee that no more than a maximum of fifteen hundred prisoners will be armed in the whole of Siberia. . . . They also stated that they would have no objections to the Senior Consuls of the Allies in Siberia having the right of free investigation and, at all times, to check the maintenance and integrity of the limitations.”^[7]

Webster and Hicks, on April 1, 1918, telegraphed with reference to the prison camps to the British Mission, Moscow:

“We have just visited the large war prisoners’ camp outside Irkutsk where we were given every facility to see everything and talk with the prisoners. . . . We saw the senior officer prisoners, and several leading soldiers with whom we held long conversations. We, in all cases, asked the following questions: First, is there any pressure put on you to join the Red Guard or Socialists? Answers—none at all. Second, How do you regard any of your commanders who express Bolshevik sympathies? Answer—With very strong disapproval. . . . Fourth, Are any of your fellow prisoners armed? Answer—About seven, who help to guard the prison supply depot . . .”^[8]

After an investigation by Major Drysdale, he reported that the Soviets did not release their German war prisoners from the prison camps, and that

the rumor that the Germans were forming a battle front in Siberia was propaganda designed to influence the United States in the question of military action.

It is difficult to understand why the United States sent representatives to get certain specific information about war prisoners, and then decided to send troops to Siberia to frustrate any action taken by organizations of German and Austrian war prisoners which United States representatives said did not exist. Subsequent events have shown that the information furnished the United States Government by these investigators was absolutely correct. Siberia was a great field for propaganda and even Consular Agents of the various Governments had great trouble to know what credence to give reports they received. In this vast country, with limited means of obtaining information, it was a difficult problem to check the accuracy of information.

France, from the moment the Bolsheviks suggested peace with the Central Powers, became the implacable enemy of the Soviets. The French representatives, after signing the agreement with the representatives of the Russian Government to continue to fight together until there was a successful termination of the war, felt there was a base betrayal of her interests, by Russia in proposing peace without consultation with her Allies, and Mr. Clemenceau went so far as to characterize the action as treason to France.

England's past affiliations with Czarist Russia had not been very agreeable, but the chances for the material advancement of England were better with the old Czarist officials than with the Soviets, and it was evident to the Allied representatives, at this time, that any Government in Russia, established by the people of Russia, would necessarily be socialistic.

Bearing upon the subject of intervention in Russia, Dr. Leonid I. Strakhovsky, in an article appearing in *Current History*, March, 1931, states:

“In these circumstances the Allied Governments were ready to undertake Military intervention in Russia; this is the reason given to explain and justify the policy of the Allies—But there was another reason for this step, a reason that has existed all

through the nineteenth century, Great Britain's fear of the rising power of Russia as manifested in the Russian penetration of Central Asia, and in Russian expansion in the East. France, on the other hand, looked for material economic advantages, where Great Britain mainly pursued a political aim, although the British were not likely to overlook economic possibilities. France and Great Britain came to an understanding and agreed to an actual dismemberment of Russia in L'Accord France-Anglais du 23 December, 1917, definissant les zones d'action française et anglaise."

Dr. Strakhovsky cites as his authority for this statement, the writings of General Denikin and Winston Churchill. As he is at present a professor at Georgetown University and fought with the French and Wrangel in 1918-20 against the Bolsheviks, it can not be charged that his article was written in the interest of the Soviet Government.

England's interest in India could not be entirely ignored, and from her point of view, it was desirable to keep the socialistic ideas of Government, advocated by the Soviets, from reaching India.

As soon as it became apparent that Russia could not be depended upon to supply men or materials for the Allies on the Eastern front, England began using every means available to frustrate Germany in an anticipated attempt to send troops from the East to the West front, and also to prevent Germany from getting access to the Siberian resources. These two reasons were the ones assigned by England for her advocacy of military intervention in Siberia.

The propaganda, as to the deleterious effects of bolshevism, had not taken such roots at that time in the United States as to warrant England in stressing that phase of her desires for military intervention in Russia, but she could and did stress the necessity for the protection of military stores in Archangel and Vladivostok, and for helping the Czechs.

Japan was willing to help the Czechs, protect any property, and guard the railroads east of Lake Baikal, but was not willing to send her troops west of Lake Baikal and especially if she was to bear the expense of any such movement.

The actions of the representatives of England, France, and Japan in subsequent operations in Siberia showed conclusively that the fear of radicalism, known as bolshevism, was not a minor consideration in their efforts to secure agreements as to military intervention in Siberia.

The records show that President Wilson, about March 15, 1918, sent a cable to the All Russian Congress of Soviets, which stated, in part:

“The whole heart of the people of the United States is with the people of Russia in the attempt to free themselves forever from autocratic government and become the masters of their own life.”^[9] This communication indicates that President Wilson cherished a hope that the Soviets would discard their socialistic ideas, join the United States and the Allies, and all work for a liberal and democratic Government for Russia. It is manifest that the Soviets could not have been induced, at this time, to listen to any suggestions as to changes in their plans of Government for Russia.

This statement was made more than four months after the overthrow of the Kerensky Government by the Soviets, and was in accordance with the well-known views of President Wilson as to representative Government. Subsequent events have shown that these views of the President were not shared by all the representatives of the United States in Siberia. At practically the same time that President Wilson was expressing the views above referred to, and was forcefully resisting the Allies in their efforts to induce the United States to agree to military intervention in Siberia, Mr. Francis, the American Ambassador to Russia, stated that the reports of Mr. MacGowan, American Consul at Irkutsk, indicated Germans preparing to take the Siberian railway.

March 22, 1918, Mr. Francis also stated:

“My advices from MacGowan and other reliable sources charge Sternberg, who is a pro-German-Swede, with aiding and directing organization and arming prisoners. Recently, MacGowan wires, that uniforms of German officers are only partly concealed by Russian overcoats.”

On March 25, 1918, Mr. Francis wired Colonel Robins, Red Cross, at Moscow:

“ . . . Cable which is in my private code, indicates Department has heard that Soviet leaders acting under direction of German General Staff . . .

Mr. Robins, in reply to this, stated:

“Regard suggestion of German control Soviet Government as absurd and impossible. If Washington credits this contention, why are we wasting time here?”

On April 6, 1918, Mr. Robins wired Mr. Francis, in part:

“Soviet Government believes America can prevent hostile intervention, and if Japan advances, it means that America has consented.”

On March 15, 1918, Mr. MacGowan, Irkutsk, wired Mr. Francis, in code:

“Train-load prisoners passed Eastward twelfth, with dozen machine guns, is stated, and two thousand stopped here. There is concurrent testimony that 3- and 6-inch guns are arriving, two of latter already commanding railway bridge and station. In daily machine-gun practice cadet school. Informant, hitherto reliable, states German Major Generals, even other officers, (omission) over thirty prisoners arrived and general staff expected from Petrograd to direct destruction of bridges, tunnels, and execute plan defenses. German, Turkish, and Austrian officers at times throng station and streets with insignia of rank visible beneath Russian military overcoats. Every prisoner whether at large or in camp has rifle.”^[10]

Subsequent events have shown that these supposed facts reported to Mr. Francis by Mr. MacGowan were someone's imagination. But the object of these reports is, however, perfectly clear. The representatives of England, France, and Japan had found in Mr. MacGowan a ready and willing listener to reports as to the danger to be expected from the German and Austrian prisoners who were confined in Siberia.

During the Spring of 1918, while the Allied Governments and the United States were considering the question of military intervention in Russia, England and France had shown, by their support of certain factions in South Russia, that they were not averse to taking sides in the internal affairs of the Russian people.

At this time England and Japan were supporting the Cossack bandit leader Semenov, who claimed to be fighting bolshevism.

It has always been difficult for me, and I believe it is difficult for American readers, to understand why the United States ever acceded to the desires of England, France, and Japan to send United States troops to Siberia. It should, however, be remembered that President Wilson was bombarded from all sources with information purporting to give facts. All reports emanating from representatives of England, France, and Japan, and from some of the representatives of the United States, notably Consul MacGowan, indicated that some steps were necessary in Siberia, in order to protect the interest of the Allied Cause. In political and financial questions alone, President Wilson would probably have remained steadfast against the appeals of the Allies, but in a military question, such as sending troops to Siberia, it would have been difficult for him to justify insisting upon putting his judgment against that of all the Allies.

In times of stress, such as exist in War, there are always false and exaggerated reports received at all Headquarters, and the difficulty experienced is to properly evaluate these reports. Mr. MacGowan, however, was making reports from Irkutsk, as to what was taking place there, and should have been able to ascertain the truth about prisoners and German General Staff officers who, according to his report, made very little or no effort to conceal their identity. As these prisoners and Germans were not in Irkutsk, as reported by Mr. MacGowan, I am forced to the conclusion that he was desirous of getting information that would justify his reports to the State Department. His consular associates from other countries were all interested in making him believe there was a menace from these war prisoners, so all information given Mr. MacGowan naturally would be calculated to form the impressions the Allied representatives desired.

- [1] *Current History*, Vol. V. Part 1, page 13.
- [2] *Documents of Russian History*, 1914-1917, by Frank A. Golder, Stanford University, the Century Company. Pages 329-330.
- [3] Russian-American Relations, March, 1917—March, 1920. Pages 39-40.
- [4] Such a peace the Government considers to be an immediate peace without annexations (i. e. without seize of foreign territory, without the forcible annexation of foreign nationalities) and without indemnities.
- [5] Russian-American Relations—March, 1917-March, 1920.
- [6] Russian-American Relations—March, 1917-March, 1920, p. 82.
- [7] Russian-American Regulations, March, 1917-March, 1920.
- [8] Russian-American Regulations, March, 1917-March, 1920.
- [9] *New York Times Current History*, Vol. VIII, Part 1, page 49.
- [10] Russian-American Relations.

II

AID TO THE CZECHS

The War Department, on August 3, 1918, cabled the Commanding General of the Philippines to send by the first available United States Transports the following troops for duty in Siberia: The 27th and 31st Infantry Regiments, one field hospital, one ambulance company, and Company "D" 53rd Telegraph Battalion, including clothing for winter service as far as practicable. The necessary subsistence and other supplies were to be furnished from stores in Manila until the Service of Supply could be established direct from San Francisco to Vladivostok.

I was informed of these orders on the same date and directed to forward to Vladivostok five thousand men from the 8th Division at Camp Fremont. In the selection of these men the following instructions were given:

"The men should be strong, hardy, fit for service intended, and should represent all parts of the United States; it being desired that they should not contain a large proportion of men from the Pacific Coast States."

These men were to fill the two regiments from the Philippines to war strength. I was authorized to confer with the Commanding General of the Philippines relative to officers for duty on my staff or I could, if desired, take officers of my staff at Camp Fremont.

The question of clothing and supply gave me great concern. I knew nothing of the probable duty these troops would be called upon to perform; I knew nothing about what buildings, if any, I could get to house the men after arriving in Siberia; and, in addition, I pictured Siberia as a cold, barren, and desolate country.

By the time I returned from Kansas City, Brigadier General J. D. Leitch, who was in command at Camp Fremont, had received the orders relative to the movement of troops and had energetically begun preparation for the

transfer. About all I had to do relative to the movement was to check up the arrangements, make some personal preparations, and on August 11, 1918, I notified the War Department that all was in readiness for the move.

After conferring with General C. A. Devol, in charge of Quartermasters work in San Francisco, I telegraphed the War Department asking for authority to call on him direct for supplies. The War Department approved my request and this cut out the Quartermaster General's office in Washington, which, naturally, was principally occupied with supplying the American troops in France. Later, I was very thankful for this arrangement, as it provided for direct dealing which was in the interest of prompt supply.

At this point I desire to express the gratitude of the entire command as well as my personal thanks to Mrs. Stern of Menlo Park, California, for the many articles sent to the command, such as fruit and candy, as well as many other articles which only a discriminating and intelligent woman could select. At Christmas every enlisted man in the command, due to her kindness, had two oranges which, in far away Siberia, was a treat that I am sure we will always gratefully remember.

On August 13, the War Department authorized me and my staff to sail from San Francisco on the Transport Thomas, which carried 40 officers and 1,889 enlisted men. On August 14, we left Camp Fremont, California, on two special trains at 12:30 and 12:35 P.M., and embarked at 2:30 P.M., but the shipping authorities would not permit sailing until after dark, so we did not leave the harbor until 8:30 at night. Some other agency of the Government evidently thought the world should know of this movement of American soldiers, as the searchlight was turned on the Thomas and kept there until we passed through Golden Gate. To provide protection from German submarines or some other reasons of safety which were unknown to me, we were being escorted by the old U. S. Battleship Oregon and the U. S. Gunboat Vicksburg. The Transport Thomas was not known as a ship likely to break any speed records, but it was certainly faster than the Oregon and Vicksburg. I was not informed as to how long we were to be protected by these Naval vessels, but by noon on August 15 I became a little impatient at having to stop and wait for our escort, so I directed that we wave good-bye and steam full speed ahead for Vladivostok.

As one of the announced principal reasons for sending troops to Siberia was “to help the Czecho-Slovaks consolidate their forces and to get into successful cooperation with their Slavic kinsmen” it is quite interesting to analyze the situation of the Czechs at the date my orders were written, July 17, 1918. It should be remembered that the main reason advanced by those interested in military intervention in Siberia, was the immediate and urgent need for protection of the Czechs who were supposed to be trying to get through Siberia to Vladivostok and then to the Western front where they could join the Allies.

On April 26, 1918, Mr. John F. Stevens, head of the Russian Railway Commission, received from the State Department a telegram as follows:

“Ambassador (Mr. Francis) Vologda recommended that Emerson be sent immediately with two to five Engineers to Vologda to confer about transportation. . . . Department approves.”

The Emerson referred to was Colonel George H. Emerson, Mr. Stevens’ first Assistant in the Russian Railway Service Corps, which will be referred to in a later chapter.

Colonel Emerson and party left Harbin on May 4, 1918 for Vladivostok, to make arrangements for transportation. On the 6th, he explained his orders to the American Consul at Vladivostok and to Admiral Austin M. Knight, commanding the Asiatic fleet. Both Mr. Caldwell and Admiral Knight stated they knew of no arrangements for a train for Colonel Emerson and suggested, that as they had no dealings with the Soviet at Vladivostok who were then in charge of Governmental affairs, that Colonel Emerson deal direct with local authorities about his transportation. This is the first time I can find any record of the official representatives of the United States having received instructions not to deal with the Soviets, and I assume, of course, the American Consul at Vladivostok was acting under instructions of his Government.

On May 9, Colonel Emerson met the Soviet representatives of the railroad and informed them of his instructions to go to Vologda and asked them to provide the necessary railroad equipment. The railroad officials

said they would immediately take the necessary measures so they could get started. The Soviet representatives stated to Colonel Emerson that they had found they were unable to carry on the immediate work of conducting transportation efficiently and they hoped America would soon be in a position to assist; that what they needed were men to properly organize and direct the work.

At this time Colonel Emerson says he found at Vladivostok “a large number of Czech troops of the 5th and 8th regiments and were informed there were some eight thousand located in barracks.”

The Chinese Eastern Railway representatives at Vladivostok would not cooperate in getting transportation and insisted that none of their equipment be taken. Colonel Emerson notified the Soviet representatives to this effect, and they experienced some difficulty and delay in getting the necessary equipment for him. The Soviet railway officials finally turned over to Colonel Emerson, Amur Service Car No. 1, which the Soviets had been using, and secured International Sleeping Car No. 2036 for them. Colonel Emerson further states that the Soviets had difficulty in getting a car with suitable cooking accommodations, but they finally told him that if he could take Chinese Eastern Car No. 2015 to Nikolsk or Habarovsk, they, the Soviets, would wire ahead and locate a dining car and they could then return Car No. 2015. The Soviets finally got a special train, and Colonel Emerson and party left Vladivostok May 19, 1918. This special train arrived at Habarovsk at 9:00 A.M., the 20th, and Colonel Emerson was informed by the Chinese Eastern representative there that they had no dining car to furnish them, and that they would have to leave No. 2015 at Habarovsk. At 10:30 the same morning a messenger from the Soviet Commissar brought Colonel Emerson a letter from the President asking him to call at his office, and he sent him an automobile in which to make the trip.

When Colonel Emerson arrived at the office of the Commissar he discovered this official spoke English with very little accent, and expressed his surprise at finding a Russian Soviet official in the interior of Siberia with such a thorough knowledge of the English language. The Commissar replied:

“It is going some to change from a bum lawyer in Chicago to a Commissar of the Soviets in Eastern Siberia in two months.”

Colonel Emerson notified this official of his orders and was assured the matter would be adjusted. Later this matter was straightened out and at daylight the next morning the train continued with Car No. 2015. Colonel Emerson had requested that his train run only during the day in order that he might inspect the line, which request was acceded to by the Soviet officials.

The special arrived at Irkutsk May 26, about 1:00 P.M., where Colonel Emerson found the American Consul General, Mr. Harris, who had been there for two weeks. Mr. MacGowan, the American Consul, who had notified Mr. Francis at Vologda, of the evidences showing the activity of the Germans in organizing and equipping German prisoners, previously referred to, was also there.



AMERICAN TROOPS ON THE MARCH IN SIBERIA

Colonel Emerson states that the Soviet representatives met his train to ascertain his wishes. They were informed he desired to go as soon as possible, so arrangements were immediately made and Colonel Emerson left at 2:00 P.M. He arrived at Krasnoyarsk in the evening of May 27, and the station-master told him "the line was in trouble ahead and he could not let him proceed." He found the American Vice-Consul who introduced him to the President of the Soviets who informed him that the Czechs were fighting at Marinsk, three hundred versts west, and that he had sent one thousand regulars of the Red Army to try and make peace, as he wanted to get the Czechs through to Vladivostok without any more trouble. Colonel Emerson offered the services of himself and Major Slaughter, U. S. Army, as mediators, which offer was accepted, and the President of the Soviets agreed to send a telegram to the Commanding Officer of the Czech troops at Marinsk, signed by Major Slaughter, asking the Czechs to defer all action until they could confer with Colonel Emerson. Colonel Emerson's train proceeded to Marinsk, and about twelve miles from there they found the Headquarters of the Russian troops. The Russian Commander said the Czechs were responsible for the trouble, and the Russians would request that the Czechs disarm before they would permit them to proceed to the East. In addition, the Russians added the following conditions before consenting to the Czechs proceeding:

1. That the Russians would permit the movement of disarmed Czechs in an expeditious manner to Vladivostok.
2. The Czechs to promise they would not in any way directly or indirectly interfere with internal or Government affairs in Russia.
3. That the Czechs and Russians would appoint a commission to investigate the trouble at Marinsk with a view to punishing the offenders.
4. That the Russians would agree to return to the Czechs all foreign owned ammunition at Vladivostok which has been taken from them.

The Russian authorities agreed to put a guard of Russian soldiers on the Czech train so as to guarantee safety to Vladivostok. Colonel Emerson and party went from Russian Headquarters to Marinsk to confer with the Czechs, and the following is taken from the stenographic report of the conference:

“Conference held between Colonel Emerson and Captain E. B. Kedlets at Marinsk, Siberia, May 29, 1918, relative to Czech soldiers taking possession of City of Marinsk, Siberia—Colonel Emerson then offered his services as mediator in the differences referred to above. Captain Kedlets thanked him, but in a very short statement explained that they positively would not disarm. Colonel Emerson asked if they had experienced any molestation or trouble between South Russia and Marinsk. Captain Kedlets replied that they had not been molested since leaving South Russian territory under immediate German influence, but stated that due to German influence they were afraid of being captured. Colonel Emerson stated that there were 12,000 Czechs in Vladivostok, with 3000 more enroute between Marinsk and Vladivostok, and they had all stated they had not been molested in Russia. Captain Kedlets admitted that he and other train commanders had instructions from Penza to stop where instructions overtook them and capture the towns; that it was a concerted movement and that director of movement was at this time in Novo-Nikolaevsk. These train commanders were to remain in the towns until further instructions were received. Captain Kedlets suggested that Colonel Emerson go to Novo-Nikolaevsk and consult General Radola Gajda, their leader, and stated that the movement was a concerted movement and at a designated time all train commanders were instructed to take over the towns. Captain Kedlets agreed to let Colonel Emerson’s train proceed to Novo-Nikolaevsk and consult Gajda but unless he got a messenger back in three days he would open hostilities.”

Colonel Emerson did not go to see Gajda, but returned to Soviet Headquarters and reported the result of his conference. The head of the Soviets got very much excited and said:

“France, through concerted action with the Czech troops, has taken Siberia in twenty-four hours.”

Colonel Emerson then decided to try and get a French Consul or Military Attaché from Irkutsk as he felt no one could deal with the Czechs

except the French. He telegraphed Consul General Harris and asked him to use his influence to this effect and in this way save the railroad from being put out of commission. On May 30, 1918, Colonel Emerson and Major Slaughter, U. S. Army, joined in a telegram to Consul General Harris, Irkutsk, and to American Consul Harbin for Mr. Stevens, in part as follows:

“Conference Czech Commander Marinsk stated emphatically they would not give up arms and munitions, admitted movement was concerted action Czech forces in Siberia and European Russia, instructions take cities in vicinity where they are located.”

On May 31, Consul General Harris telegraphed from Irkutsk:

“I have the following proposition with which the French Consul General agrees. I propose to the Soviets at Krasnoyarsk and other towns West to allow the Czech trains to continue to Irkutsk, where the French Consul General and I, with a white flag, went to meet Czech delegate, and finally, in a treaty between Czechs and Soviets, three Czechs trains disarmed and went East to Vladivostok with thirty rifles for protection of each train.”

These are the Czechs that General Gajda said he would punish for leaving Irkutsk, as soon as he came in contact with them.

On May 31 Consul General Harris telegraphed Colonel Emerson that the Czechs and Soviets had had a fight at the station in Irkutsk, and two other trains of Czechs, one thousand men, arrived at first station west of Irkutsk, and there was another fight. After these clashes, Consul General Harris and the French Consul succeeded in disarming the Czechs and sending them on to the east, with thirty rifles for each train, and a Soviet official accompanying each echelon. Consul General Harris said the Russians bind themselves to forward all Czechs east, without any hindrance, and that the Russian authorities at Irkutsk asks why Czechs are not sent from Vladivostok. We answer “no transportation available.”

If the Allies were really trying to get the Czechs to the Western front in France, it seems peculiar that no arrangements had been made for ships to take them from Vladivostok. I am clearly of the opinion that as early as

May 28, 1918, there was no intention of sending the Czechs to the Western front. I am unable to say exactly when this decision was made, but it was at least two months and six days before I received my instructions in which appeared the sentence, "For helping the Czecho-Slovaks, there is immediate necessity and justification." All foreign representatives were not informed of the intent, relative to Czechs until about one month later.

At the time under discussion, there was naturally a tenseness in the ranks of both Czechs and Russians. The Czechs were passing through an unknown country where the atmosphere was charged with rumors of plots and schemes. The Soviets not only were filled with anxiety as to the Czech's intentions in Siberia, but they apparently felt that for foreign troops to pass through the country armed, would lower their dignity and would be an infringement of their sovereign rights. Colonel Emerson was not only anxious to get through to Vologda, in European Russia, but was anxious that the Trans-Siberian Railroad should not be put out of commission, and to help in accomplishing his desires, he told General Gajda that nothing would be gained by fighting if the Czechs really wanted to get to Vladivostok. General Gajda stated that as soon as the new Government comes into power, it will stop the Soviets and there will then be no trouble about destroying bridges and tunnels.

Captain Kedlets, who was at the conference of Colonel Emerson and Gajda, referring to the new Government, stated "now a new Government has been established that will make it possible for us to move forward." Colonel Emerson replied: "Regardless of any new Government that may be organized, you must admit that at the present time, the power is in the hands of the Soviets. They are certainly in a position to block your progress to Vladivostok." Gajda replied: "In ten days there might be, in Irkutsk, another power." Gajda also stated that the points they had taken were occupied by a new Government, and it was to their advantage to leave some rifles to help the new Government.

This was a clear indication that the Czechs were involved in driving the Soviets out of the towns, and substituting for them "the new Government," often referred to in the conferences.

On June 1 or 2 the French Consul General sent the following message from Chita to Gajda: "The Echelons of Seventh Regiment. The Soviet Government offering all assistance to expedite the movement. Do not let yourself be implicated in the internal political fight." This French official evidently had not been informed of the plans of the French.

Again on June 4—to American Consul Thomas, who was with Colonel Emerson on his train: "Have General Gajda, who is in command of Czechs, understand that he must only consider the movement of these Echelons East, also, advise him he must not do anything without first securing instructions from the French and American Consuls, and that he must not forget the important and explicit instructions of Professor Masaryk."

At 8:00 P.M., June 3, the two sides met between the lines and a conference was held in Colonel Emerson's car. At 3 A.M., June 4, an armistice, applicable to Marinsk, was signed which was to last six days. On June 4, Colonel Emerson and Major Slaughter sent a message to Consul General Harris at Irkutsk, in part:

"Now going West with Soviet and Czech representatives secure final settlement. Soviet agrees permit Czech proceed, fully armed. White guards Novo-Nikolaevsk, Tomsk, and Marinsk taking advantage situation to arm and take control places named. Czechs refuse permit Soviet resume authority these places prior to their departure."

Colonel Emerson's train arrived at Novo-Nikolaevsk the evening of June 5. He had a conference with the Czech commander, General Gajda, and two of his assistants, and American Consul Ray. Before this conference there was a lot of childish bickering as to Colonel Emerson's authority, but he was still patient and explained again why he happened to be mixed up with the trouble between the Czechs and Soviets. At this conference the American Consul asked him when the Czechs and Soviets had trouble at Irkutsk. Colonel Emerson said it was part of the Czech concerted action to take the towns in which these Czechs Echelons were. The Czech replied, "Sunday one week ago, May 28."

The representative of the new white guard Government called on Colonel Emerson and said—"He had called on Ambassador Francis about two weeks ago at Vologda, and stated that the new Government was connected with the Central Siberian Government organized at Harbin under Mr. Ostrougov and he had been informed it had been recognized by the Allies."

Just after Colonel Emerson left Novo-Nikolaevsk he received a message from Consul General Harris saying he wanted to be present at the final peace conference which he supposed would be held at Omsk. The Czechs suggested the conference be held at Kargat instead of Omsk. Colonel Emerson stopped at Kargat where Consul General Harris joined him on the 8th. Mr. Harris had a conference with Czech representatives at noon on the 8th. Captain Krizek, Czech, at the outset of the conference asked Mr. Harris what he thought of the new Government. Mr. Harris replied:

"Nothing was known in Irkutsk when I left concerning any counter-revolutionary movement. My mission had to do only as a mediator between the Czechs and Bolsheviks. My mission had nothing to do with factional strife in Russia, between Bolsheviks and the counter-revolutionary movement. . . . The President of the United States has issued specific instructions to all the official representatives of the United States in Russia to in no way interfere, recognize or become mixed up with any faction or partisan strife in Russia or Siberia."

This latter statement of Consul General Harris is very important in trying to ascertain the truth as to whether the American troops in Siberia were used in accordance with the wishes of the President of the United States. A reading of my instructions, previously quoted, will show there was absolutely no difference in the meaning of my instructions and the instructions Consul General Harris says were given to all representatives of the United States in Siberia, and not one word or letter of my instructions were changed during my entire stay in Siberia.

As soon as Consul General Harris was informed of the counter-revolutionary movement against the Soviets in all towns occupied by the Czechs, he refused to longer act as mediator and withdrew from all

conferences. As justification for this action he again repeated the instructions he had received from the United States Government.

Colonel Emerson continued his efforts to reach Vologda, and reached Cheliabinsk on June 13, where there were many Czechs, and there he met Major Guinet. There were train difficulties reported west of Cheliabinsk and he did not arrive at Miass until June 16, where it appeared impracticable to proceed further west. On June 23 he received from Major Guinet, of the French, who had gone to Omsk, the following:

“The French Ambassador makes known to Commandant Guinet that he can thank the Czecho-Slovaks for their actions, this in the name of all the Allies. They, the Allies, have decided to intervene the last of June and the Army Czecho-Slovaks and the French Mission form the advance guard of the Allied Army. Next comes recommendations in respect of occupation and organization a double point, political and military.”

I have no information as to the identity of the “French Ambassador” referred to by Major Guinet but it was probably the Ambassador to Russia.

On June 25 Colonel Emerson states “Major Guinet called on us and showed us the message relative to intervention, and said this message ‘was sufficient for him to start action,’” and suggested we take over operation of railroad. Colonel Emerson and party were very anxious for a verification of the part of the French Ambassador’s message which said, “This in the name of all the Allies,” so they returned to Omsk where they arrived on the 26th. The first information Colonel Emerson received at Omsk was July 13, which was from the Czech Commander Gajda at Irkutsk, that he was in the act of occupying that city.

On July 15 Colonel Emerson received a message from Consul General Harris at Irkutsk as follows:

“Have had no communication with outside world since May 26, with Vladivostok, and July 2, with Peking. Late news received show that Allied Marines and Czechs threw Bolshevism out of Vladivostok. Latest Message from Peking Legation was confirmation of Message received by French Mission to which you refer and which has been handed to Colonel Gajda

here.” This is the first information Colonel Emerson had received satisfying him that the United States was a party to the contemplated intervention the last of June. He immediately ceased his efforts to get to Vologda to report to the United States Ambassador, Mr. Francis, and decided to go to Irkutsk as soon as possible to offer his services in helping to keep the railway in operation, and he left Omsk on July 16.

On the 19th, he states at Polovina: “We had noted perfect order along the line, a few Czechs being left at each town to look after policing of these places.” This information confirms what had been apparent since the Czechs, by concerted action on May 28, took the towns on the Trans-Siberian Railroad, that the Soviets were either unable or unwilling to resist the encroachments of the Czechs.

It is a remarkable coincidence that Colonel Emerson received notice from United States Consul General Harris, July 15, that the United States was to take part in the intervention in Siberia, and my instructions dated July 17, show an absolute determination on the part of President Wilson that the United States would not take part in military intervention in Russia. This is conclusively shown by the sentence in my instructions which states: “It (the United States) cannot, therefore take part in such intervention or sanction it in principle.” My instructions, previously quoted, show that the United States was so determined not to take part in military operations in Russia that the Allies were warned, that if they persisted in their designs to intervene and go beyond the purposes announced by the United States, as the object for sending a few troops to Siberia and Archangel, the United States might feel obliged to withdraw entirely from any cooperation in Russia.

It would have been difficult to have used language that would have made plainer the intent of the United States in so far as the use of the United States troops in Siberia is concerned. The quotations, so copiously made from Colonel Emerson’s stenographic report, show that the Czechs were never in danger from the aggressive acts of the Soviets. Certainly they were not in any danger as long as the Czechs stuck to their announced purpose of going through to Vladivostok on the Trans-Siberian Railway. The Czechs were the aggressors, and the report of Colonel Emerson shows that the Soviets wanted to get the Czechs out of Siberia, and were willing to

meet them more than half way in effecting their announced desires. The Czechs not only took possession of towns where their echelons happened to be on May 28, but at least one town, Marinsk, they took possession of a depot of military supplies belonging to the Soviets and completely armed their men with rifles, ammunition, machine guns, and such other stores as were available and desired.

As the conclusion, relative to the safety of the Czechs, drawn from Colonel Emerson's reports, differ so radically from the generally accepted idea that they were in grave danger, it seems advisable that some information as to Colonel Emerson's past life, and natural characteristics be given the reader, so as to help him in properly evaluating his report. Colonel Emerson practically grew up with the Great Northern Railroad. He began working for this railroad when a boy, and left it as General Manager, when he went to Siberia. I had never known him until we met in Vladivostok but Mr. John F. Stevens told me that he considered him the best mechanical railroad man in the United States. He is a man whose language, whose appearance, and whose general attitude towards the duty in hand inspires one with confidence in his integrity of purpose, and the longer one knows him and his work, the greater this confidence becomes.

Colonel Emerson was as disinterested in the political squabbles of the Russian factions as any man I saw in Siberia. He was in Russia for the sole purpose of helping the Russians operate the railroad and took no interest in any other activity.

All those who were in Siberia while United States troops were there, and know the extreme prejudices that existed, will realize why I have attempted to give some of the prominent characteristics of Colonel Emerson.

The action of Consul General Harris, in notifying Colonel Emerson that he had received confirmation of the report that the Allies and the United States were going to intervene in Siberia, and his subsequent actions in accordance with this information, created an inexplicable situation. It should be kept in mind that this statement was made two days before the policy of the United States Government, dated July 17, 1918, was prepared

by the State Department, and given to me more than two weeks later for my guidance.

At the very moment the policy of the United States, with reference to Russia, was being prepared in the State Department, solemnly assuring the Russian people and notifying all Allied Nations, that the United States would not intervene in the internal conflicts of the Russian people, the Consul General of the United States in Siberia, Mr. E. H. Harris, a representative of the State Department, was telling the people of Siberia that the United States was a party to the contemplated intervention in the internal conflicts of the Russian people.

This statement can not be refuted because any action against the then dominant Russian power in Siberia must be construed as taking sides in Russian internal conflicts.

How could such a situation arise? One can only surmise as no explanation was ever made by the State Department and no change was ever made in the policy of the Government in so far as this policy applied to the use of United States troops in Siberia, and judging from the practice of Consul General Harris, his instructions received through Peking were never modified.

The United States, therefore, had its representatives of the State Department and War Department working at cross-purposes from the beginning of military action in Siberia.

III

BEFORE THE ARMISTICE

The first American troops, the 27th Infantry, consisting of 53 officers and 1537 enlisted men under Colonel Henry D. Styer, arrived in Siberia from Manila, August 16, 1918. The 31st Infantry, with 46 officers and 1375 men followed a few days later. Colonel Styer assumed command of the expedition until my arrival, September 1.

Up to the time of my arrival in Vladivostok, I had received no information as to the military, political, social, economic, or financial situation in Russia. Just before I left San Francisco, I received a dispatch from Washington, stating in effect, that information seemed to indicate that Japan's policy would be to keep the various Russian forces apart and oppose any strong Russian central authority, but to support a number of weak Russian forces which could not form more than a screen for Japanese action. If I had known as much about the Japanese Military when I received this information from Washington as I knew later, the message would have conveyed much more information to my mind. I have often thought it was unfortunate I did not know more of the conditions in Siberia than I did when I was pitch-forked into the mêlée at Vladivostok. At other times I have thought that ignorance was not only bliss in such a situation, but was advisable.

Due, in part at least, to my ignorance of the conditions, I landed in Vladivostok without any preconceived ideas as to what should or should not be done. I had no prejudice against any Russian faction and anticipated I would be able to work harmoniously and in a cooperative spirit with all the Allies.

Very early in the morning of September 2, Colonel Styer and several American officers came aboard the Thomas, and Admiral Austin M. Knight sent an officer to extend me an invitation to breakfast with him on the old Brooklyn.

The fact that we were not troubled by custom inspectors and quarantine officials was my first initiation into a country without a Government. It is true the Czechs were in charge of Vladivostok at that time, but their authority was a result of force, not of agreement, therefore one national had the same right, as to entering the town as another.

I left the Thomas and went to the Brooklyn where I met Admiral Knight which proved a very pleasant and helpful association for me, as he had been in Vladivostok for nearly six months and was as well informed about the situation existing in Siberia as anyone. He was generous in sharing his information with me and in extending to the Military all assistance possible and every officer and soldier, arriving with the first troops in Vladivostok, is indebted to him and his officers, for generous assistance at a time when assistance was needed and meant so much to us.

As soon after breakfast as practicable, I went to American Headquarters which had been established in a building owned by a German Mercantile Company. Some Russians claimed to hold an interest in the Company, but I was never satisfied that this interest was not arranged before the Germans left Vladivostok, after the beginning of the World War. The building was admirably adapted for the Headquarters, as it was large enough to furnish office rooms, as well as living quarters for officers.

During the day, Colonel Styer gave me complete information as to what had been done prior to my arrival. I learned that the 27th Infantry was taking part in a combined action against the enemy. The enemy being represented to me as Bolsheviks and German prisoners. I was satisfied that the American troops were not departing from the announced policy of the United States Government to refrain from taking any part in Russian affairs.

General Otani (Japanese) was the senior in rank of the Allied Commanders. In the afternoon of September 2, I called upon General Otani and, in a very few moments after I met him, he asked me if I had instructions that he was to command American troops. I told him I did not have such instructions, but, on the contrary, I had limitations placed upon me as to the use of American troops, that would make it necessary for me to give all orders for future movements. He said that he had been notified by the U. S. State Department that he would be in command. I was informed

that when Colonel Styer landed in Vladivostok, he called upon the senior Allied Commander and asked if there were any suggestions as to the best means of cooperation. General Otani had not arrived at that time, and General Oi (Japanese) was the senior of the Allies in Vladivostok. General Oi told Colonel Styer that, in view of the fact that General Otani had been designated, *at the request of the American Government*, for the supreme command, his arrival, which was expected very soon, might well be awaited. On August 18 General Otani issued the following order:

“I have the honor to inform you that I have been appointed Commander of the Japanese Army at Vladivostok, by His Majesty, the Emperor of Japan, and that I am entrusted, unanimously, by the Allied Powers, with the command of their Armies in the Russian Territory of the Far East—

“The cooperation and the friendship between our Armies will easily permit, from the point of view of their command, of rapidity of action and of success without any difficulty. I hope, with all my heart, that our Armies will work together for the common aim.”

(signed) General Otani,
Commander-in-chief of Allied Armies.

Colonel Styer was puzzled at this order as he had received no instruction to that effect from the United States Government. He cabled to Washington requesting information, and Washington replied that General Graves would soon be in Vladivostok and that he had instructions relating to such matters; this only made the question more puzzling to Colonel Styer. I have never known, even to this day, the meaning of such a remarkable order. I came to know General Otani quite well, and I feel that some one had led him to believe that he was to be in command of all Allied troops. He was not a man to assume such authority and, besides, he was a soldier and well knew that Allied Commanders could not give up command of troops without specific instructions. The question was never again mentioned, except once in February, 1920, by General Oi who, at that time, had succeeded General Otani in command of Japanese troops. The order applied to all Allied troops, but was never referred to so far as I know,

during my stay in Siberia. I have always supposed that some diplomatic agent, not knowing the difference between “Allied Commander” and senior of the Allied Commanders, in order to appear agreeable, told some Japanese representative that General Otani would be the Commander of the Allied forces. I found General Otani to be a very agreeable man, and disposed to be fair in the handling of questions relating to our respective forces. The trouble was, one had to insist upon seeing him and insist very forcefully before you could get by his Staff. The Japanese Staff was very aggressive and would take advantage, or try to do so, of every opportunity to enhance their own prestige with the class they were supporting.

General Otani told me an amusing incident that occurred while General Grant was in Japan during his trip around the world. General Otani had just graduated from the military school and had been designated as orderly for General Grant. He said he was very anxious to do the right thing, and he could not make up his mind whether it showed more respect to General Grant, for him to carry his sabre in the scabbard or carry it in his hand; he tried to get advice but no one seemed able to help him, so he finally decided he should draw his sabre, as soon as he reported and carry it as if on a military duty. The first day he reported, he drew his sabre and, with much discomfort, carried it all day in his hand. The next day when he reported, and drew his sabre, General Grant patted him on the shoulder and said, “Young man, you had better put that in the scabbard, you might stick some one with it.”

As I was very much impressed by the solemn assurance of the United States that they would not intervene in the internal conflicts of the Russian people, I was anxious to know the composition of the forces against which the Allies and the United States were operating north of Vladivostok. All assured me that Bolsheviks had been organized and joined by German and Austrian prisoners and were planning to take the stores at Vladivostok. Colonel Styer had cabled on August 19, the estimate of the situation, as given by the Japanese Chief of Staff. The plan of operations was:

“First take Habarovsk, 15,000 armed enemy this sector; then advance west by Amur and Manchuria.—General Otani stated that in his judgment present forces, assigned to expedition, are insufficient to accomplish mission which was and remains solely

the extrication of the Czechs west of Irkutsk, between whom and us are 40,000 enemy forces and a long double line of communications, to make secure; the Czechs, west of Irkutsk, have little ammunition left and are otherwise in a pitiable plight, so much so that their relief before winter is imperative, if they are to survive. He asked all Allied Commanders to so represent to their Governments, and that they themselves, send all forces immediately available, and request Japan to send troops at once in sufficient numbers to meet the situation. Japan has ready many troops.”

With reference to this statement the natural inquiry is, where did General Otani get his information? Was this statement based upon information, or was it entirely Japanese propaganda? At this time it was not possible to send or to receive information from the section west of Irkutsk, and when communications were opened, we learned from Colonel Emerson, that on July 12, the Czech troops occupied Irkutsk and, subsequently, took up the work of consolidating their control of the communications across Lake Baikal and around its Southern end. As previously stated the Czechs, by concerted action, had taken the Siberian towns west of Irkutsk on May 28, and Vladivostok as early as June 28, and had established a new Siberian Government in most of the towns taken. This new Government was not as radical as the Soviets, but fell short of being Absolutists.

As early as the Spring of 1918, Japan had made representations to the Allied Powers, that: “Because of her interests, she was placed in a special position, and asked that should the occupation of Vladivostok and the Chinese Eastern and Amur railways be necessary, that the task be left to her alone.” The United States, or more accurately speaking the President of the United States, opposed this request on the grounds that the Russians would be likely to misconstrue such action.

In the light of subsequent knowledge of the actual situation west of Irkutsk, the only logical inference from General Otani’s statement is that Japan was not, as stated by her on August 3, 1918, actuated only by sentiments of sincere friendship toward the Russian people. She, undoubtedly, had not given up her ambition to occupy Eastern Siberia. No

one could have been associated with Japanese military representatives, as I was in Siberia, and escape the conviction that they always hoped to occupy Eastern Siberia.

In trying to analyze the situation as given by General Otani on August 19, one must conclude that the Japanese Military Intelligence was absolutely ignorant of the real conditions, or that their statement was not candid, but aimed to satisfy what they presumed to be Allied desires, by exaggerating the magnitude of the military problem and recommending heavy reinforcements. At the time General Otani asked for heavy reinforcements, he ordered an offensive which must be construed as indicating that he had confidence that the troops at his disposal could defeat the enemy long before the requested reinforcements could arrive in Siberia, and, as a matter of fact, the actual military movements ordered by General Otani, proved to be little more than skirmishes. The Japanese, subsequently, directed all movements so that success was accomplished, without American troops getting into the first line positions and observation, which placed the Americans in the position of not being able to verify by observation, reports of casualties and strength of enemy forces. The Intelligence officer of the American forces, after a careful inspection of the battle field at Kraevski said:

“My judgment is that the strength of the enemy, previous to the combat, at Kraevski, as given to us by the Japanese General Staff, and by the Allied Intelligence officers, was greatly exaggerated, as was also the current estimate of the enemy casualties.”

On the 6th of September the Japanese Command issued an order practically ending the Ussuri Campaign, if it may be so designated, and directed the following movement:

“The Army will concentrate at Habarovsk the main body of the 12th Division and a portion of the American and the Chinese Armies; to defeat the Austro-German prisoners and Bolsheviki troops, who are to the east of Zeya and important points along the Amur railway.”

As another indication that Japan was not candid in her representations or in her action I was informed that the United States and Japan were each to send about ten thousand troops to Siberia, but later Japan said, for organizational reasons, she wanted to send twelve thousand men. The United States consented to the increase. Between October 11 and 17, 1918, I made an inspection of United States troops as far north as Habarovsk and east of Habarovsk to Bira (about one hundred and twenty-five miles) west of Habarovsk, and I found nearly all towns occupied, in part at least, by Japanese troops. I had previously been informed that Japanese troops were at various places on the Southern line of the Trans-Siberian, as far west as Chita. On October 18, I reported to the War Department that Japan had at least sixty thousand troops in Siberia and it was disclosed later, that I had underestimated the number by twelve thousand. There was no military situation demanding this increase and if Japan felt there was such a situation, she would undoubtedly have notified the United States with whom she had the agreement to send only twelve thousand men. I have excellent reasons for stating she did not notify the United States that she had sent seventy-two thousand men to Siberia.

After my trip north, I was forced to the conclusion that Japan was indulging in both political and military maneuvers, and it soon became apparent that Japan was not the only nation working at cross-purposes with the announced policy of the United States; it is known that England was not only willing but as early as March, 1918, had asked Japan to occupy the Trans-Siberian Railway. She gave as a reason for this request, "That Japan could control the only line of communication, by which aid could be extended to anti-Bolshevik movements in South Russia." In this connection the following suggestions were made by the military representatives of the Supreme War Council:

"If Japan demands some compensations for her efforts it may be necessary to acquiesce in her occupying a small portion of Eastern Siberia. It is probable that in any case she will take part of Siberia, but this may prevent her from looking for expansion elsewhere."

When I left the United States for Siberia, I did not anticipate that I would be involved in the political squabbles of the Far East, but very soon

after my arrival in Vladivostok, I learned that every act of an American, civil or military representative, was represented as designed for political effect in the Far East. This was true of all Russians and practically all Allies.

At the time of my arrival in Vladivostok, when the Allied representatives spoke of Russians, they meant the old Czarist officials, who felt it was then safe enough for them to appear in their gorgeous uniforms every evening, and parade down Svetlanskaya, the principal thoroughfare. The other class was called "Bolsheviks," although, as a matter of fact, the old Czarist officials did not claim to be in favor of the reestablishment of a Czar in Russia, and the Russians called Bolsheviks, did not claim to be in favor of the Soviet Government. The line of cleavage between these two classes, however, was distinct enough for anyone to recognize. There was no such thing as the mingling of the two. The old Czarist officials could see nothing but meanness, rascality, and everything else bad, in any Russian who did not agree with them as to what should be done to restore the Motherland to a pre-revolution status. As the Allies were so opposed to bolshevism, and every form and degree of liberalism was classed as such, they were dealing almost exclusively with the former Czarist officials. The word "bolshevism" was so extended as to easily take in the Zemstvos, a body elected by the people, with a right of suffrage extended to all males and females of twenty one years of age. This situation resulted in all activities in Vladivostok, such as telegraph, mail, passport, and civil control of the town, being in the hands of former Czarist officials. They were not slow to organize so as to make the most of this advantage and were soon reaping their revenge on Russians who had dared to act contrary to their beliefs.

All Allied representatives seemed to know that the principal reason for sending United States troops to Siberia was to help the Czechs, but as they occupied not only Vladivostok, but all towns from there to the Urals, some other claim had to be advanced, if the United States continued on to the Western part of Siberia. On September 8, I cabled the War Department:

"Practically all organized resistance, in Siberia, has disappeared."

The old thought of forming an Eastern front had not entirely gone, notwithstanding President Wilson's steadfast determination that the United States would take no part in it. The American soldiers had been brought into Siberia by misrepresentation, and the natural query among Allied representatives was, why not use the same method to get them into European Russia, in order to achieve their purpose by indirect means?

The Allies had apparently sensed the fact that President Wilson was intensely interested in the fate of the Czechs. I was not only ignorant as to the discussions which led to intervention, but I was ignorant as to the political schemes of the Far East. For a few days, I was disposed to take the statements of prominent Allies at full value, and act accordingly. I find from my records that on September 12, I notified the War Department that the Czechs were returning to the West to help out the Czechs west of the Urals. On the 8th of September, I was notified that the English, French, Japanese, and Czechs desired to go as far as the Volga River before winter, and desired to know the attitude of the United States.

On September 19, I cabled:

“French and English are, undoubtedly, trying to get the Allied forces committed to some act which will result in the establishment of an Eastern front.”

On, or about, September 9, Captain Hasurak, Czech, General Gajda's Adjutant, arrived in Vladivostok from the West, and reported that the Czech situation west of the Urals, was such as to demand immediate assistance from the Allies. On September 27, I received a cable stating that American forces would not go further west than Lake Baikal, and stating that if the Czechs withdrew to the westward, my responsibility would extend only to helping keep the line open. I was notified that the message of the President, relative to the use of troops in Russia and Siberia, had been sent to all Allied Governments, and this helped me very materially in my dealing with the Allied representatives.

The Allies, however, were not willing to play the Siberian tune with many strings to their bow; that would leave too many chances for discord. They had, early in the game, represented to the United States Government

the advisability of organizing an inter-Allied Board whose duties, among others, would be to insure unity of action towards the Russian people, and deciding political disputes. This was flatly disapproved by the United States Government, but as will be shown later, this was not the end of the efforts to secure unity of action. There could be no such thing as unity of action because the representatives of England, France, and Japan were partisans in the Russian conflicts and I was not. This made cooperation impossible as long as my orders remained as originally issued.

Soon after the Armistice, the representatives of England and France began to criticize me for my failure to cooperate, and spoke of the Russian faction supported by them as “the forces of law and order,” and by implication, charging other Russian factions as representing lawlessness and disorder. This designation was not in accord with the facts, and, undoubtedly, was adopted because it sounded well where real conditions were not known.

The senior Japanese representative at the Conference on Limitation of Armament, at Washington, D. C. in 1921, and 1922, made a statement to the Conference that about the time the Allied troops were dispatched to Siberia, Japan decided to give Semenov material support, “in order to check the Bolshevik influence from permeating the Far East” “and that Japan was only following the line of policy adopted by some of the Allied Powers, notably Great Britain and France, to entrust to Russian forces the task of resisting the Bolshevik menace.” This is good evidence that England, France, and Japan had an understanding before they sent troops to Siberia, and that one great purpose of intervention was to fight bolshevism.

The action of the representatives of England, France, and Japan during the entire time I was in Siberia, coupled with the information that has come to light since intervention, leads one irresistibly to the conclusion that there were two main reasons for military intervention in Siberia. The first reason was the desire to take action which would aid the Allies in the prosecution of the War; the second reason was the desire to resist the spread of Bolshevistic ideas. I am unable to say which of the two ideas predominated in the decision for Allied intervention. My lack of experience in international affairs, lead me at first to give too much credence to the statements of various Nationals as to the objects to be attained by

intervention in Siberia. The private discussions by the representatives of England, France, and Japan, as to the reasons for intervention in Russia, as subsequently disclosed, stressed the need for preventing the spread of bolshevism to the Far East.

In a book by Frederick Lewis Schuman, entitled “American Policy Toward Russia,” pages 96 and 97, appears the following:

“The American Consul Grey, at Omsk, received a cipher message from the American Consulate at Samara, dated July 22, 1918, which transmitted a communication from Consul General Poole, in Moscow, under date of June 18: ‘You may inform the Czechoslovak leaders, confidentially, that pending further notice the Allies will be glad, from a political point of view, to have them hold their present position. On the other hand they should not be hampered in meeting the military exigency of the situation. It is desirable first of all, that they should secure the control of the Trans-Siberian Railway, and second, if this is assumed at the same time possible, (possibly) retain control over the territory which they now dominate. Inform the French representative that the French Consul General joins in these instructions!’”

The Mr. Poole referred to, is the same man who later had charge of Russian Affairs in the State Department in Washington. This shows that American Consul General Poole, in European Russia, without giving his authority, on June 18, 1918, was taking sides in the Russian conflict in Siberia, while on June 8, Consul General Harris, in Siberia, said that all United States Government representatives had specific instructions not to take sides in Russian affairs, and not to take sides in party strife. Mr. Harris pursued this policy until July 2, when he stated that he received confirmation from the “Peking Legation” of the intention of the United States to engage in military intervention, which had for its object hostile action against the Soviets, no matter what reasons were publicly stated. As previously noted, I received my orders, written July 17, on August 3, which were given, not only to the United States Military, but were in the form of a policy, applicable to all United States representatives, in which there were definite, clear, and positive instructions that no United States representative would intervene or take sides in Russian affairs. My instructions came

direct from Washington, but I have never seen any statement that Mr. Poole was acting under instructions from the State Department, when he decided to advise the Czechs, in the name of the Allies, to take certain action, which could only be construed by them as a statement by the senior United States Representative in Russia, that the United States was a party to intervention in Siberia. Mr. Harris cites as his authority for changing from “non-interference” to the policy of taking sides, the confirmation from “Peking Legation” of a report handed around in Western Siberia, by Major Guinet of France. The Peking Legation was not competent to give instructions to Consul General Harris, and if it was transmitting instructions from Washington, why was Washington not given as the authority for the change in policy?

The different policies followed by the representatives of the United States in European Russia and in Siberia, unfortunately create a justifiable belief that the United States was not entirely frank and candid in its dealings with the Russian people. Mr. Poole’s suggestion to the Czechs that “they should not be hampered in meeting the military exigencies of the situation” had the appearance of containing intended and carefully prepared subtleties. If I had to determine the meaning of this sentence, I should unhesitatingly say it was a subtle suggestion to the Czechs that the Allies would not object to their beginning military operations against the Soviets. I realize, however, that the sentence is so worded that Mr. Poole, if the occasion arose, could deny that he had such an idea.

Mr. Poole certainly could not think that the Czech Military would wait for the approval of the Allied Consular representatives in Moscow, before taking action to meet “the military exigencies of the situation” in Siberia, especially when the record shows it took one month and four days for the message from Mr. Poole to reach Consul Grey in Omsk. Why was Consul General Poole sending information to the Czechs as to what the Allies desired? It seems to me he was used by the Allied representatives in European Russia to pull a chestnut out of the fire for them.

This action of Mr. Poole’s resulted in a very noticeable resentment against the United States by the Czechs who remained in Western Siberia. This was so palpable when these Czechs arrived in Vladivostok, that I took up the question with Czech Headquarters to ascertain the cause.

Mr. Poole by his communication led the Czechs, or helped lead them, to believe the United States and the Allies were going to intervene in Siberia. As a result of this belief the Czechs willingly remained in Western Siberia, always hoping and expecting that United States and Allied troops would soon come to their assistance.

These Czechs not only experienced great hardships during the Winter of 1918 and 1919, but many of them lost their lives in fighting the Bolsheviks in an effort to secure and keep control of the Trans-Siberian Railway, at the request of the Allies. Put yourself in the place of the Czech soldiers, and ask yourself if, under the circumstances, you would have any resentment?

How can the action of Consul General Poole be reconciled with the statement of Consul General Harris (quoted in the second chapter) made the 8th of June, ten days before the message of Mr. Poole was conveyed to the Czechs, through Consul Grey? Mr. Harris says on the 8th:

“The President of the United States has issued specific instructions to all official representatives of the United States in Russia, to in no way interfere, recognize or become mixed up with any faction or partisan strife in Russia or Siberia.”

There were American soldiers in Archangel during the time Mr. Poole was Consul General, and if reports are true, and there is no doubt in my mind as to their accuracy, the direction of American troops was turned over to the British. A participant in the campaign has recorded his impressions in a book entitled, “Archangel, The American War with Russia.” In this work on page 30 the writer says:

“No war, but in the province of Archangel, on six scattered battle-fronts, American soldiers, under British command, were ‘standing to’ behind snow trenches and improvised barricades, while soldiers of the Soviet cause crashed Pom Pom projectiles at them, and shook them with high explosives and shrapnel, blasted them with machine guns, and sniped at any reckless head that showed from cover!”

On page 75 of this same book, the writer states:

“Also there was an American Consulate, with an American Consul General, DeWitt C. Poole, who at times appeared to take over a supervision of the American share in this strange, strange war with Russia.”

On page 28, the writer gives some instructions, cabled by the State Department to the American Ambassador, on August 3, 1918, (the day my instructions were made public). These instructions, in so far as object to be attained by the troops in Northern Russia goes, were identical with that part of my instructions previously quoted. This seems to justify the conclusion that the United States troops in Northern Russia had the same general instructions as to policies that were given the troops in Siberia. It is not possible for me to make any definite statement about the expedition to Northern Russia, because, so far as I know, the United States has not given any information to the public relative to the expedition to Siberia or to Northern Russia, but if these two expeditions had the same instructions, how is it possible that the Archangel expedition was used in hostile combat against the Soviet forces, while the Siberian expedition was not? This hostile action against the Soviets, was particularly puzzling as the President stated to the United States Senate on June 26, 1919:

“The instructions to General Graves direct him not to interfere in Russian affairs.” If the same instructions applied in Northern Russia, as seems very probable, why did the United States troops in Northern Russia interfere in Russian affairs?

When in Siberia, I had never seen any definite statement as to the policy of France, but such statement was unnecessary, as the actions of the French representatives clearly showed they were following the same policy as the English and the Japanese, and the correctness of this surmise was confirmed by a statement made on behalf of the French Government at the Limitation of Arms Conference, which was, in part:

“The French Government would have the same feelings, the formal assurance given by Baron Shidehara of the intention of the Japanese Government concerning Siberia; of Japan’s desire to withdraw her troops from Russia as soon as possible; of its firm purpose to respect the integrity of Russia. France accepted these

assurances with all the more pleasure because it was exactly the program which the French Government had adopted in 1918.”

I could never reconcile the statements of the Allied representatives relative to intervention in Russia, with the actions of their representatives in Siberia. The word “Bolshevik,” as used in Siberia, covered most of the Russian people and to use troops to fight Bolsheviks or to arm, equip, feed, clothe or pay white Russians to fight them was utterly inconsistent with “non-interference with the internal affairs of Russia.” If England, France, and Japan intended to use their troops in fighting bolshevism when they entered Siberia, why was this intention not made public at that time? It is difficult for a layman to understand diplomatic language.

Fortunately, for the comfort of the troops, we were very comfortably settled before the Russian and Allied representatives in Vladivostok knew what my attitude would be towards “combating bolshevism.” It was very easy for the Russians to help secure quarters or, it was equally as easy for them to say they could give no assistance. The officials who were said to have been put in authority by the Russians, and were really put in positions by the Allies, were all pro-Czarist, and were very anxious for the Americans to see the necessity for the establishment of some form of Government in Russia, that would restore them to the same position, or, at least, the same pay status, as they had during the Czarist regime. They gave us every assistance in getting settled. Czarist Russia had planned to make Vladivostok such a strong military station that it could be defended from an attack from the sea, with probable success, and in their plans they had built excellent barracks for many thousand men. These barracks were very comfortable, with the exception of bathing facilities which did not exist. No effort had been made since the Russian soldiers had left the barracks in 1914, to keep the civil population from using them and, as a consequence, they were frightfully filthy. After they were cleaned, however, they were much more comfortable than I had expected to find them. As the population increased to about two hundred thousand, to be housed in a place built for half that number and, as the number of Allied troops increased and the Russian troops were mobilized, the demand for barracks became very pressing. We would not give up the barracks we obtained when we first arrived and, in this way, we were able to comply with War Department orders, as to the required air space for soldiers, although at times it became

embarrassing to justify the need of twice the air space considered necessary for a Japanese or Russian soldier.

Some of our troops had to be distributed along the railroad to guard bridges or culverts, as the supply requirements made it necessary to keep the railroad open. These men generally lived in a box car, more often than not the car was removed from the running gear, put on the ground, and banked with dirt when possible. Most of the cars were of double thickness and, while not comfortable, were better than one would expect to find in a cold country like Siberia.

Soon after my arrival, I inquired as to arrangements made for paying for the building taken for Headquarters and I was informed that the building belonged to Germans and that no questions were asked as to payment. I wanted all financial dealings of the United States kept up to date so as to avoid claims after American troops had left Siberia, so I ordered a board of officers to consult the owners or agents and, if no agreement could be reached as to the price we should pay, to submit a report to me. Some Russians claimed ownership to the building and had papers that seemed to justify their claim. These Russians said the rental was worth eight thousand a month, but as we were Americans, they would only charge us six thousand. The board went to see the Russian who was acting Mayor, and found that the cost of all buildings was on record as, also, was the amount the owner should charge for use of his building in case it was taken for military purposes. In case of congestion of the people of Vladivostok, the law provided for an increase of fifty percent over the normal rent. If we complied with the law in force in Vladivostok, the most we could pay for the building was seven hundred and fifty a month instead of eight thousand. I was surprised when the Mayor asked us not to pay the owner more than the legal rate. This was a bright spot in my dealings with official Russians. This official of the city had, however, been elected by the citizens of Vladivostok.

Colonel Styer, prior to my arrival, had gotten some large buildings belonging to the railroad, to be used as storerooms. These were excellent for the purpose, and could be reached by our Transports, except when the harbor was frozen over. They were at the extreme southern end of the bay and about three miles from American Headquarters. The ice-breakers could

not operate this far down, but there was a narrow gauge railway that enabled us to get our supplies to our store houses without hauling.

General Horvath, while in charge of Russian affairs in the Far East, came to me and apologized for asking rent for these buildings, as Americans were helping to keep the railroad open, but said they needed some money and the United States was the only country from which they had any hope of getting funds. I told him I would not approve the payment but I would send his request to Washington. I disapproved the request, stating that to pay rent for buildings occupied by troops guarding the railway was analogous to sending troops to guard a man's house, and paying the man for the use of his stable while guarding his house. I was very much surprised when the paper came back, directing me to pay five or six thousand dollars a month for the use of these empty buildings.

As the Czech question had been settled, if there ever had been a Czech question in Siberia previous to my arrival in Vladivostok, and as I was told not to intervene in the internal conflicts, there was nothing left for United States troops to do but to help carry out the part of my instructions which stated: "the only legitimate object for which American or Allied troops can be employed, is to guard military stores, which may subsequently be needed by Russian forces." Before I could take any steps "to render such aid, as may be acceptable, to the Russians in the organization of their own self-defense," manifestly some decision had to be made as to what faction constituted the Russians referred to in the policy. The decision could only be made in Washington and the conditions were such that you could not render any assistance to any Russian, without throwing overboard the policy of non-intervention in their internal affairs. I could not give a Russian a shirt without being subjected to the charge of trying to help the side to which the recipient of the shirt belonged.

As to protecting property; there was evidence everywhere, that the property needed protection, not from the German and Austrian prisoners, but from anyone who wanted to take it. The hills were covered with property of all kinds, which had been bought by the old Czarist or Kerensky Government and dumped where a place could be found. I was much impressed by a large number of bales of cotton thrown on the ground, with no covering and with nothing under the cotton to protect it from the

dampness. There were great piles of rubber that was reported as needed by the Allies, and there must have been at least one thousand automobiles that had never been taken out of the crates. Any individual could have taken any of this property if he had desired to do so. There was some safety to it, due to the fact that an individual could not have gotten the property out of Siberia if he had taken it, and he could not have used it in Vladivostok.

At the first meeting of the Military Commanders, I suggested that we, each Allied Commander, have a record of all Russian property taken out, or authorized to be taken out of Vladivostok. The list was to show the destination, and for what purpose it was removed. General Knox, the British Commander, informed me that all of this property had been bought with British money and he proposed to distribute it as he saw fit and that he did not intend anyone should have anything to say about it. I told the Allied Commanders my reasons for wishing the record, but this seemed to excite General Knox more than my first statement. I then informed him I had no information about who bought the property, but I felt Russia had satisfied the nation from which she bought it, as to payment before it was delivered. The question was dropped without adoption of my suggestions. This controversy with General Knox, which took place in September, 1918, was again brought to my mind when I read in the Congressional Record of February 26, 1921, that \$53,186,352.70, of the money the United States had loaned to the Kerensky Government, had been expended for "exchange and cotton purchases."

Each day the situation was becoming more tense and it was evident, at each meeting of the Allied Commanders, that the military representatives of England, France, and Japan were standing together on all propositions. I do not believe that any unbiased person, who had personal knowledge of conditions, will claim that the representatives of England, France, and Japan did not take sides in the internal conflicts of the Russian people. These representatives not only did not deny, but boasted about their efforts to destroy, what they called, bolshevism.

It soon became evident at these Allied meetings, that I was an unknown quantity, and their principal darts were fired at me, when any differences arose. There were basic differences in our policies which could never be reconciled as long as my instructions remained. England, France, and Japan

always had as their objective to do all the damage possible to Bolsheviks, while I was trying to keep out of trouble with any Russian party. The principle of non-intervention had been broadcast throughout the world and everyone in Siberia, Russian and foreigner, knew of this promise before Allied troops entered Siberia. From my point of view, this policy was sound and there isn't a nation on earth, that would not resent foreigners sending troops into their country, for the purpose of putting this or that faction in charge of their Governmental machinery. The result is not only an injury to the prestige of the foreigner intervening, but is a great handicap to the faction the foreigner is trying to assist.

The moment that the United States took sides in the Russian conflict, which was at variance with the solemn assurance made to the Russian people by President Wilson, her reputation for honesty of purpose and fair dealing was discredited.

The Czechs in Siberia were naturally liberal minded men. They had had enough of autocracy and were willing to fight bolshevism, because they visualized it as being an agent of Germany and Austria, and because it seemed to stand between them and their aspiration to establish a republican Czecho-Slovakia. As soon as they realized that fighting bolshevism meant not only combating all forms of liberalism, but it meant the placing of what governmental power was left into the hands of people who had held office during the Romanoff dynasty, and who probably had the Czarist ideas as to Government; then the Czech could no longer march in step with England, France, and Japan.

The Canadians and the Chinese (to use an English expression), could not see "eye to eye," with the three nations above mentioned. As I saw the Canadians, they constituted a conscientious and serious minded force. It is no secret to say they did not believe in the oppressive and repressive measures used by the Kolchak supporters against the people, which measures, if not entirely approved by General Knox and Sir Charles Eliot, were not resented by them. The practices of killing, imprisoning, and beating the people, because they had certain ideas, were repulsive to the Canadians. They could not understand the repeated statements of Governments that they did not intend to depart from the traditional policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of the Russian people and, at the

same time, act in a manner that would cause ninety-nine and nine-tenths percent of the individuals, who were cognizant of these acts, to construe them as interference of the most objectionable kind.

I was one time notified, by a high ranking Canadian officer, of a serious situation arising in the Canadian forces due to their objection to certain instructions given by Sir Charles Eliot, the British High Commissioner, and soon after the incident the Canadians were sent back to Canada. I have never seen any official statement as to the reason for sending these troops home, but I have seen a printed statement, in an English book, to the effect that they were not entirely satisfactory; as to why they were not satisfactory, the statement did not disclose. To those of us in Siberia, there was no occasion for disclosing the reasons, for that was very apparent. As the Canadian soldiers were under the direction of British authority, the Czarist propagandists did not like to stigmatize them by that terrible word "Bolsheviki," as they would have done had they come from the United States instead of Canada.

The Italian Commander informed me that he had instructions from his Government, to vote with the American representative on every proposition. This placed the representatives of England, France, and Japan in the minority and in an awkward position, as General Knox thought he should shape the actions of the Allied Military representatives in Siberia. As soon as he had decided that the United States would not, under any conditions, take part, either directly or indirectly, in the formation of an Eastern front, he easily switched to the idea that the Allied troops should be used in fighting bolshevism, and when he found himself often opposed by the majority of the Allied Commanders, his bitterness and resentment grew to a white heat, and he seemed to be especially bitter against Admiral Knight and me. It was often brought to me that he was very open in his criticism of President Wilson and his resentment was so intense that he forgot himself and, more than once, criticized the United States representatives where the criticism was resented. One evening, at the British dinner table where an American was present as a guest, he characterized Admiral Knight and me as being stupid and stubborn.



ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES IN SIBERIA

Reading left to right—Top row: Captain T. Watanabe, Captain R. J. Hoffman, Major S. Hasebe, Captain G. Bazzani, Lieut. Col. Vuchterle, Major Gaston Renondeau, Major J. Broz, Captain F. B. Rives; *Second row:* Professor J. Maruyama, Brig. Gen. J. N. Blair, Col. H. H. Pattison, Col. Fuching, Major Ou, Col. M. Le Magnen, Col. O. P. Robinson, Major C. Manera, Major Gen. M. Nakajima; *Bottom row:* Major Gen. S. Inagaki, Col. Louis Teissier, Major Gen. Wm. S. Graves, General K. Otani, Lieut. Gen. M. Yuhi, Brig. Gen. Yüyousi, Lieut. Col. Filippi, Count of Baldissero.

During September General Gajda came to Vladivostok, and I met him for the first time. He was accompanied by General Paris, the senior French officer in the Far East at the time, and by other French officers. General Paris also had ambitions to form an Eastern front and was inclined to be critical of Americans for not doing as he thought they should do. General Gajda was a young man, about twenty-eight at the time, and flushed by his success at Irkutsk. I thought it advisable to tell him not to expect American troops to go west of Lake Baikal, as he was being used by Allied representatives to do what he could to get each nation to send troops west.

Unfortunately, for unity of action, Dr. Teusler, handling the American Red Cross, came into the picture at this time, and it seemed to be very

common knowledge that he was a cousin of Mrs. Woodrow Wilson. He was a very staunch Autocrat and had lived in Japan for something like eighteen years. He probably expected to return to Japan when he finished his Red Cross work in Siberia, or at least he did return to Japan. He appeared to be more in sympathy with the British, French, and Japanese attitude than he was with the American policy of non-interference.

As soon as General Gajda had left me, Dr. Teusler told him that he knew this was the announced policy of the United States, but if a situation should arise where the Czech found it necessary to telegraph me that they needed military assistance, I would not dare to refuse and would start American troops west at once. Major Slaughter, United States Army, was present and heard this statement of Dr. Teusler and, as soon as he had an opportunity, copied it from memory and sent it to me. Dr. Teusler being a relative of Mrs. Wilson's, caused foreigners to attach more importance to his views of policy, than they would if he had not been so related. Major Slaughter also reported that General Paris, while traveling west with General Gajda, "had criticized the attitude of the United States to the Czechs and that it is doing us considerable harm, at the present time."

In September, Semenov, who was later shown to be a murderer, robber and a most dissolute scoundrel, also came to see me. He was being financed by Japan and had no convictions that would interfere with his doing as the Japanese directed. He always remained within striking distance of Japanese troops. As a matter of fact, he had to do this because he could not have existed one week in Siberia, if he had not had the protection of Japan. He was always talking about "the restoration of the Motherland."

During September and October the Allied representatives and the Russian representatives were trying to "size me up" and I, at the same time, was trying to "size them up." I do not know what success they had, but, as for myself, I was being disillusioned very fast. I had expected to find representatives of the Allies and Russians with no motives other than to help Russia. Russians belonging to different political factions, such as Monarchists and Social Revolutionists, or classes such as peasants, as well as representatives of the Zemstvo, were coming to see me, evidently with an idea of determining what my attitude was going to be towards their problems, and I was glad to tell them that the United States troops would

not interfere in their internal affairs or political questions. This, as was to be expected, pleased some and disappointed others. In October, a Russian officer in Czarist military uniform, came to my office and said he was an official, or at least he held some official position. This man told me I was seeing people whose policies they objected to and the people he represented wanted me to stop seeing them. I asked him how they expected me to keep in touch with conditions and he replied, "We will furnish you with all the information it is necessary for you to know." I told him I would talk to anyone I pleased. The Russian, in true Cossack style, stood up, clapped his heels together, saluted, left my office, and I had made enemies of another Russian faction. I was amused and thought such an idea could only be found in an autocratic country like old Russia. Later, however, General Knox came to me and said that "I was getting the reputation of being a friend of the poor and didn't I know they were only swine."

On October 11, I left Vladivostok for Habarovsk and beyond, with a view to inspecting the 27th Infantry. We obtained a special train but the train service was most uncertain. We had, however, a field clerk at American Headquarters, who had been employed as a railway manager on this same railroad, and he was able to push the train through in excellent time. The country through which we passed was intensely interesting because of unexpected fertility of the soil which produced very fine grain, hay and, in fact, nearly anything the peasants used. At one place near Nikolsk, the land was a rolling prairie, entirely planted in wheat, and at another place, the land, as far as one could see on both sides of the track, had also been planted in wheat. There were no detached houses, such as one sees in the United States, but the peasants lived in villages and sometimes went five, six, or seven miles to their fields. They did not need to fence their hay fields. They went out at the proper time to cut their hay, stacked it on the ground, put a fence around it, and left it until it was needed for the animals. I was informed they generally turned the animals into the small corral around the hay stack, left them as long as there was any hay, and then would move on to another stack. I was told the grain consisted, generally, of wheat, oats, and buckwheat. The country we passed through the first day was very much like parts of Nebraska or Kansas.

Our sleeper on this trip was a first class Trans-Siberian coach. These are large wooden coaches with nine compartments and an aisle running down

one side of the car. The compartments can be opened or separated by sliding doors, as the occupants desire. The cars have lower and upper berths, running crosswise the car, instead of lengthwise. The berths are wider and give more room than the Pullmans in the United States. The tracks in Siberia are five feet wide, instead of four feet eight inches as in the United States.

On the morning of October 12, we began to see some of the trees, said to be so plentiful in Siberia. I saw a thin coating of ice on a pool of water which was the first I had seen, although this was nearly four hundred miles north of Vladivostok.

We arrived at Habarovsk at 10 A.M., and spent the day inspecting the quarters of the officers and men of the 27th Infantry. I was very much pleased with their winter accommodations.

In September, during the campaign, or at least when we thought the Japanese were conducting a campaign, some of the 27th Infantry had been sent west of Habarovsk as far as Bira, about one hundred and twenty-five miles. They also occupied three or four towns between Habarovsk and Bira and I wanted to see how these men were faring. I took Colonel Styer with me and our train left for Bira at 6 o'clock in the evening, where we arrived the next morning, before daylight. I stepped out of the car as soon after dawn as possible and the only thing alive, that I could see, was an American soldier, posted as a sentinel, around the railroad station. I asked him what his orders were and he replied, "To pick up any papers he saw around the station." I asked him who were in the station, and he said, "some Japanese officers and Japanese soldiers." I looked for the town but could see only a few straggling huts built along the stream. We found the Americans in some old box cars, although the Captain of the Company had gone hunting. I asked the men how they liked it; they were very enthusiastic and said they hoped I would let them spend the winter there. When I inspected the kitchen I noticed they had two large salmon for dinner; I asked where and how they caught them, and they replied, in a pool of water by the river, and that they had caught them by hand. They said squirrels and bear came into their camp. I could see no reason for troops at Bira, and told Colonel Styer to move the Company back to Habarovsk. On the return trip, we stopped

and inspected troops at Tchanka and Inn. I could see no reason for keeping troops at any of these stations, so ordered that all be brought to Habarovsk.

I have often wondered why the Japanese wanted troops at these out-of-the-way stations and the only conclusion I could come to was that they felt if they could keep troops at such stations, Japan could justify sending seventy-two thousand men to Siberia instead of twelve thousand as agreed upon with the United States.

On the trip from Bira to Habarovsk, we saw miles of beautiful woods which were part of the three hundred million acres of virgin timber east of Lake Baikal. I don't know enough about trees to say what kinds these were, but it is claimed there are between fifty and sixty varieties in Siberia.

Just before reaching Habarovsk, we passed over the Amur River on one of the most beautiful bridges I ever saw and it is said to be the third longest bridge in the world. It is of steel construction, lighted by electricity and consists of twenty-five spans.

When I reached Habarovsk, I saw General Oi, Japanese Commander of the 12th Division, and notified him that I had ordered the removal of all American troops from west of Habarovsk. I also met for the first time, the notorious murderer, robber, and cut-throat Kalmykov. He was the worst scoundrel I ever saw or ever heard of and I seriously doubt, if one should go entirely through the Standard Dictionary, looking for words descriptive of crime, if a crime could be found that Kalmykov had not committed. He was armed and financed by Japan, in their efforts "to help the Russian people." I say this advisedly, because I have evidence that would satisfy any open-minded person. Kalmykov murdered with his own hands, where Semenov ordered others to kill, and therein lies the difference between Kalmykov and Semenov. To use a Russian expression, Kalmykov was "liquidated" (killed) by the Chinese when he was driven out of Siberia and tried to take refuge in China. Semenov was later driven out of Siberia and took refuge in Japan where he still lives.

I invited Mr. Carl W. Ackerman, representing the *New York Times*, and Mr. Herman Bernstein, of the *Herald-Tribune*, to go with me on my trip to Bira. These gentlemen were very keen observers, very much interested in the Russians and were anxious to learn the policy of the United States.

I have never been able to understand by what means or by what agencies the people of the United States were led to believe our troops went to Siberia to fight bolshevism. I could always understand why certain foreigners misrepresented the policy of American troops in Siberia, because I understood the object of this misrepresentation. The *New York Times* was certainly well informed on all International questions during the Wilson administration, and no paper in the United States had a better opportunity for obtaining real facts. Mr. Carl Ackerman, a representative of this paper, came to Siberia in October, 1918 and later stated, with reference to a conversation I had with an officer relative to the arrest of a Russian because he said he was a Bolshevik, that my instructions to the officer, "was the first intimation he had that the United States did not consider the Bolsheviks, everywhere, as enemies of the Allies."

As an indication of the erroneous impression that prevails, as to the use of American troops in Siberia, an article, in the *New York Times* of December 7, 1930, purports to give an account of a reply made by the late General Bliss, to a proposal by Marshal Foch for Allied action against Russia, at a meeting March 27, 1919, of the Big Four. The information contained in the article is reported as coming from Mr. Herbert Bayard Swope, who was chairman of the press delegation, to the Paris Peace Conference. The statement, in part is:

"Before the Armistice the United States, in common with other Allies, had sent troops into Russia to prevent, among other things, the possible capture of Russian munition supplies by the Germans. These troops were now in Siberia assisting White Russian detachments in fighting the Red armies."

The United States troops in Siberia, never engaged in fighting Red troops, before or after the Armistice. They did take part in a campaign in September, 1918, but the enemy forces were reported as being partly composed of German and Austrian prisoners. I believed this report, else American troops would not have taken part in this campaign.

In the same article, above referred to, appeared a purported statement of President Wilson also in reply to Marshal Foch's proposal as follows:

“To send troops, would be to create a state of War, into which the United States could not enter without a former declaration, by Congress, so I could not send a man, even if I wanted to, which I do not.”

The United States never entered into a state of War with Russia, or any faction of Russia. It was equally as unconstitutional to use American troops in hostile action in Siberia against any faction of Russia, as it would have been to send them to Russia with a view to using them in hostile action against the Russians. If I had permitted American troops to be used in fighting “Red armies,” as stated, I would have taken an immense responsibility upon myself, as no one above me, in authority, had given me any such orders. The fact that I did not permit American troops to be so used was responsible for nine-tenths of the criticism directed against us, while in Siberia. I was told by General Leonard Wood, upon my return from the Far East in December, 1920, that if I did not have copies of my papers I would be “torn limb from limb, in the United States, because I did not take part in fighting bolshevism.”

It was decided early in September, just after my arrival in Siberia, that it would be advisable to send troops to the Suchan Coal Mines with a view to opening the mines. These mines were situated about seventy-five miles east of Vladivostok and supplied coal for the Primorsk province and for the operation of the railroads in Eastern Siberia. The last forty-eight versts of the trip to the mines was made on a narrow gauge road, operated by cable. The political pot had been boiling around these mines for some time prior to the arrival of the Allied troops, and the controversies had virtually stopped operations. Allied Commanders unselfishly decided that the United States should look after this section. I consented and we sent a company of 250 Americans, a company of Japanese troops, and one Company of Chinese; all to be under the supervision of an American officer in so far as guards were concerned. This proved to be the “stormy petrel” of all our Siberian experiences. At this period of intervention, the Allied Commanders conferred as to conditions at Suchan and as to what was best to be done. The manager of the mines had previously been run out by the Bolsheviks, but the Allied Commanders thought it was advisable to return him, as he knew the mines and would probably produce more coal and incidentally more trouble for the Americans. This undertaking, at best, required military,

political, and economic consideration. To return the old manager added materially to the political complications. The manager, however, said he was an engineer and politics never entered into his calculations, but we found he changed considerably after he got his old job back and he soon became an ardent advocate of the old Czarist methods in dealing with the miners.

In order to get first hand information of the situation, I sent my Chief of Staff, Colonel O. P. Robinson, with the first troops to Suchan. He took every occasion to explain to the people that our object was to get out coal for the use, primarily, of the Russians. He found the people friendly and felt that a majority of the former miners were not opposed to the return of the old manager. Colonel Robinson reported upon his return, that he anticipated no trouble unless the manager by reasons of reprisal upon his former opponents provoked opposition. Colonel Robinson tried to show him that it was unwise to begin discharging men because of former troubles. Things went well at first, but soon reports reached me that the Allied Guard was being used for suppression of political activities. I sent the Commanding officer the following telegram:

“Troops must take no part in arresting people, because of their political affiliations, they have no authority to arrest and confine citizens, unless they commit some illegal act. I cannot hold in confinement a Russian citizen, because he has taken part in some meeting.”

Animosity and a desire for revenge seemed to exist to an unusual degree around the Suchan mines. Each side was always attributing actions to the representatives of the other side that did not accord with facts. The desire for revenge was deep seated in the Pro-Czarist people against the Soviets, because the Czarists had been driven out of the mines, prior to the arrival of the Allies in Siberia. These mines seemed to be the key points for trouble and will frequently be mentioned in future chapters.

IV

“AFTER THE ARMISTICE”

The signing of the Armistice, November 11, 1918, changed materially the duties of American troops, and brought other causes for discord between myself and the representatives of England, France, and Japan. Such military operations as the Americans had taken part in were based upon the belief that the hostile troops were composed, in part at least, of German and Austrian prisoners. As far as the energy put into military activities by the representatives of England, France, and Japan is concerned, it made no difference with them whether the organizations were Bolsheviks or composed of Bolsheviks and German and Austrian prisoners. Therefore, as far as they were concerned, the Military was used just the same after the signing of the Armistice as before. I took the stand that, as far as American troops were concerned, the United States was not at War with any part of Russia and we could not take any hostile action except to protect ourselves or the property placed in our charge. This added some to the bitterness of feeling which was already rather intense.

For about five months from the signing of the Armistice until the American troops, in accordance with instructions from Washington, took over the duties of helping guard the railroad there was only the ordinary garrison duty for our troops.

On November 5, an extract from a letter the War Department had received from the State Department was cabled to me as it related directly to questions arising in Siberia. This letter stated that the Consul General was authorized, not only to keep in personal touch, if possible, with local Governments, but to permit consular officers under him to give aid and advice to these Governments, in their effort to improve local conditions. This communication also stated that the United States Government was not yet prepared to recognize any new Government in Russia. At this time all towns on the railroad in Siberia were in charge of the Whites and consular agents were all located along the railroad. To give “aid and advice” to local

and municipal officers, in practice, was giving aid and advice exclusively to the Whites, which naturally caused the Bolsheviks to claim the United States was helping the Czarist adherents. If these consular officials had any personal feelings as to the Russian factions, and in all probability all did have, the instructions opened the door, to some extent, for United States representatives to take sides, if they so desired, and these people had feelings and opinions like everybody else.

As an example, I mention the wife of an American consular official at Vladivostok, who stated to me at a dinner where we were both guests, that she wished she had command of American soldiers, and stated as a reason for her wish, that she would send the Military to make those worthless people go to work. She also said that the ideas of freedom that were being placed in their heads had resulted in her having to increase the wages of her cook from ten to twelve dollars a month. Our personal interest has a great deal to do with shaping our judgment on all questions.

The instructions, above referred to, in my judgment, were the entering wedge to, what proved to be, a very distinct cleavage between the representatives of the State and the War Departments in Siberia. As time went on, further instructions were received by representatives of the State Department and these instructions were more indicative of the desires of someone higher in the scale of authority in Washington. All this time not a change of a single word was ever made in my instructions. The result should have been evident. The only benefit that I can imagine can come from such a policy is that it gives an opportunity to easily answer critics, by referring to the action of the State Department or the War Department, as the occasion demands. More will be said about these differences in the discussion of them later.

In April, 1918, the Allied diplomatic representatives were notified of the formation of the Government of autonomous Siberia, this was generally known as the "Siberian Government." In September of the same year a new Government was established at Ufa, known as the "Ufa Government" which was an all Russian Government. This latter resulted from a conference attended by some members of the Constituent Assembly, and was presided over by Mr. Avksentieff, former Minister of Interior in the Kerensky Cabinet. These two Governments coalesced early in November,

and formed a Government known as, “All Russian Provisional Government” with a directorate of five members.

On the night of November 18 and 19, the Directorate was overthrown and Admiral Kolchak declared himself the “Supreme Ruler of Russia.” A number of Russian officers, all Whites, engineered the *coup d'état* and it was common gossip in Siberia, that General Knox (British) was one of the moving spirits in this change of Government. There can be no question that the British troops were marching around the streets of Omsk the night of the Coup and this had the effect of giving aid to the Russians, engineering the change. There can also be no doubt that General Knox had much influence with Admiral Kolchak, and he seemed to want everyone to know of this influence.

There were many different reactions noticeable in Eastern Siberia, to the assumption of power by Admiral Kolchak. Those Allies favoring an Autocratic Government for Russia were well pleased with the change and all the Russians who had held office in the Czarist Government were more than pleased, because this was the only movement since the downfall of the Czar, which gave promise that they might hope to be restored to their old governmental status. The peasants of Siberia were not ready to show their hand, until there was some evidence of intent of the Kolchak Government. They had had enough of fighting and did not intend to take part in any more Wars if they could help it. They were the ones always mobilized to do the fighting in all Russian Wars and had lost more, in killed, during the World War, than any other nation. Their families had been subjected to great hardships during the War, and when they returned to their homes they found their means of cultivating the land had been taken by the Military. I had the greatest sympathy for these people and found them generous, kindly, and very hospitable.

People have often said to me, “were they not very simple and ignorant,” but you will not find these peasants so ignorant about the things pertaining to their own self-interest. Another erroneous impression in the United States is that these peasants do not desire an education. Everything I saw in Siberia refutes this. In passing through the villages, one would see the children going to school with no difference from the custom in the United States, except the boys carried their books in a knapsack, as a soldier carries

his pack. Another indication of an interest in and a desire for education was the fact that nearly all peasant delegations that came to see me about their problems, and there were more than a hundred such delegations, had the village schoolteacher as a member of the party.

When I first went to Siberia I conceived it to be my duty to study the people, their habits, their customs, their desires, and their aspirations, and it soon became a very fascinating work to me. I never talked to one of these peasants that I did not leave him with the thought that there is a human being with a generous and a big heart who literally carries out the injunction, "Do unto others as you would have them do unto you." These were a simple people, they reasoned simply. They had had no opportunity or means to study National or International questions and generally their vision only extended to limits of their own immediate interests. What opportunities to share in the benefits of modern civilization had been given these peasants, that would cause them to willingly take up arms to fight for either the Allies or the Central Powers? What reason did they have for thinking that by pouring the same old Russian wine from different bottles, they would have a better opportunity to enjoy the benefits and privileges of modern civilization than they had enjoyed under the Czar?

Admiral Kolchak surrounded himself with former Czarist officials and because these peasants would not take up arms and offer their lives to put these people back in power, they were kicked, beaten with knouts and murdered in cold blood by the thousands, and then the world called them "Bolsheviks." In Siberia, the word Bolshevik meant a human being who did not, by act and word, give encouragement to the restoration to power of representatives of Autocracy in Russia.

The Russian meaning of the term Bolshevik originated from the word "majority." It began to assume political significance in 1903, when the Russian Social Democratic Worker's Party assembled in London at the second Congress of the party. At this meeting, two points of view were manifested, one quite radical and revolutionary and the other, moderate and reformist. The adherents of the former, led by Lenin, were in a distinct majority at this meeting, and were called "Bolsheviks." The other side was called "Mensheviks," from the Russian word, minority. Up to 1912 the two

groups remained in the same political party, but after that time their differences could not be reconciled.

Since 1918, the Bolshevik party has been known as the Russian Communist party. Since the Russian Revolution, the word has been indiscriminately used in the United States, and has been applied to all kinds of activities, the real meaning depending upon the sympathies and affiliations of the person speaking. The word, as used in the United States, has more the meaning of “minority” than “majority.” It is generally used when speaking of the opposition to the dominant party or, at least, the person or persons in control. It is used when referring to church opposition, school opposition, town opposition, etc., etc. One gets no help by consulting the dictionary for a meaning of the word. If it had been limited to the meaning given in the Standard Dictionary, it could only be applied to the members of “the terroristic branch of the Democratic Party that became dominant in Russia during the revolution of March 1917.” This definition does not even include the present Soviet Government, as they came into power in November, 1917.

The word was, and is, loosely used but always carries with it a malevolent meaning in the United States, while in Siberia it was used in a special political sense, and was applied to every one who did not support Kolchak and the autocratic class surrounding him. The word has an entirely different meaning in the United States, especially when applied to Russians. The people of the United States pictured the Russian Bolsheviks, as men with a torch and a bomb, trying to destroy civilization. If any stigma is to attach to the word bolshevism as at present it does in the United States, then according to all moral precepts the Russian peasant is the least deserving of this stigma, of any Russian class I saw in Siberia.

The political meaning of the word Bolshevik, as used in Siberia, took in all the representatives of such Zemstvo organizations, as were opposed to the ideas of Kolchak relative to the kind of Government that should be established in Russia. These men had the confidence of the people, among whom they lived, as shown by their election to the positions they held, by the votes of their own countrymen and neighbors.

No one in Siberia, excepting those belonging to the Kolchak supporters, enjoyed any of the boons of modern civilization, such as freedom of speech, freedom of press, freedom of assembly, and freedom of legal action, which are well recognized heritages of all civilized people. The Zemstvos, the dumas, and the cooperatives were such well-known legal, reliable, and law abiding organizations, that it would have been difficult for Kolchak to have justified to the world, the oppressive measures used against these people if they had been referred to by their proper names. This could be, and was, easily avoided by putting all who were not Kolchak supporters good, bad, and indifferent, into one class and calling that class Bolsheviks, which out of Russia at least automatically cast a serious reflection upon the character of these men. How could these Zemstvo representatives and thousands of other Russians like them, no better and no worse, have escaped the stigma attached to them in the United States, due to their political classification as Bolsheviks in Siberia? There was only one way, and that was to disregard their principles, give up their own ideas of Government, take off their coats, jump in the Kolchak boat and pull.

Apparently the Immigration authorities in the United States employed the same political classification of Russians in Siberia as was used by Kolchak. I know of one Russian who was representing the cooperatives of Siberia, and took no part in the political differences, who received permission to come to the United States on business in 1919. My investigations convinced me, before this Russian left Vladivostok, that he was an honest, upright man. When he reached San Francisco he was taken in charge by the Immigration authorities, and stigmatized in the San Francisco press, as being probably the worst Bolshevik in Siberia. Why was this man a Bolshevik? He did not oppose Kolchak, but he was a Bolshevik because he was not in the Kolchak boat and pulling.

Now let us turn the picture and look at the other side. In 1919 Semenov sent a Captain of his Staff to Washington, and this emissary not only had no trouble in getting into the United States, but I saw in the press that a certain prominent American had arranged for this Russian to make a talk on conditions in Siberia while on his way from San Francisco to Washington. I do not know the object of the visit of Semenov's agent, but he boastfully claimed that one object was to get me relieved from command of American troops. When this Russian returned to Vladivostok, he said the War

Department had been very considerate, and had designated Colonel Cronin, United States Army, to escort him around Washington, and help him meet the prominent people. He also said that when he left Washington, Colonel Cronin assured him that I would be relieved before he got back to Vladivostok. This man represented Semenov and it is certainly fair to assume that he had the same moral and criminal character as his chief, whom he represented. Semenov's character was well known in Washington, therefore one can only assume that character was ignored, and political classification alone considered, in determining whether a Russian should be permitted to enter the United States. The general information for immigrants, issued by the United States Department of Labor, states:

“The immigration laws intend that only those aliens who are mentally sound, morally clean and physically fit, shall enter into the United States.”

If Semenov was “morally clean,” then I never saw a human being who was not morally clean. Did any one in Siberia ever report that he met the requirements of our law, in so far as being “morally clean,” is concerned? I do not believe they did. The American Consul General, Mr. Harris, talked to me about Semenov, and, in fact, he read me part of a report he had made to the State Department in Washington, in which he referred forcefully to Semenov's character, and it is hardly possible, and I think very improbable, that Mr. Harris ever changed his mind about the character of Semenov.

The reaction of the workmen was more hostile to Kolchak than any other class, but this was natural, as in all countries the workmen are in a position to be more easily affected by the policy of their Government.

The British, the French, and the American State Department representatives were all very friendly to Admiral Kolchak from the start, but this friendship was to be expected from the British and the French who had been openly opposing the Soviets from the beginning of the Soviet regime. It is noticeable that the declaration of the British Government to the Russian people, August 7, 1918, printed in *Current History*, Vol. VIII, Part 2, contained no specific statement that the English would not intervene in the internal conflicts of the Russian people. This omission would not be so noticeable and not so indicative of intent, had the United States not asked

all nations taking part in the movement in Siberia, to solemnly assure the Russian people that the powers, joining in the movement, did not intend to intervene in her internal conflicts. The United States and Japan did make such a specific promise and history will have to determine if these two nations kept this promise and if not, why not. In a book recently published, "The Soviets in World Affairs," written by Louis Fisher, Vol. I, on page 127, appears the following:

"Harris, the American representative (says Kolchak) showed me the greatest feeling of friendship and extraordinary sympathy."

A day after the coup, Mr. Harris promised the new dictator, so said Kolchak, United States aid, and to those of us who were in Siberia, during the regime of Admiral Kolchak, there was no question but that the American Consul General was an enthusiastic believer in him and helped him in every possible way. In discussing conditions with Consul General Harris, he said to me there was no hope of settling conditions except by the Cadet party, which was Kolchak's party.

Japan was not an ardent supporter of Admiral Kolchak, in fact, at first, she opposed the Admiral. On November 26 and 28, I received reports that appeared to me worthy of credence, which stated that the Japanese officer with Semenov was trying to get him to declare himself Dictator of Trans-Baikalia and seize the railroads and tunnels. On the 28th of November, ten days after Admiral Kolchak became Supreme Dictator, I had information that seemed reliable, that Semenov was directed from Tokyo to oppose Kolchak and the Japanese representative in Siberia followed this policy. As soon as it was known that Japan was supporting Semenov with troops and money at Chita, and Kalmykov, at Habarovsk; then it was known, in Siberia at least, that Japan did not desire conditions settled there, and a strong stable Government established in power. In March, 1918, Japan asked the Allies to permit her alone to take the Chinese Eastern and Amur railroads as well as Vladivostok, if the Allies considered it necessary to occupy Eastern Siberia. Although this proposition was blocked by the United States, Japan had not given up hope of eventually accomplishing her desire when the Allies sent troops to Siberia.

Semenov and Kalmykov soldiers, under the protection of Japanese troops, were roaming the country like wild animals, killing and robbing the people, and these murders could have been stopped any day Japan wished. If questions were asked about these brutal murders, the reply was that the people murdered were Bolsheviks and this explanation, apparently, satisfied the world. Conditions were represented as being horrible in Eastern Siberia, and that life was the cheapest thing there.

There were horrible murders committed, but they were not committed by the Bolsheviks as the world believes. I am well on the side of safety when I say that the anti-Bolsheviks killed one hundred people in Eastern Siberia, to every one killed by the Bolsheviks. It was my judgment when in Siberia, and is now, that Japan always hoped, by fostering these murderers, that the United States would become disgusted with conditions, withdraw her troops and request Japan to go in and clean up the situation.

Japanese Russian supporters were always the foci of malicious falsehoods about American troops. General Horvath came to me and told me that on a certain date, the Japanese controlled press was going to begin a violent and abusive campaign against Americans, and said their idea was that I would have to take action and if I did take action they hoped to succeed in having me relieved from command; and if I failed to notice it, Russians would have a contempt for us, because they could not imagine anyone with soldiers at their disposal, permitting such to appear in the press unless these charges were true. The campaign of vilification started on the date that General Horvath said it would. I felt I had to stop such scurrilous articles, and took actions which did stop it, but not without much local criticism of the United States for advocating freedom of the press, and permitting their agent in Russia to prevent the "Russian" press from telling "facts."

The accuracy of statements concerning United States troops in Siberia can be fairly well judged by a comment of Louis Fisher in Vol. I, page 227, of his book entitled "Soviets in World Affairs." Mr. Fisher says:

"Kolchak too dislikes the conduct of the American."

This is probably absolutely true. His dislike did not extend to the behavior or deportment of United States troops but was entirely due to the fact that they would not, and did not, aid his supporters to spread a reign of terror among the peasants and workmen, who had committed no crimes; who were living peaceful lives, and who could see no reason why they should take up arms and try to put Czarist officials in power. Mr. Fisher further states that Kolchak received a report, dated December 12, 1919, from an agent in Vladivostok, in which he said:

1. "The United States Soldiers are infected with Bolshevism."
2. "That most of them are Jews from the East Side of New York City who constantly agitate for mutinies."

These are characteristic of the charges that were made against Americans in Siberia and, although not substantiated by facts, they were constantly offered in an effort to force United States troops to join in the acts of terror against a helpless and peaceful citizenship, or failing in that to force them to leave Siberia, and thereby remove the little restraint we exerted by our presence.

So far as I know, no one in Washington ever gave to the public a single statement as to the orders given to American troops for their guidance in Siberia, or as to the outrages being committed by the Kolchak supporters. The policy of the United States was given to the public, but no information that I was to follow that policy.

Upon my departure from Siberia, I received a cable suggesting that I refrain from discussing Siberian questions, and there were many acts committed there that the participants must have hoped would never be disclosed. Reputable and disinterested writers, on intervention in Siberia, will obtain their information from all available sources and if no information as to the object of intervention is given out by the United States representatives, these writers must go to a probably prejudiced source for their information and such a source is almost sure to represent the United States as being recreant in the performance of their duty; not because of conduct, but because the Army failed to follow the line of action the speaker thought it should follow, and thereby encouraged bolshevism.

As representatives of England, France, and Japan, since the termination of intervention, have officially stated that the fear of bolshevism in the Far East had much to do with their acts in Siberia, one can not escape the conviction that these Governments were not entirely candid in their announcements just prior to intervention, as the word bolshevism was not mentioned in the public announcements given to the world by any nation taking part in Russian intervention.

As to Kolchak's statement, quoted in Mr. Fisher's book, it was well known that the Russian Kolchak supporters were constantly trying to discredit every Foreign representative in Siberia who did not support Kolchak and facts had nothing to do with their representations. This is proven by the statement that "most of the American troops were Jews from New York." Most of these troops came from men mobilized on the Pacific Coast. Why was such a statement made? Because the Kolchak supporters had given up any hope of receiving active military support from American troops, and if the world and especially the Czarist officials surrounding Kolchak could be made to believe that the United States had sent a command composed of Russian Jews to Siberia, the reason we did not support Kolchak would appear evident. These false reports were not occasional, but appeared almost daily for several months and, at one time, they became so virulent that I notified Mr. Soukine, Kolchak's Minister of Foreign Affairs, that if they did not stop, I would arrest the editor of one paper and put a padlock on the building in which this paper was published. This drastic act on my part was occasioned by the paper publishing a statement that all Americans were degenerates, and other statements which common decency makes it impossible for me to repeat.

I was directed from Washington that, in the future, I would deal through the State Department in such matters. This appeared to me to be a question where diplomatic language and procedure could not be effectively used, but I succeeded in abating, to some extent, this particularly virulent and coarse propaganda. During the period of these violent outbursts I was notified through a Kolchak liaison officer, that two Czarist Russian General officers, both supporters of Kolchak, would stop this propaganda against me and other Americans, if I would pay them twenty thousand dollars a month.

I believe the reason Japan wanted our troops out of Siberia, and wanted the United States to ask her to settle conditions, was that she thought this would absolve her from the solemn assurance to the Russian people, made at the request of Mr. Wilson, not to impair Russia's territorial integrity now or hereafter. Japan had recently come to be considered one of the five big powers of the world and she was naturally very desirous that her action should be in consonance with the ideas of other big powers, as to the solemnity of obligations involved in international agreements. This required cooperation.

The assumption of power by Kolchak was unexpected by the Czechs. They had put the new Siberian Government in power all along the Trans-Siberian Railroad and, as previously stated, the Czech did not like the sound of Supreme Ruler. General Gajda complicated matters by announcing that he favored the Dictatorship before the Czech National Council could formulate its policy. He stated that the Russians could not be ruled by kindness or persuasion, but only by the whip and bayonet. He also expressed the opinion that a strong dictator was necessary to bring order and to expel bolshevism. This statement was circulated widely and increased Gajda's popularity with the Russians supporting Admiral Kolchak. The effect was very different with the Czechs. It became clear that Gajda's Division heartily disapproved of his views, and bitter criticism of him and his Russian associates spread rapidly. His men objected to the Russian officers on his Staff, and attributed their military failures to Russian methods. The aversion of the Czech for the Russian was thus much increased and both officers and men became insolent to the Russians. Czechs were openly saying that the Czech non-commissioned officers were better than the Russian officers. It became known on November 20, that the Czech National Council had decided to issue a proclamation opposing the Dictatorship, on the ground that the Czechs could not approve an illegal establishment of a Government without the consent of those to be governed; and those authorized to form a Government. Gajda then made disparaging statements about the Czech Council and tried to suppress all forms of propaganda against the Kolchak regime. These actions of Gajda's served to further alienate his troops and cause them to determine not to participate in the suppression of any uprising that might occur against Kolchak troops. The Czech leaders became very much divided, some with what was known

as the “constituent” group and some of the others violently opposed to the constituent group.

During this intense feeling among the Czechs, Gajda ordered the 5th Czech Regiment to the front for an attack on Perm. The Regiment flatly refused to go and sent delegates to the council to explain their reasons, and the reasons presented were:

1st A disinclination to fight in Russian quarrels. If the Allies really wished to fight the Bolsheviks, they would send assistance.

2nd Fighting now would benefit the Omsk Government which they did not wish to support. . . .

7th Doubt as to whether fighting Bolshevism was what the Allies desired.

Soon after the *coup d'état*, an uprising had been planned by workers of the Ural factories, but the Czechs were able to prevent it. The Czech officers, or those higher in authority, were very anxious to take some action that would remove the stigma coming from the refusal of the 5th Regiment to go to the front in obedience to Gajda's orders, as well as to prevent the spread of dissension in the ranks. General Syrový got Gajda to Cheliabinsk, and then he gave the order to the 5th Regiment to move to the front, but stated that activities would be held up until the arrival of General Stefanik, the War Minister of Czecho-Slovakia.

On November 4, a telegram came from President Masaryk asking the Czechs to hold on as Allied help was coming. I have no knowledge as to where President Masaryk got his information, but, presumably it came from the French. While I was in Siberia, I saw a communication written in French and signed by Major Guinet (French) and Mr. De Witt C. Poole (American), telling the Czechs, Allies were coming and to hold on to the railroad.

This was rather interesting to me, as I had been definitely told American troops would not go west of Irkutsk. If American troops were not to go to the assistance of the Czechs, I could not understand why Mr. Poole should take part in telling them Allied troops were coming. This, again, looked like lack of team work on the part of the Americans.

General Syrový stated that the Czechs felt badly about the Omsk Government, for it seemed as if they had betrayed their responsibility to the Russian people in the matter of safeguarding their rights. There was an evident anxiety on the part of the Czechs, as to whether the Kolchak adherents would act in accord with the Czech views as to the rights of the people. The Czechs were removed from the front which improved the situation, and Gajda was granted a leave of absence without any request coming from him.

On December 24, Gajda was appointed senior Commander of all Siberian forces in the Ekaterinburg region, which was undoubtedly a reward for his services to Kolchak, and he immediately began planning for a military movement. The Czechs, as was to be expected, had difficulties with the Kolchak troops used in this movement.

By January 20, 1919, all Czech troops in the front were replaced by White Russians and the feeling was such, by this time, that the Russian White Army was glad to see the Czechs go. Some of the villages, however, where the Czechs had been quartered were sorry to see them go, and asked them to remain and settle down as inhabitants. It was stated that many Czechs gave serious consideration to this invitation, though it is not known how many did accept. The feeling was such that the Czechs could not get out without a further complication with the Kolchak Russians over surplus arms and equipment they were to turn over to them. These Czechs, in Siberia, were remarkable soldiers and always looked the part. There seemed to be no trifiers in their ranks, and when they were assigned to a military duty they brooked no interference with their proper performance of that duty.

During my entire stay in Siberia the official relations between the representatives of England, France, and Japan on one side and myself on the other, steadily became more strained, and these representatives seemed to have no patience with anyone who did not actively support Kolchak. At that time I personally felt, that if Admiral Kolchak could carry out his reported ideas, there was some hope that he would establish a Government with views between the extreme factions, that might be acceptable to the great mass of Russians. I particularly felt this way after he gave an interview to Mr. Sharkey, Associated Press, on Russian New Year, of 1919,

which purported to give Kolchak's views as to the principles upon which he hoped to establish a Government in Siberia. I later came to the conclusion that he did not have the confidence of the mass of the people and therefore could not establish a Government. With reference to this interview I took my first step into Russian politics. The result was not encouraging to say the least, and this was my first and last effort to try to act as mediator between two Russian factions.

Some representatives of the Social Revolutionists, I remember a Mr. Gaiman and a Mr. Morovsky, both former members of the "Derber Government," in Siberia, came to see me, and I invited their attention to the statement of principles sent out by Admiral Kolchak, and told them that these were the same principles of Government they had told me they advocated. They laughed and said I did not understand Russia, and that this interview was for consumption in the United States. They said Admiral Kolchak and the people around him had no intention to carry out this announced policy. I, however, insisted upon these gentlemen telling me whether they would support Admiral Kolchak if he would carry out these announced policies. They finally told me they would, and the only thing they wanted was some means of assuring themselves that these announced policies were being carried out. I thought this was fair enough and I asked General Romanovsky, who was, at that time, handling political affairs for the Omsk Government, to come to my office, but when I told him what these gentlemen had said and asked him if he thought it possible to get together and try to stop some of the useless spilling of Russian blood, he flew into a rage and said:

"The idea of these people speaking of condition upon which they would support the Omsk Government, and before long, such characters, as I had been talking to would be glad to come to the Omsk Government, put their heads on the ground, beg for forgiveness and for an opportunity to support Admiral Kolchak."

I began early in 1919 to realize that United States Consul General Harris was opposed to my views of "non-interference in the internal affairs of Russia," and supported Kolchak where he could. I also began to sense that I had opposition in Washington. I had recently been on duty in Washington and still had many Army friends there so I began trying to find

who were my real friends and who were my critics. My service there enabled me to tell, at least to my own satisfaction, in what offices my actions would receive sympathetic consideration, and where they would be criticized, if possible. For example, I received a cable from Washington, containing a rather sharp, pungent criticism of me for lack of supervision of my censorship regulation, winding up by telling me that I would give this my personal attention. I personally examined all communications from my office, and could find no violation of censorship regulations. After this examination, I realized that Brigadier General Marlborough Churchill, head of Military Information Division, where censorship questions were handled, was anxious, at the behest of someone, to be critical. I then had to watch my communications which, under the rules of the War Department, would be checked by the Adjutant General to Military Information Division, and later events amply justified my judgment. I am glad to record that, with the exception of the Military Information Division, I not only have no criticism of any branch of the War Department, but have always been most grateful for the cooperation and help I received. To avoid what I conceived would probably be unfair consideration of papers that would naturally go to the Military Information Division, I frequently departed from the prescribed rules of correspondence in the War Department, and sent some communications to the Chief of Staff instead of to the Adjutant General. After I had examined the critical cable relative to my alleged carelessness in handling censorship questions, I cabled to General March, Chief of Staff, telling him I could find nothing wrong with censorship at my Headquarters, and expressed a regret that the cable did not specify wherein there was neglect. I received a reply from General March saying my views on censorship were exactly correct, and he would see that I was not annoyed by any more communications of that kind.

Soon after I arrived in Siberia, fifteen officers and very high class men reported to me from Military Intelligence Office in Washington, for Military Intelligence work in Siberia. The majority of them, as I remember, came from Educational Institutions, and I was very much pleased with their appearance as well as their standing and reputation in the United States. I was careful to see that all of these officers understood the orders:

“Not to interfere in political affairs, and not to intervene in internal conflicts.”

I then sent them out to various parts of Siberia, all at railroad towns with a view to getting reports on the military, political, social, and economic conditions in Siberia. I soon received a cablegram from the War Department, stating that the Government expected to get their information as to conditions in Siberia from the representatives of the State Department. This cable puzzled me very much. While it contained no instructions to me, the meaning seemed clear that the Government wanted me to know that what I said of Siberia, or of conditions there, would be ignored. Such a peculiar cablegram as this had some significance or meaning which was not entirely disclosed, and if the State Department wanted to know the real conditions in Siberia, why did they propose to ignore the information coming from the great majority of United States representatives? The Army was in a much better position to get the facts, than the State Department, because of the much larger number of observers, and the greater number of places from which reports were received, and I can not admit that the Army observers had less intelligence than the Consular agents of the State Department in Siberia. If the State Department did not attach any importance to the Army reports, why not throw them in a waste basket? Why tell me they were going to ignore my reports? The facts of the matter were, these Army reports were pinching somewhere. They wanted information along a certain line, as was disclosed by their cable sent to Mr. August Heid, representative of the War Trade Board, functioning under the State Department, that he, Mr. Heid, was not sending the kind of information the State Department wanted him to send out of Siberia. The Military was not supporting any faction and was, therefore, in a position to report the facts as the observers saw them, regardless of whether the reports were favorable or unfavorable to any faction. I communicated with the War Department, asking what this cable meant and received a reply from General March saying I was sending just the information he wanted, and to keep it up. It was evident to me then that Consul General Harris or the Russian Division of the State Department in Washington, both of whom were Kolchak supporters, were not pleased with the information the Military was sending, relative to the Omsk regime. I was quite annoyed, after receiving General March's cablegram, as it appeared to me that the State Department, or some one in that Department, had sized me up as a weak man who could easily be frightened, as well as easily deterred from performing what I conceived to be my duty.

At this time there was considerable criticism in the United States of the action of American troops in Siberia. This criticism took different forms, some suggesting that the Americans had become bolshevistic; some suggesting that we could watch the situation from the United States, as well as from Siberia; and some were critical of my selection to command the American forces, because of my lack of experience in the command of large bodies of troops. Mr. George Harvey, of *Harvey's Weekly*, seemed to be the most severe critic. He, of course, as usual, used his sarcasm, not only against me, but against the Secretary of War because of my selection for the Siberian command. These criticisms were very familiar, as they were almost as common as my meals in Siberia. The American Consul at Vladivostok was cabling to the State Department each day, without comment, the libelous, false and scurrilous articles appearing in the Vladivostok press about the American troops. These articles, and the criticism of the American troops in the United States, were built around the charge of being bolshevistic. This charge could not have been based upon any act of the American troops, because there was not a single incident where they gave aid or comfort to the Bolsheviks, but the charge was the same that was lodged against every one in Siberia who did not support Kolchak, by Kolchak adherents, which included Consul General Harris.

Evidently this idea became so wide spread in the United States that the Government, in one case at least, decided to watch Americans who had seen service in Siberia. This statement is based upon an incident that took place at the Commodore Hotel in New York City, in November, 1921. A self-appointed committee had made arrangements for as many of the Americans as possible, with service in Siberia, to meet at a dinner given at the Commodore Hotel in New York. There were about sixty people at this dinner, and all had seen service or were relatives of those who had seen service in Siberia. Admiral Knight and I were both present. After we sat down at the table, a man who was unknown to any of the committee came in to the room and also took a seat at the table. The senior member of the committee found an opportunity and asked this man who he was. The man showed him a Department of Justice badge and said he had been ordered from Washington to be present at this meeting, that he was going to remain, and he advised the representative of the committee not to cause any trouble. Nothing was said about the incident until after the dinner, when the

representative of the committee saw the Assistant Manager of the hotel and asked for an explanation. The Assistant Manager said the man had shown him credentials and papers, which made it impossible for him to do anything except take him to the dining room. There is no doubt in my mind that the Department of Justice agent was sent to this dinner by some official of the United States Government, and so far as I know, the practice of sending secretly, and without the consent of the guests, an agent of the Department of Justice to a private dinner is only resorted to when there is fear of subversive activity against the United States. Practically every person at this dinner had done their best for the United States during the War; they were proud of their service for their country, and the country should have been grateful to them for this service. All who knew of this incident felt mortified and hurt. If I had known of this man's presence at the time of the dinner, I would have advised demanding of the hotel management that he be removed from the dining room and, in case of refusal, I would have advised all the dinner guests to leave the hotel, and I could certainly not have sat quietly at a dinner table where the Department of Justice was watching my acts, or my speech. This, after Admiral Knight had given more than forty years of his life and I had given more than thirty-seven of mine, to the service of our country.

In December, 1918, another effort was made to prevent freedom of action of the United States Military in Siberia. General Knox came to my office and showed me a communication from the British Government, approving his recommendation that General Janin (French) would command all Russian and Allied forces operating against the Bolsheviks, and that he, General Knox, would have command of the lines of communication, and also have charge of the training of the troops. I suppose he wanted to get my reaction to his proposition, as he knew well the American troops were not fighting Bolsheviks, and were not being controlled by either General Knox or General Janin.

In my judgment, it would have been most unfortunate if the United States had taken any action that would have placed the use of American troops under the direction of English, French, or Japanese in Siberia. There were constant efforts being made to bring about this situation and, if it had been done, no one can doubt that the American troops would have been used to kill Russians for their political beliefs. This would have been bad

enough, but there is another side to the picture that I believe is of more importance to the American people, and that is, that American troops would also have been used to bring resentment against the United States by the Russian people. Situations could have been created for this specific purpose.

The English and French can not be charged with guarding a railroad that was being used for the exclusive use of Kolchak and against the interest of the great mass of Russians, because these nations did not send enough troops to Siberia to enable them to take part in guarding the railway. Was this failure to aid in guarding the railroad designed to escape the resentment of the people which came upon the other nations who did use troops to extend the Russian War, by guarding the railroads, and in this way, give assistance to the losing side? The British had two or three times as many officers in Siberia as did the United States, but few soldiers. Notwithstanding this fact, I find that Mr. Fisher in Vol. I, page 197 of his, "Soviets in the World Affairs," says:

"The Commander-in-Chief of all the interventionists' strength with Kolchak, was at one time, the British General, Knox, and later the French General, Janin."

This is not a fact, and it would be interesting to know where Mr. Fisher got his information, as no foreigner ever commanded American troops while I was in Siberia. Why, and by whom was such information given out? It is fair to assume that some English or French representative gave out the information, as they thought this report would add to the prestige of England and France.

On December 13, 1918, General Knox told me that England had sent him material for arming and equipping 100,000 Russians. On the same date I notified the War Department as follows:

"All information that I am able to obtain leads me to the conclusion that the Government, headed by Admiral Kolchak, can not last."

I also stated in the same letter:

“Russians continue to inform me, that because of our presence here, the autocratic class are enabled to try to re-establish an autocratic form of government, the United States is losing prestige and the people are not sure as to our belief in a representative form of Government for other countries.”

The Acting Secretary of State notified the Secretary of War that:

“The views expressed by General Graves vary in some degree from those of other representatives of this Government in Siberia.”

By December 1, 1918, the actions of Ataman Kalmykov, of the Ussuri Cossacks had become very embarrassing to me. The United States had asked Japan to join in the limited objects for which American troops were sent to Siberia and every act of Japan, or Japanese paid Russian agents, was, logically, a discredit or a credit to the United States; and Russians were sure to think; because the United States had invited Japan to join her in action in Siberia, that she must be working with her. Japan, in her intent to divide the people and prevent a strong Government from emerging in Siberia, soon had Semenov and Kalmykov in her employ. It is hard to imagine a man like Kalmykov existing in modern civilization, and there was hardly a day passed without some report of the terrible atrocities committed by him or his troops. On December 1, I reported to the War Department, in part:

“I, of course, under my instructions to take no part in the internal squabbles could do nothing, with the exception that I have reported to the Japanese Headquarters that the excesses of Kalmykov should be stopped and that his actions were a disgrace to civilization. I did this, and so informed them that I did it, because it is well known that he was being paid by Japan and, that if Japan should stop supporting him, his excesses would stop immediately.”

I later proposed by letter to the Japanese Commander that we notify Kalmykov in writing the next time he or his men murdered a Russian, that we would use such force as was necessary to arrest him and turn him over

to the Russians for trial by the civil court. I received a reply from Japanese Headquarters saying:

“Kalmykov had promised them, on November 28, that he would not kill any more people, and that he had kept that promise but, if I desired, they would join me in notifying him as I had suggested.”

It was evident that Kalmykov did not kill, after that, where Americans could verify the murder, but it was also evident that he was taking his victims where Americans could not see their bodies. Two women came to my office from a town two or three hundred miles from Vladivostok, and told me Kalmykov had come through their village and had taken their husbands. They begged me to help find out if these men were alive and if alive, where Kalmykov had taken them. I directed the Commanding Officer at Habarovsk to ask Kalmykov where these men were. Kalmykov replied that they had escaped, and he gave the Commanding Officer, what purported to be, a copy of instructions he had sent to all stations to see that they were recaptured. It later developed that when his train was passing over a lake, Kalmykov had it stop while he had stones tied to the necks of these men, and they were thrown into the lake. Reports of the terrible atrocities being committed by Kalmykov troops continued to reach American Headquarters almost daily, but as I had no means of verifying the truth of these stories I could take no action.

The beginning of Kalmykov's power in the Spring of 1918 was when he was selected Ataman of the Ussuri Cossacks. This Cossack assembly authorized him to seek a loan from the Allies for the purpose of enabling the Cossacks to finance their spring planting. Japan made the loan on condition that the Ussuri Cossacks would not join the Bolshevik forces. The money, advanced by Japan, enabled Kalmykov to go to Progranichnaya and begin organizing a Division of Cossacks, with a Japanese Major as adviser in the organization of the troops. This information was furnished by Kalmykov's agents in Vladivostok.

During the Ussuri campaign, July to September, 1918, Kalmykov's Cossacks participated, and entered Habarovsk with Japanese troops, September 5 and 6, 1918. Kalmykov remained in Habarovsk and carried on

his regime of terror, extortion and bloodshed, which eventually caused his own troops to mutiny and seek the protection of the American troops. Under the pretext of combating bolshevism, he resorted to the unscrupulous arrest of people of some means, tortured them to secure their money and executed some on the ground of bolshevism. These arrests were so frequent that all classes of the population were terrorized and it was estimated that there were several hundred persons executed by Kalmykov troops in the vicinity of Habarovsk. These murders we established as best we could from peasants and depositions of local legal authorities. Kalmykov's troops began flogging and striking members of his own command and on December 6, the Intelligence officer of the 27th Infantry reported that the situation was becoming serious. There is no question about the disloyalty of, at least, one half of the troops under Kalmykov, and on December 28, a number of his men appeared at Headquarters of the 27th infantry, asking permission to enlist in the United States Army, and many wanted assistance in getting away from Habarovsk. The Japanese sensed trouble and ordered all buildings in Habarovsk searched for arms. The search resulted in finding 218 rifles, 138 pistols and some ammunition for the same.

On the nights of January 27 and 28, 1919, seven hundred of Kalmykov's troops deserted. Three hundred of these men went into hiding in near by towns; about thirty asked protection of the Chinese troops, and three hundred and ninety-eight, with animals and arms, including 4 guns and 3 machine guns, came in a body to Headquarters 27th Infantry, and told the American Commander if he would give them protection from Kalmykov, they would surrender all their arms and equipment; but if the American Commander would not protect them, they would return in a body and fight it out with the remainder of Kalmykov's troops. According to Japanese statement there still remained about four hundred Cossacks with Kalmykov. The Commanding Officer said in his report:

“To prevent bloodshed and plunder in garrison, city and vicinity and for the safety of our troops, I placed the deserters under guard and rendered them powerless for plunder and disorder. This was accomplished quietly and at the wish of the mutineers who were without officials.”

I approved Colonel Styer's action but could not approve his suggestion that they might be turned over to the senior officer, recognized by Horvath and Kolchak, for reorganization or for discharge. I felt conditions were too uncertain, and if these men should be turned over to any Kolchak Russian, there was a considerable chance that they might get into the hands of Kalmykov and that meant certain death for all of them. I notified Colonel Styer that the disposition of these men was a question for their own decision and one in which the Americans could take no part. I decided this on the ground that Kalmykov was not recognized as controlling any legal body of men and did not recognize any superior Russian authority, but was a hireling and puppet of Japan. As was to be expected, the Japanese were very much exercised over the mutiny of Kalmykov's men and their Chief of Staff came to see me and later wrote me a letter asking my view. To this I replied:

“First—Such soldiers will not be delivered, by the American forces, to Kalmykov, Horvath or the representatives of either at Habarovsk, or elsewhere, but will be released at Habarovsk and permitted to go where they please.”

“Second—Upon such release, they will be given reasonable protection against persecution by Kalmykov, or his forces, on groundless charges, or charges of desertion, rebellion or mutiny.”

“Third—While yet under control of American forces, any of such soldiers will be delivered to the local civil authorities upon service of Judicial warrants, for murder or other crimes, violative of Russian laws, provided that there shall accompany such warrants a synopsis of the evidence against the accused person indicating prima facie evidence of guilt.”

“Fourth—All this is but reasonable protection to prevent ruthless sacrifice of human lives, and for the proper protection of our own soldiers and property.”

The Japanese then asked that the deserters be placed under a joint guard of Japanese and Americans. This, of course, was not acceded to by the

Americans. The Japanese Commander at Habarovsk then submitted a memorandum to Colonel Styer containing the following:

“First—For what reason and with what responsibility has your detachment received armed soldiers deserting Ataman Kalmykov’s detachment?”

“Second—The desertion involved, and your reception of the soldier, is an event within Kalmykov’s detachment and is simply a matter of its Military discipline. This case is believed as interference with the interior administration of Kalmykov’s detachment. What is your opinion of it?”

“Third—What is your opinion as to the disposition of the Russian soldiers that you have received in your detachment?”

The Japanese seemed determined to inject themselves into this question and it was known, as well as anything could be known, without legal documentary evidence, that Japan was paying, controlling, and had equipped this body of murderers. Colonel Styer telegraphed to Vladivostok the substance of the Japanese Commander’s question. I notified him that the questions would be handled in Vladivostok, and for him not to release any of these prisoners without authority from me.

Shortly after this, a Colonel of the General Staff from Japanese Headquarters came to see me and after telling me that the Japanese Chief of Staff was ill, he said he had come to request me to return the prisoners to Kalmykov. I replied that this would never be done. He then asked me to turn them over to the Japanese and let them settle it. I told him that I considered his suggestion bordered on an insult, and that I had no intention of asking Japanese approval or disapproval of my acts, and that the interview was over. He replied that General Inagaki would come to see me about it, and I told him that I would not discuss this question again with any representative of Japan.

In a few days General Inagaki, the Japanese Chief of Staff, appeared and apologized for the action of the General Staff Colonel, and said his suggestion was inexcusable and that Japanese Headquarters did not approve of his action, and he hoped I would overlook the matter. I told him that I

was glad to know that his Headquarters did not approve of the Colonel's action and, so far as I was concerned, we would drop the question. I felt sure this Colonel had been sent to American Headquarters by Japanese higher authority.

On February 4, 1919, Colonel Styer telegraphed:

“There is no semblance of discipline left in Kalmykov's force, His Government from Nikolsk to Iman is a disgrace to the Allies, who must tacitly approve it, if only by their presence. His power of life and death has been so indiscriminately used as to create a reign of terror, and the life of no soldier or civilian is safe. Have restricted our men to limits of garrison to prevent possible trouble with Kalmykov's undisciplined remnants. The Cossack officers of rank were quartered in the Japanese Headquarters building.”

The problem of what to do with the deserters was complicated by the fact that, in the course of the mutiny, a Cossack had been wounded and had later died of his wounds, and there was a possibility that the murderer might be among the men under the protection of the United States. Seven of these men had expressed a desire to be released and were allowed to go from the United States protection. Colonel Styer was very anxious to get rid of them and again suggested that he turn them over to Russian officers designated by General Ivanoff-Rinoff.

I replied:

“The difficulty in acting as you suggest is that we do not recognize any Russian Army and consequently do not recognize Kalmykov, and while agreeing with you, we do not want to protect a murderer, it is not believed practicable to permit Russians of Ivanoff-Rinoff's selection to make the necessary investigation, among the men you are now holding, to locate the murderer. However, you should make such investigation as you can with a view to determining if the murderer is among the men you have. We cannot turn these men over to anyone except upon the specific request of the men themselves. My view of the situation is that you simply disarmed a band of men to prevent

bloodshed. The men may be permitted to go as individuals, or in a body, when ever they want to go.”

On February 22, Colonel Styer reported that the situation regarding the mutineers was working out satisfactorily along the lines approved by me, and the large majority would shortly be released, and on March 15, he reported that only thirty-five prisoners remained and that they would be released within three days.

This incident gave Japan an excellent opportunity to start their controlled local press in spreading anti-American propaganda and especially against the United States military forces. General Oi, Japanese Commander, had shown his hand to such an extent that Americans felt that if we should have a conflict with Kalmykov, we would have to reckon with the Japanese forces under the command of General Oi. Kalmykov asserted that, “no violence or cruelty had ever been done in his detachment, which stands for law and order and defends citizens from any kind of injustice.”

The situation at Habarovsk became so tense that Colonel Styer wrote General Oi a letter in part, as follows:

“Although Ataman Kalmykov’s detachment is armed, maintained and supported by the Japanese Government, still no one claims to be responsible. Kalmykov is responsible to no one and no Nation assumes responsibility for his acts. On several occasions I have reported the conduct of this detachment towards the Americans, and each time you have informed me that you had no authority over Kalmykov. The mere fact that he is controlled by the Japanese, and supported by them, makes you responsible for his acts. I am of the opinion, that unless you control this individual, a clash between his men and our troops is imminent.”

I sent a copy of this communication to the Japanese Commander at Vladivostok, with the following:

“In view of the fact that Kalmykov’s detachment has been armed, equipped, supported by and serving under the Japanese forces, I request that the proper measures be taken to restrain this

remnant of his forces. In case the Japanese forces are no longer responsible for the action of these men, I request that I be so advised.”

General Otani replied:

“I have the honor to assure you that the Japanese forces have no responsibility, whatever, in connection with any behavior on the part of Kalmykov’s troops. In view, however, of the fact that the Japanese Government has hitherto assisted them in their equipment and supplies, and that the Japanese troops have been operating in cooperation with them, we feel it our duty to see that Kalmykov be duly advised and that a satisfactory and smooth solution be reached in connection with the matter lately informed by Colonel Styer, as it is feared that a serious consequence may ensue toward the maintenance of peace and order, in the event of a failure of a successful settlement of the question. Assuring you, sir, of the best wishes for our everlasting friendship, I remain,”

Colonel Styer handled the Kalmykov incident, with the Japanese at Habarovsk, in a very diplomatic and satisfactory manner.

The Japanese policy is to select boys who give promise of being suitable for military service, and then see that they are educated and trained. They send young officers for training to various countries, with a view to utilizing these officers where their training seems best suited to their particular ability.

In my judgment, General Oi would not have been adverse to seeing a clash between the American forces and Kalmykov’s men.

As soon as the Ussuri Cossacks found an opportunity they deposed Kalmykov as Ataman of the Ussuri Cossacks and as soon as the terror of his power was gone, they repudiated him and all his works. On February 4, 1919, the Cossacks issued a public statement asking the American Command to liberate from Kalmykov’s control the Cossacks who still remained in his unit. Kalmykov still continued to keep quite a force around him, and his force when at Habarovsk was always under the protection of Japanese troops. When these men left Habarovsk for any purpose, there

were a sufficient number of Cossacks to handle any resistance to punishment by Kalmykov's men that might be made by the peaceably inclined inhabitants.

The Japanese first approached me to return to Kalmykov the horses, arms, and equipment surrendered to Colonel Styer, but I would not consent to their request. They then told me that all of these things belonged to Japan. I told the Japanese Chief of Staff that if Japan would notify me in writing that she had armed this murderer, that the property had never been paid for by Kalmykov, and if they would identify their property, and sign a receipt for it, I would let them have it. This was done and the receipt sent to the War Department for file with the records.

As the winter of 1918-19 approached we anticipated that the worst enemy we would have would be cold and disease. We had pictured the cold in Siberia as being much worse than it really was, consequently, our preparation for the winter proved very satisfactory. The climate at Vladivostok is relatively mild for a cold country and the troops at Harbin and Habarovsk, where it was colder, suffered very little as they were well clothed, housed, and fed. I have never lived in Montana or Dakota, but I have pictured the climate of Siberia very much like that of North Dakota. The chief characteristic is its extremes and the range from day to night varies about 10 degrees F to 30 degrees F. The mean temperature at four different stations is shown by the following data, gathered by the Medical Department United States Army, while American troops were in Siberia:

	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June
Vladivostok	5	12	26	39	49	57
Harbin	-2	5	24	42	56	66
Chita	-18	-9	10	32	47	53
Irkutsk	-5		17	35	48	59

	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Annual
Vladivostok	66	69	61	49	30	14	40
Harbin	72	60	58	40	21	3	38
Chita	66	60	47	29	7	10	12
Irkutsk	65	60		33	13	1	31

The following gives the maximum and minimum temperatures observed at these towns:

	Maximum	Minimum
Vladivostok	99	-34
Chita	97	-46
Harbin	100	-39

The rainfall in Siberia is not great and the snowfall is comparatively slight. While the snowfall in the mountains around Lake Baikal is very heavy, east and west of these mountains the fall is so slight that wheeled vehicles are used all winter. There was very little snow in Vladivostok and we had no trouble in operating our motor vehicles. The evil effects of the low temperature are much less than might be expected because of the absence of wind, and the principal danger from the cold comes from not realizing how cold it is, and failing to wear fur protectors for the nose, ears, and hands. Personally, I saw this happen only once during my two winters in Vladivostok. I was walking with an officer of my staff, and I noticed the tip of his nose was turning white but we got some snow and rubbed his nose with it until the circulation was restored and then finished our walk of four miles. In these cold days the sun is so bright and the air so still and exhilarating that one seldom feels fatigued.

The winter begins the latter part of October, and is freezing all waters by the end of November. September and October are delightful months although there is more wind in the fall and spring than during the winter months. The harbor freezes early in December and breaks up early in April. By the use of ice-breakers, ships are able to enter the harbor of Vladivostok during the entire winter, even when the ice in the bay is about thirty inches thick.

In March, 1920, one of our Transports, returning to Manila from Vladivostok, was caught in an ice-flow just out of the harbor and was helpless. They wirelessly the situation, tugs were sent to the rescue and they soon broke an opening so the Transport could get out. No damage was done and the boat proceeded on to Manila.

From the stand point of an American, the sanitary conditions were deplorable. This is probably not too strong a characterization of sanitary conditions even in former times, but it was now complicated by the breaking up of families, due to the World War and the Civil War, and resulting in a great percentage of the people trying to reach relatives or friends. This latter movement, resulting in all railroad yards being crowded with trains filled with human beings crowding into stations and any other heated place, made the sanitary situation look almost hopeless. The Chief Surgeon in describing conditions said:

“A general description of the sanitary situation in Siberia is most readily conceived by the perfectly truthful remark that practically none exists.”

A few of the buildings in Vladivostok have driven wells a few hundred feet deep and have their own water supply, and this was the case in the building we obtained for American Headquarters. Practically all towns in Siberia, including Vladivostok, depend almost exclusively upon surface wells for their water supply, and this situation is not helped any by the water being delivered in cans carried by filthy Chinese coolies.

The Chief Surgeon reported the prevalent diseases as being, “plague, typhus, relapsing fever, typhoid fever, scarlet fever, and malignant sore throat.”

The social conditions in Vladivostok were almost unbelievable, and a common expression was that Harbin used to be the worst city in the world but that Vladivostok was running it a close second.

Many of the young men brought into service by the draft had never been away from home, and suffered very much from nostalgia.

The women of the Y.M.C.A. and the Y.W.C.A. rendered magnificent service in helping with the entertainment of, not only American soldiers and sailors, but soldiers belonging to the Czecho-Slovak forces. Orders were issued soon after my arrival forbidding the use of intoxicating liquor, requiring all soldiers to have a pass if out at night, and requiring all officers to have permission of their Commanding Officer if they were to be out after midnight. This caused much criticism as being an unnecessary restriction upon the freedom of action of Americans, but I had received disturbing reports which convinced me it was a wise move.

When typhus fever became quite prevalent, and no one could tell whether it was safe to ride in a public car or not, we reserved cars and made up our own train. This train consisted of sleeping car, dining car, and a hospital car. The train was thoroughly cleaned and kept in charge of a United States representative at all times. Members of the Command were ordered not to travel on any other train except in case of emergency, and this train was kept moving from station to station practically all the time. When any of the Command moved as individuals they had a place to sleep and to eat and boiled water to drink. The hospital car was made from a second class passenger coach, permitting a twelve bed ward to be installed, using the standee bunks as used on Transports. The Medical Officers considered this type of bed more satisfactory than the regular berths installed in cars with compartments. In view of the unsanitary conditions in Vladivostok, I could not understand how we could escape some epidemic but we did. The medical care of the Command was very important, and the results were most gratifying, showing that the Medical Officers and the nurses were very faithful in the performance of their duties.

The question of obtaining a suitable building for a hospital in Vladivostok was a difficult one, but we finally found a group of buildings, about eight miles from American Headquarters, that proved to be

satisfactory. This group would house all the necessary personnel except the female nurses. A large detached brick building, about half a mile from the other buildings, was obtained; this would accommodate the nurses and they seemed perfectly willing to live there, and after being installed in this building appeared to be fairly comfortable. The War Department cabled me that a hundred female nurses were in San Francisco, and would leave for Vladivostok on the next army Transport. I did not want these nurses because of the conditions relative to accommodations, and the absence of any recreation for them, so I cabled asking that they send but twenty-five, which was approved, and the twenty-five came. They proved to be a great help, and I was very glad to have them as they were very self-reliant, and gave me no trouble by requests for better conditions, which I would have been glad to have given them, if I could.

V

MOBILIZATION OF RUSSIAN TROOPS

On October 24, 1918, General Ivanoff-Rinoff appeared in Eastern Siberia. He was a typical Czarist Russian official, and believed in treating all who stood in his way in a ruthless manner. The Directorate in Omsk had put him in command of all Russian troops in Eastern Siberia, and on November 3, 1918, he declared the provinces of Amur, Primorskaya, Sakhalin, and Kamchatka to be under martial law, making himself, in effect, Dictator of Eastern Siberia, and placing the question of life or death in the hands of the autocratic class, who were determined to see that the principles advocated by autocracy should not die in Russia. I reported, with reference to the declaration of martial law:

“The object has not escaped the Russian people, and, in my judgment, the feeling is so strong that a clash will occur even if the Allied troops remain, and no one doubts that it would occur immediately upon the withdrawal of Allied troops. As I see it, the effect of keeping troops in Siberia, is to permit the crowd of Reactionaries, headed by General Horvath, supported by former Russian officers, to try to firmly establish themselves while the Allied troops are in Siberia.”

I expected Allied troops, as well as United States troops, to be withdrawn from Siberia soon after the signing of the Armistice, and I seemed to be the only military representative who was not aware that we had a war of our own in Russia, and that our War was independent and separate from the War in France. The Armistice had absolutely no effect in Siberia. It seemed to me, as all the stated reasons why the United States took part in military action in Siberia had entirely disappeared before the Armistice, or at the time of the Armistice, we would withdraw our troops from Russian territory and naturally the question repeatedly came to my mind, why are American troops kept in Siberia? I had complete confidence in the accuracy of the statement made by the State Department, that the

United States was not going to take sides in Russian internal affairs. The presence of Allied troops was undoubtedly delaying the settlement of Russian questions by the Russian people and, no matter what attitude the troops took towards internal conflicts, we could not escape responsibility for some acts against the Russian people that could not have been committed if foreign troops had not been in Siberia.

On December 13, I reported as follows:

“Kolchak troops are arresting and murdering the people and basing their actions on the authority of Admiral Kolchak, that every one opposing the Government should be punished.” I also stated, “General Krestachinsky had informed me that the Japanese had agreed to supply new equipment for 10,000 men for duty in the Far East.”

Japan was already supplying Semenov and Kalmykov troops and, in my judgment, if details were ever discussed as to the use of these men for whom Japan offered equipment, the Russians would find that Japan demanded that the troops be put under their control. There was at this time great resentment in Omsk against Semenov, because he would not support Admiral Kolchak, although he always claimed that he was supporting him.

He was finally ordered to Omsk, with a view to going to the front, but he refused on the ground that conditions in Trans-Baikal were such that he could not leave. Undoubtedly, Kolchak hoped to get Semenov from under the control of Japan, and in this way break the strangle hold of Japan, in that the Japanese could, through Semenov, stop supplies reaching him, as all supplies had to go through Chita. In this way Japan could demand any concession from Kolchak and he was powerless to refuse them.

Evidently this was what Kolchak referred to in March, 1919, when he told Consul General Harris that “his Government could not control the situation, in the Far East, and that he was practically unable to exercise authority, and also, that particular attention must be paid to Ataman Semenov, who is backed by Japan. He added, that due to these conditions, his Government could not assume responsibility for what is to take place in the Far East.”

This declaration of Kolchak was considered “extremely confidential as no similar statement has been given to the other Allies, in this connection.”

Kolchak’s statement mentioned above was the truth, but, by no means the whole truth, and it was manifestly given out for American consumption. It was characteristically an autocratic Siberian statement, designed to answer any inquiring Government, relative to reported conditions in the Far East.

In connection with Kolchak’s liberal statements to Mr. Sharkey, Associated Press, and to Mr. Harris, U. S. Consul General, Mr. Fisher in his “Soviets in the World Affairs,” Vol. I, page 197, states that there was found in the secret archives of Kolchak’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, a telegram from Mr. Ughet, financial agent of the former Russian Government in Washington, which suggested: “that the Supreme Ruler make a declaration of liberal policies in order to win United States public opinion.”

In my reports and cables I was stressing the excesses, not only of Semenov and Kalmykov, but of the Kolchak Russian troops under the immediate control and direction of Ivanoff-Rinoff. The excesses of the troops under the latter, in so far as assault and robbery were concerned, were in magnitude nearly equal to those of Semenov and Kalmykov, although the troops under the control of Ivanoff-Rinoff and Horvath were not killing to the extent practiced by the troops of Kalmykov.

Ivanoff-Rinoff and Horvath recognized Kolchak’s authority and he could have stopped these excesses of the White Russian troops if he had so desired. The fact of the matter is, it is rather unreasonable to expect the practice of centuries to be stopped suddenly by the Czarists and especially, when there was only a slight chance that the ruthlessness practiced would be published to the world. The Allies in Siberia had become so enmeshed in Siberian affairs, in their determination to destroy bolshevism, that they could protest only feebly against Czarist Russian excesses, if they protested at all.

As to Admiral Kolchak’s statement through Consul General Harris, to Washington, it was well known that Consul General Harris resented the reports the Military were sending and he was not only instrumental in getting Washington to cable me that most remarkable statement that the

United States Government expected to look to the State Department for information on Siberia, but he reported that the Army in Siberia was playing politics. Subsequent events have shown clearly who was playing politics, and it was not the Army.

In December, 1918, Admiral Kolchak issued an order directing the mobilization of all officers and soldiers of the Russian Army, and this practically included all Russians of military age. I stated in my report with reference to this mobilization order:

“There is a belief in some quarters that there is danger in arming any large number of troops, as the people from whom soldiers are drawn are, generally speaking, opposed to the autocratic form of Government.”

His mobilization order was a long step towards the end of Admiral Kolchak's regime.

When I first arrived in Siberia representations were being made everywhere to the effect that the Russians, in some other section of Siberia, were in need of arms with which to fight the Central Powers, and the peasants were being told that the Allies were then in Siberia, and the Russians no longer needed these arms for their personal protection. A large number of arms were being turned in by the peasants, and Cossacks were being sent into villages, and were taking by force the arms not willingly surrendered. If a peasant was discovered with a rifle and ammunition it often meant his death and certainly meant a frightful lashing with the knout. The two methods succeeded in getting nearly all arms out of the hands of the peasants and this enabled the Cossack troops, in the Far East, to safely carry on their ruthless campaign of murder and robbery.

It is amazing that the Czarist Russian Army Officers did not realize that some change had to be made in the Army practices used during the Czar's regime, and the atrocities being committed east of Lake Baikal were so overwhelming that no open-minded person could doubt the truth of many of the reported excesses. On January 24, I reported to the War Department:

“There is now a meeting being held at Vladivostok of the selected Zemstvo representatives from all provinces East of Lake

Baikal, and from Irkutsk and Semipalatinsk, West of Lake Baikal. In addition to these, there is also attending this meeting representatives of the Dumas.”

These gentlemen, or a representative body of them came to see me and they impressed me as being intelligent, well informed, and fair men.

Kolchak sent an order to his representative in Vladivostok directing him “not to permit this convention to discuss or consider any question concerning his powers, constitutional right, or politics.” This convention was held in accordance with the law and the subjects they were to discuss had been published, and the meetings and discussions were to be public. Could there have been made a much plainer statement to the Zemstvo representatives who were elected by the suffrage of the people, that henceforth Autocracy, not representative Government, was to reign supreme in Siberia?

It soon became apparent that Kolchak’s statement to Mr. Sharkey was for consumption in the United States. The question in every one’s mind was, is Kolchak really in favor of some of the concessions demanded by the people or is he, at heart, a Monarchist? In my judgment, he had the same ideas as the Monarchists in so far as the oppression and suppression of the great mass of the Russian people are concerned. He had surrounded himself with the most distinct type of Absolutists, and had, thereby, rendered himself powerless to act according to his own judgment, if he had desired, and one could hear frequent rumblings that he was too liberal in his views, but I never saw any indication of liberalism in his actions toward the people.

On January 30, I cabled the War Department, in part:

“The following from Major Slaughter, at Ekaterinburg, January 27th, Bolsheviki power growing here, espionage service says that any Russian Army will fall to pieces, the order to mobilize five new classes same as organizing army for Bolsheviks. New mobilization worst feature.”

This was from Western Siberia, four thousand miles from where I was reporting same conditions in Eastern Siberia—and this is the kind of report

characterized by Consul General Harris as “Army playing politics.”

On December 30, 1918, Captain Schuyler, at Omsk, telegraphed me:

“Nine new Japanese Staff Officers just arrived in Omsk. They are trying to form Japanese party in Russia, especially among Army officers, and are having considerable success. They promise anything wanted, whether they can perform or not and point out failure of Allies to afford effective aid and in spite of promises.”

This was a move by Japan to determine definitely and surely what could be done with Admiral Kolchak. If he could be handled satisfactorily, then Japanese influence could be extended beyond Lake Baikal.

By controlling Semenov at Chita, and Kalmykov at Habarovsk, and, as far as the Allies were concerned, they had a dominating power over Ivanoff-Rinoff at Vladivostok, they practically controlled Eastern Siberia. If they could establish a working agreement with Kolchak they could eliminate, to some extent at least, the causes for friction between themselves on one side and the English and French on the other. This friction had existed since the assumption of power by Admiral Kolchak.

England, France, and Japan were still in step, in so far as bolshevism was concerned, but England and France believed their objective could be reached more surely by treating bolshevism as an equal menace in all parts of Siberia and by using Kolchak as their agent in destroying it. Japan had spent considerable money in Eastern Siberia, and her main consideration was to destroy bolshevism there, and at the same time be in a position to take advantage of any situation that might arise, but bolshevism west of Lake Baikal was secondary to her interests in Eastern Siberia.

As an indication of the success the nine Japanese officers had in their efforts to form a Japanese party in Russia, I received, on January 31, 1919, the following telegram from Captain Schuyler, at Omsk:

“Small reactionary revolt here last night as protest against liberalism of Kolchak, which displeases many officers. Demonstration against Allies in restaurant, and toasts drunk to

Japan, the only friend of Russia. This has strengthened position of Japanese, here, who have been under a cloud as a result of their activities last December.”

What did this apparent change in the attitude of the Russian officer class towards the Japanese mean? It meant that the Japanese Staff officers had promised the Russian officers anything they wanted, and they were not only ready to take assistance from any source, but were very grateful for this assistance. Looking at the situation from their point of view, one can hardly blame them. Their backs were against the wall and their main object was to help establish some Government in Russia that would restore them to the positions they had before the War, which they had no hope of reaching if the Soviets remained in power. With them, however, fighting bolshevism was a means for accomplishment of their main object.

Notwithstanding some bitterness remained between the Japanese and the old Russian officer class, due to the Russo-Japanese War, the position of the Russians was such that they were glad to accept support from Japan. The more Japan gave them the greater was the praise for her and her people. This apparent friendship could not be obtained without the expenditure of money or military help.

Three or four years after I left Siberia the American Military Attaché in Tokyo sent me a report of a speech made in the Japanese Diet, in which the speaker was reported to have said that the Siberian venture cost Japan about nine hundred million yen.^[1] One naturally wonders why Japan put all this money into Siberian intervention and it is hard to believe her object was entirely altruistic. I have no definite information as to her real intentions and have no idea that I ever will have such information.

As an indication of a Czarist Russian's ideas of ethical methods in securing funds, Colonel Korff, Russian liason officer with American Headquarters, told Colonel Eichelberger, the American Intelligence officer, that General Ivanoff-Rinoff and General Romanovsky had the power to stop all criticism of me and of all Americans, as well as of American policies, and if I would get the United States to give the Russian Army twenty thousand dollars a month the propaganda against Americans would cease. He also told Colonel Eichelberger, at the same time, that Lieutenant General

Krestachintsky would be in his car at the railroad station until 6 o'clock that evening and that it would be to my advantage to see him.

Kolchak's mobilization order was not complied with by the great mass of Russians within the military age and, as soon as it became evident that force would have to be used to mobilize them, Ivanoff-Rinoff did not hesitate to send his Cossacks to bring in the men of prescribed age, which started a reign of terror difficult to believe.

In March a young woman who had been a village school teacher, came to American Headquarters and asked for a guard for herself and her brother so they might return to their village of Gordyevka, and bury their father who had been killed by Ivanoff-Rinoff troops. The young woman said the Russian troops had come to Gordyevka looking for young men to force them into the Army, but the young men had escaped, so the troops took ten men of the village, who were beyond military age, tortured and killed them, and were guarding the bodies to prevent their families from burying them. This seemed so brutal and unnatural that I ordered an officer with some troops to go to Gordyevka and investigate the report, and I notified the young woman of my intentions.

The officer sent to make the investigation reported as follows:

“On arrival at the Gordyevka school house, I was met by a body of seventy or eighty men, all armed with rifles, mostly Russian army rifles, with a few old single shot 45-70 caliber among them. The information I obtained was all taken in the presence of these seventy or eighty armed villagers and some twenty-five or thirty women. Most of the information was from the wives of the victims, and these women broke down repeatedly, during this trying ordeal for them. The first woman interviewed said her husband was on his way to the school house with his rifle to turn it in to the Russian troops, as ordered. He was seized on the street, beaten over the head and body with his rifle, and then taken to a house a short distance from the school where he was stretched by his neck to a pin in the rafter, his hands tied, and terribly beaten about the body and head until the blood

was splashed even on the walls of the room, and the marks on his body showed me that he had been hung by his feet also.

“He was later stood in a row, with eight other men, and shot to death at 2 o’clock P.M. There were ten men in line and all were killed but one, he being left for dead by Ivanoff-Rinoff’s troops. —The next woman I interviewed was the woman, in whose house all the men were beaten, and in the back of whose barnyard the men were shot. She stated that about 11 A.M., the morning of March 9, 1919, a number of Ivanoff-Rinoff’s officers came to her house and made her take her husband to another house, and about 11:30 they took her husband back to her house and beat him, with the rest of them, also broke one of his arms and cut out his fingernails, and knocked out all of his front teeth. Her husband was an invalid and a cripple.”

The officer said in his remarks:

“I found that the floor of the room these men were beaten in was covered with blood, and the walls in the room were all splashed with blood. The wire and loops of rope that were used around the men’s necks were still hanging from the ceiling and covered with blood. I also found that some of these men had been scalded with boiling water and burned with hot irons, heated in a little stove I found in the room.

“I visited the spot where these men were shot. These men were lined up and shot, and each body had at least three holes in it, and some as many as six or more. They were apparently shot in the feet first and then higher in the body.”

There was much more evidence taken and reported by the young officer making the investigation and the evidence not quoted agrees, in every detail, with that above quoted.

This seemed to be such a terribly shocking case that I ordered the young officer to report to me in person. He was not a regular Army Officer, but was in the service only for the duration of the War. I shall always remember

the remark this officer made to me after I had finished questioning him. His remark was:

“General, for God’s sake, never send me on another expedition like this. I came within an ace of pulling off my uniform, joining these poor people, and helping them as best I could.”

From Spasskoe, on the railroad between Vladivostok and Habarovsk, an entirely separate section from Gordyevka, the Intelligence officer reported relative to Russian officers sent to Spasskoe:

“They laughingly tell of their experience in the recent raids, in search of arms and clothing. In order to make a point of duly impressing the people of the seriousness of their mission, they seize the first man they see, upon entering a village, and give him fifty lashes, and later give him more if there was reason to believe that he held back any information.”

If this was an isolated case it might be taken as the boasting of young ignorant officers, but reports showed that this practice was carried out in other parts of the Far East, and reports of these terrible atrocities reached me from many different stations of American troops. Many of these reports claimed that the maltreating of the peasants was done by Japanese soldiers, or by Russians under the protection, and in the presence of Japanese troops. I had no means of investigating nine tenths of these reports, and even if we had made an investigation and found they were true, we had no remedy. The object of this terrorism was not only to spread terror among the peasants, but Japan and the Russian autocratic class hoped to create a situation that would force the peasants to try to protect themselves, and this would justify calling for more Allied troops to put down the Bolsheviks. By the ruthless and systematic search for all arms in the hands of peasants, these poor people had no means of protecting themselves and could only pray and hope for relief and trust that the Russian troops being mobilized were not in sympathy with the Kolchak Government, and would revolt and save them from the terrible punishments being inflicted upon them.

The Kolchak adherents, including Semenov and Kalmykov, who claimed to be supporting him, were assembled along the Ussuri, Chinese Eastern, and Trans-Siberian railroads. They could not have existed away from the railroads and, in my judgment, at no time while I was in Siberia was there enough popular support behind Kolchak in Eastern Siberia for him, or the people supporting him, to have lasted one month if all Allied supports had been removed.

Judging from the liberal, material, and financial support given by Japan to certain reactionary leaders in Eastern Siberia, and from the energetic efforts she and her paid Russians agents were making to spread terror there, I was always convinced, and am so convinced today, that the Japanese were constantly looking for and expecting some occurrence or event to happen that would justify them in directing Semenov to declare Eastern Siberia independent of the rest of Russia. This could have been claimed as a necessary step in fighting bolshevism.

The Japanese and Cossack leaders were always trying to attribute their troubles to the presence of United States soldiers and every time I was approached by anyone with a proposition involving the use of American troops, I told them that our forces were to take no part in these differences and would not be used to protect either side in case of conflict. The Japanese and their Cossack puppets hoped to get the United States in a position where we would be attacked by the Bolsheviks and then I would take sides. This would have relieved them of a great deal of embarrassment.

On February 25, 1919, I cabled Washington, in part:

“General Romanovsky, representing Kolchak, informed me yesterday that the Russian people were now pretty well crystallized into two parties and they considered any man not with them, as being against them; that they had to fight for their existence, and proposed to take such steps against their enemies, in Eastern Siberia, as they considered necessary, without regard to the Allies.”

This was a correct statement of the situation. This same day a representative of the Zemstvos informed me:

“The middle class are bitter against the newly formed Russian troops as they are whipping and otherwise maltreating the people and this resentment may extend to the Allies, as the people believe this condition could not exist if Allied troops were not in Siberia.”

I felt sure, in my own mind, that no one could interpret my instructions other than I had interpreted them, although I knew the Consul General in Siberia, Mr. Harris, was anything but favorable to my attitude there and I also felt, but without the same knowledge I had with reference to Mr. Harris, that the Section of Russian affairs in the State Department was unsympathetic. I had reason to believe that Mr. Morris, American Ambassador in Japan, and handling the Russian question in the Far East for the State Department, heartily approved of my stand in Siberia.

In order that there could be no misunderstanding I cabled the War Department:

“The feeling is now becoming so bitter that each faction claims that if you are not with them you are against them. The Japanese have started a campaign to put down an uprising in Amur Province and my refusal to permit the use of United States troops in the trouble between Russian factions has enabled the reactionary party to claim that Americans are Bolsheviks and enabled the other party to claim that we are favorable to the reactionaries because, by our presence, the reactionary party is enabled to commit excesses on the people which they could not do if the Allied troops were not present. No one doubts the truth of this latter contention. Japan and the United States are in Siberia with the same announced purpose and are following opposite courses relative to taking part in internal troubles. This has made it seem advisable to me to ask if my policy, in considering the Bolshevik trouble in Siberia, entirely an internal trouble, in which I should take no part, is the policy the Department desires me to follow.”

On the 28th of March, I received a reply from General March, Chief of Staff, as follows:

“The delay in answering cablegram has been due to the fact that State Department cabled it in full to the President for his instructions, and, so far, no reply has been received. Your action as reported in the cablegram was in accordance with your original instructions and is approved, and you will be guided by those instructions until they are modified by the President.”

After this I felt doubly sure as to the desires of the principal officials in Washington, regardless of what subordinates might try to do in order to carry out their own conceptions as to what the United States Government should do in Siberia.

In addition to this cable I received a personal letter from General March, which I am going to publish without asking his consent, for if I did ask his consent to publish this letter it might embarrass him. This short statement throws a ray of light on General March's conception of duty, which should be better understood in the United States, and this very significant and agreeable letter read:

“Keep a stiff upper lip, I am going to stand by you until —— freezes over.”

In February, a committee of six peasants came to see me. They were from the Olga district, which is off the railroad and in the extreme east of Siberia. They reported that the White Russian troops, when unable to find the men they were looking for, would beat the women over their backs with ramrods taken from their guns. They said these women were beaten until their backs were raw, and the spokesman of this committee said:

“You do not have to take our word for this, we do not want you to take our word, send an officer to investigate and bring a Japanese and an English officer with you. We can show them many women who have been terribly beaten by these Kolchak troops.”

I received official reports confirming the statement of these peasants, and in referring to this in my official report said:

“These Russian troops committing these acts are part of Ivanoff-Rinoff’s troops and, for reasons above stated, I believe to be armed, equipped, and paid in part by Japan.”

In any country in the world, whether civilized or not, the inhabitants would take such steps as they could to protect themselves from such inhuman atrocities. There was great resentment against Japan by the peasants of Eastern Siberia, because everyone knew these atrocities were committed by Russians in their pay and under their protection, and the United States was not, and should not have been, entirely free from the harsh feeling of the people for these terrible cruelties committed by Japanese hirelings, as the United States had let it be known, throughout the world, that she had invited Japan to join her in sending troops to Siberia. My reports to Washington were filled with these terrible atrocities and, so far as the people of Siberia knew and, in fact, so far as I knew, not one word of protest was ever made to Japan for these acts.

In view of Consul General Harris’ attitude towards the controversy in Siberia, between the Bolsheviks and the anti-Bolsheviks, I doubt very much if he ever reported these atrocities, and as the State Department announced that the Government intended to get its information as to conditions from representatives of the State Department, it is possible that the United States Government had no official information of these atrocities.

On March 3, I reported to Washington:

“Japanese Headquarters inform me of the following losses suffered in fighting against bolsheviks in the vicinity of Blagovestchensk—

Feb. 11th, two officers, eighteen soldiers, killed near Zabetaya.

Feb. 15th, one officer and from ten to twenty soldiers killed near Andreskaya.

Feb. 16th, a reconnoitering patrol of one officer and fifty men encountered a Bolshevik force, of about twenty-five hundred,

near Skranskoy, about thirty kilometers Northwest of Alexeyensk, the entire Japanese patrol killed.

On the same day two peace strength companies of Infantry, total of about two hundred and fifty men, one company of Artillery and one section of Infantry met the same bolshevik force at different times, and only three Japanese escaped, all others being killed. In this connection on February 12, General Oi, Japanese at Habarovsk, called on Colonel Styer for one company of American soldiers to be sent to Japanese assistance. Colonel Styer asked for Instructions. I sent Colonel Robinson, Chief of Staff, to the Japanese Chief of Staff to tell him that before I could take part in this trouble I must know that the so-called Bolsheviks were not Russians resisting unjust treatment by troops. The Japanese Chief of Staff said he had not heard of this trouble from General Oi and told Robinson not to do anything unless he heard further from him. Nothing more on the subject.”

This incident was used where it could be, to stir up resentment against United States troops, and the Japanese press was very acrimonious in their comments.

In this connection I saw in the American press a statement that, “the Japanese War Department has issued a version of the encounter between the Japanese and the Bolsheviks. Accompanying this story is an allusion to the attitude of General Graves, who is alleged by the Japanese to have refused to go to their assistance.”

Again on April 15, 1919, the press carried the following statement:

“The Japanese press has been making capital in Tokyo out of the allegation that the American forces were permitted by General Graves and other officers of the American expedition, to stand by while a Japanese Military contingent was being wiped out.”

By false statement and implication, the persons responsible for these reports were trying to make political capital out of a terrible disaster which we all regretted, by bearing false witness against a representative of a friendly nation. In the first place the Japanese Commander, through his

Chief of Staff, conveyed to me, through my Chief of Staff, the message not to take any action on the request of General Oi unless I heard further from Japanese Headquarters at Vladivostok, and I never received any request relative to the trouble from Japanese Headquarters. However, I probably would have refused to send American troops if I had been requested to do so, unless the Japanese could have shown me they were not the aggressors, which I am confident they could not have done. While the statement given out in Japan does not specifically say American troops were in the vicinity of the fight, it was so worded, and intentionally so worded, as to give the impression that Americans could easily have given assistance. As a matter of fact, there was not a single American soldier within four hundred miles of where this action took place. The Japanese in Siberia knew perfectly well, no matter what action I took, and no matter what action Colonel Styer took, relative to this fight, that the Americans could not have saved a single life of the Japanese. Why didn't the Japanese send their own troops to the assistance of their men? They had an entire division in Habarovsk and vicinity, while the Americans had but two battalions. General Oi's request to Colonel Styer, on February 12, was to get Americans to go out for the specific purpose of fighting whom he called Bolsheviks, and which he knew perfectly well I could not and would not do.

About this time the American press was beginning to show a disposition to be critical of me and the American troops because we were not fighting the Bolsheviks. One paper said:

“We are not at war with the Bolsheviks, of course. We are fighting them at Archangel, but it is not war.”

This writer expressed an idea quite prevalent in the world in 1919, and this idea could be justified only on the theory that might makes right. If the United States should send troops to Russian territory at the present time and begin fighting any faction in Russia, it would be War because the Soviets are now in a position to redress their injuries by use of force and, undoubtedly, would do so.

If I sent American troops with Japanese troops, as requested by General Oi, Americans would no longer have been pacific observers of the atrocities being committed in Siberia, but we would have been participants in them.

The question is naturally asked what had these so called Bolsheviks done to justify General Oi in sending Japanese soldiers to destroy them? They were Russians, in Russian territory, against whom no nation had declared War, minding their own business and not endangering life, limb, or property of any Ally.

To those of our people who were impressed with the necessity of fighting bolshevism regardless of American policy, I was never able to determine who was a Bolshevik or why he was a Bolshevik. According to Japanese representatives and her paid puppets in Siberia, all Russians were Bolsheviks if they were not willing to take up arms and fight for the Semenovs, the Kalminoffs, the Rozanovs, and the Ivanoff-Rinoffs, and the annals of crime in the United States will not show worse characters than these. According to the British and French representatives, all Russians who were not willing to take up arms and fight for Kolchak were Bolsheviks. At this time no nation in the world was willing to recognize any of the above named men, or any other man, as the *de facto* or *de jure* head of any Russian Government.

Soon after I arrived in Vladivostok I met General Nakajima of the Japanese forces. He seemed to be a most important Japanese official, without having any specific duty as was customary with other Japanese generals. He was always very courteous and pleasant, and seemed to be in the forefront of all discussions, regardless of the subject. He was known in American Headquarters as the political General of Japan. He came to me and suggested that, as Japan and the United States were so closely associated in their work in Siberia, it would be advisable for the military representatives of both countries to have knowledge of what the other was reporting to his Government, and suggested that I tell the Japanese of important communications I sent to Washington, and they would tell me what important messages they sent to Tokyo. I knew, of course, that they would not show me the Tokyo dispatches of any importance, and he was reflecting upon my common sense by suggesting that I show him my dispatches to Washington.

I determined, however, to play his game and told him I thought his suggestion an excellent one but it seemed only fair that, as Nakajima had suggested the scheme, that they put it into operation by showing me the first

dispatch. I expected him to show me an innocuous dispatch, and I intended to meet him in kind, but this beautiful agreement was never put into operation.

After a month or so, Nakajima was sent back to Japan and it was soon an open secret that his activities were objectionable to some foreign representatives, and he had been recalled by the Japanese Government, supposedly not in its best graces. We were soon to realize, however, that his activities were not objectionable to the Japanese Government, by hearing of his promotion from a Major General to a Lieutenant General in the Japanese Army. Mr. Carl Ackerman, in his book, "Trailing the Bolsheviki," speaks of him as the General Ludendorff of the Japanese Army.

The next time I heard of him was on March 16, 1919, when I received a cable from the American Military Attaché in Tokyo, it said:

"Japanese General Staff reports ten American Army deserters have joined red guards Northeast of Vladivostok, and one has been captured. Lieutenant General Nakajima, Japanese General Staff, called me for a private conference and expressed great concern as to the future relations of the Japanese and American troops in Siberia, because (omission) and Americans are not. He referred to our failure to render assistance to General Yamada on the Amur, and to recent American deserters joining the Bolsheviks. He asked quite pointedly, what the Americans would do if the bolsheviks cut the railroad, after the new plan for guarding the railroad had been set up, and whether we would assist Japanese, remain idle, or assist their enemies, the bolsheviks. He was clearly opposed to your troops being stationed at Chita or Manchuli."

This is a fair example of the charges Americans had to meet, not only where the false allegations were made and could be refuted by the facts, but elsewhere, where neither party to the discussion knew the facts and could not intelligently discuss problems arising in Siberia.

Nakajima's statements bordered on an insult and, in my judgment, did not deserve a diplomatic answer. I replied to the telegram:

“There are six American deserters at large. The one reported as captured, has not been delivered to me. False statements have been so common that I will not believe they have captured one unless I see him. Nakajima does not know that the American deserters have joined the bolsheviks. This is a typical erroneous statement. I consider his question as to what I would do, under certain conditions, borders on insulting insinuations and characteristic of other meddlesome actions in business which pertains to the United States alone. I expect to guard my part of the railway in my own way, and this does not concern other Nations until I have failed in my duty. General Inagaki informed me yesterday that they had instructions not to fight bolsheviks unless attacked or to prevent disorders in the country. I cannot see why the United States cannot send troops into China or Siberia without getting the consent of Japan. They would bitterly resent any foreigner attempting to interfere in the locating of their troops in this same country. I do not consider they have any more interest in Manchuria and Siberia, than the United States. Japanese headquarters here have informed me that the Japanese supplied Kalmykov with his arms and equipment. There is not a man in the bolshevik, or any other army, worse than Kalmykov, who recently stated that he was glad to be under the command of General Oi.”

The Vice-President of the Provincial Zemstvo, an editor of a local paper, and two other men in Vladivostok were arrested on the night of the 2nd of March, 1919, by Russian White troops under instructions of Ivanoff-Rinoff, and at 5 o'clock in the morning were started west in a prison car. It was well known in Vladivostok that these four men had been started for Semenov's murdering ground.

Very soon after they had started, the wives of three of the men came to American Headquarters and wanted to see me. I told the officer who came to my room to report to me, to tell the women that I had nothing to do with it and could take no action, but they were not satisfied and refused to leave without seeing me. In the morning when I got up at the regular hour and passed my office door, I saw the women still there, so went in to tell them

we could take no part in the Russian difficulties. It was remarkable to see how quiet and determined these women were.

The woman, who did the talking, heard me and then, in a quiet voice, said the people of Vladivostok had thought, as the Allies were responsible for order there, they were safe from such outrages. She then said: "there will be an uprising and all we want you and the other Allies to do is to continue your policy of non-interference." She said the reactionary Russians who had committed this outrage had been given arms by the Allies, but that they could manage them if the Allies kept their hands off. I made no further comment to these women and they left my office.

Soon after I had finished my breakfast, Sir Charles Eliot, British High Commissioner, came to see me and in a very excited manner said he understood I had said that American troops would not be used to prevent an uprising of the people. As I had not discussed the question with anyone, and had said no such thing, I told Sir Charles he had been misinformed. He then asked me if I would use American troops in case of an uprising, and I replied that I would not make any definite statement as to what action I would take until I knew the nature of the uprising and the cause. He became more excited and said the lives of British subjects and British property were involved and that he must know my attitude.

I finally told Sir Charles, after some more words, that I was well aware that he wanted to know my attitude towards protecting Ivanoff-Rinoff and Horvath and that I could answer his question, and the answer would be that he knew this was a cold blooded murder, and the United States had never been in the habit of protecting murderers, and that I did not intend doing so now and, so far as I was concerned, they could bring Ivanoff-Rinoff opposite American Headquarters and hang him to that telegraph pole until he was dead, and not an American soldier would turn his hand. This seemed to satisfy Sir Charles and he immediately left my office. I have always believed that the British and the Japanese knew these arrests were going to be made.

The prison car was stopped at Progranichnaya, a railroad town on the line between Siberia and Manchuria, and it looked to me as if when Sir Charles got back to his office and had discussed the question with White

Russians and possibly others, they decided they had better not run the risk of an uprising, and so had stopped the car.

The Russians had a prison car at Progranichnaya, exactly like the one these prisoners were in, and as soon as they arrived at the station these cars were switched, the empty one going west with the train, and the one containing the prisoners left where the empty car had been. This was evidently an attempt to fool some one.

Reports were received from the American R. R. Service Corps, by telegraph in Vladivostok, about the car which was not sent on to Semenov, as everyone expected it would be, but was shunted off the main line and started south on the Japanese line towards Changchun. The action being designed to create the impression they never had intended turning the prisoners over to Semenov to be killed. Japanese sentinels were placed around the supposed empty prison car at Progranichnaya and no one was permitted to go near it. They sent food to the men by a twelve year old boy and, the first time this boy brought a meal to them, he found an opportunity and, in the presence of the guard but in a sotto voice, told them that the engineer of the train waiting to go to Vladivostok said he would take any message they wanted to send to their families. They sent a note to their people so their whereabouts was known before the ruse of sending the other car to Changchun, on the Japanese line, was fairly started.

The Allied Commanders had a meeting and I proposed that we send a notice to the Russian Commander, Ivanoff-Rinoff, stating that, as the Allies were responsible for order in Vladivostok it was incumbent upon them to see that justice was shown to all, therefore, we would not permit Russians to be arrested and taken out of Vladivostok where their guilt or innocence should be determined, and, if tried, we claimed the right to send a representative to the trial with a view to determining if it was a bona-fide trial for an offense.

The French representative claimed that this was an interference in Russian affairs and was also a political question which we could not deal with. The Japanese being the senior and presiding, again said as we were not unanimous we would drop it. I told the Japanese the day had passed when he could veto the action of a majority of the Allied Commanders, that

the notice would be sent and those who did not wish to sign it need not do so. The Frenchman said he would have to consult his Government and asked if we would wait until he cabled to Paris, which we readily consented to do. In three or four days the notice was sent to Ivanoff-Rinoff and all the Allied Commanders signed it. General Blair, the British representative at that time, was selected to take the resolution to Russian Headquarters. The prisoners were never sent west of Progranichnaya and, in a few days after the resolution was sent to Russian Headquarters, they were sent to the military jail at Nikolsk and kept there for about two weeks, when they were released.

At this period of extreme criticism, I received an unexpected assertion from Colonel Butenko, who had been selected by the Russians and Allies for Fortress Commander before my arrival in Siberia. He came to see me and, with the aid of my interpreter, told me, in effect, that he was convinced the Allies could get nowhere by trying to assist individual Russians. The result would be resentment on the part of the mass of Russians and would be an injury to the cause the Allies desired to help. He said he felt that my policy of not taking sides was the only one that gave any hope of help to stabilize conditions. He also said that I undoubtedly knew of the opposition to my policy, not only by the Anti-Bolshevik Russians but by the Allies, and on that account he could not come to see me unless he came after midnight, but I could count on his assistance in every way possible.

This offer proved to be of great help to me, not only in that it gave me needed information, but helped me to check information from other sources. I knew that if Colonel Butenko was known to be friendly to me he would not last a week. I rarely ever saw him but he continued his assistance for about a year, when he received orders to report to Omsk. He knew, and I knew, that this meant he had been suspected of something and he feared that, as he passed through Chita, Semenov would take him off the train and kill him. He went west on a train guarded by American and Czech soldiers, and no effort was made to arrest him.

His help came principally from the fact that he had access as Fortress Commander, to all telegrams passing through the Vladivostok office, which all telegrams reaching Eastern Siberia did.

[1]

The value of a yen is fifty cents U. S. money.

VI

THE RAILROAD AGREEMENT

The Provisional Government of Russia, better known as the Kerensky Government, approached the United States for help in rehabilitating and operating the Russian railroads and Mr. John F. Stevens, the well-known engineer, went to Russia in the Spring of 1917, in response to this request, and was later made official adviser to the Minister of Communications at Petrograd.

At the request of the Provisional Government, and with the support of Mr. Stevens, the American Russian Railway Service Corps was organized for the purpose of helping to put the Russian railways in condition for efficient operation.

The members, who came principally from the Northern Pacific and the Great Northern Railways, were a remarkable lot of men. While I did not meet many of them personally, I do know the services of this Corps and their work. The United States was very fortunate in having such a representative body of men in Siberia, as their efforts and energies were directed toward doing what was just and right for the Russians, regardless of Russian claims of bolshevism or anti-bolshevism. These men were not swerved from their duty by the requests or mouthings of Russian or foreign officials.

This policy often resulted in obstacles being put in their path of progress. It would have been much easier for all of us to have gotten in step with the apparent dominant crowd and moved down "popular street" with Russian bands playing "Hail to the Saviors of the Motherland."

The Provisional or Kerensky Government was overthrown by the Soviets before the Americans could reach Russia to begin their work, and, consequently, most of these men remained in Japan until March, 1918, when some went to the Headquarters of the Chinese Eastern Railway at Harbin.

When Allied troops arrived in Siberia, in August and September, 1918, the Russian railways were in a deplorable state. About all we could learn was that the Allies were negotiating for the operation of the railways. Time passed, and more time passed; and nothing was done. All this time the railroads were getting worse and worse and it was not until March, 1919, when we received notice in Vladivostok that an agreement had been reached by the various governments concerned for the operation of the railways in Siberia. This agreement was so important to the United States Military in Siberia that I quote it in full:

“1. The general supervision of the railways in the zone in which the Allied forces are now operating shall be exercised by a special Inter-Allied Committee which shall consist of representatives from each Allied power, having military forces in Siberia, including Russia, and the chairman of which shall be a Russian.

“The following boards shall be created, to be placed under the control of the Inter-Allied Committee:

(a) “A Technical Board consisting of railway experts of the nations having military forces in Siberia, for the purpose of administering the technical and economic management of all railways in the said zone.

(b) “An Allied Military Transportation Board for the purpose of coordinating military transportation under instructions of the proper military authorities.

2. “The protection of the railways shall be placed under the Allied military forces. At the head of each railway shall remain a Russian manager or director with the powers conferred by the existing Russian law.

3. “The Technical Board shall elect a president, to whom shall be entrusted the technical operation of railways. In matters of such technical operation the president may issue instructions to the Russian officials mentioned in the preceding clause. He may appoint assistants and inspectors in the service of the board,

chosen from among the nationals of powers having military forces in Siberia, to be attached to the central office of the board, and define their duties. He may assign, if necessary, corps of railway experts to more important stations. In his assigning railway experts to any of the stations, interests of the respective Allied powers in charge of such stations shall be taken into due consideration. He shall distribute work among the clerical staff of the board, whom he may appoint at his discretion.

4. "The clerical staff of the Inter-Allied Committee shall be appointed by the Chairman of the Committee, who shall have the right of distributing work among such employees as well as of dismissing them.

5. "The present arrangement shall cease to be operative upon the withdrawal of foreign military forces from Siberia, and all the foreign railway experts appointed under the arrangement shall then be recalled forthwith."

In addition to this formal agreement, there was an agreement, "on the side," between the United States and Japan, that Mr. Stevens would be head of the technical board.

This long delay in perfecting these arrangements, and the probable controversies, seemed to be due to the differences in the views of the United States and Japan. A reading of the very minute details, contained in paragraph 3, shows that Japan was determined to "Scotch" any prestige that might come to the United States in the Far East, by the prominence of the Russian Railway Service Corps headed by Mr. Stevens.

One who did not have to function under this agreement would probably think it was a very satisfactory agreement. I must admit I did. I, however, later found a few jokers in the agreement that, in my judgment, nullified the effectiveness of the entire plan.

In section 1, paragraph 1, it is provided that the Chairman of the Inter-Allied Committee shall be a Russian. Kolchak jumped on this like a cat at a mouse, and immediately appointed his Minister of Communications, Mr. Ostrougov, as Chairman.

Section 2 provided, that at the head of each railway shall remain a Russian manager or director with the powers conferred by the existing Russian law. If it were the intention of the framers of this agreement that the anti-Bolsheviks should have complete control, and that the railways should be run exclusively for the Kolchak adherents, then the agreement proved a success. There was no way for the Inter-Allied Committee or anyone else, except Kolchak or his adherents, to change an officer or employee of the railways.

The reactionary Russians were not slow to take advantage of that opportunity. I do not know what the requirements as to efficiency were in order to obtain employment on their railways, but the sine qua non was that everyone had to be an ardent supporter of Kolchak, or be so close-mouthed that no one knew where he stood, and this was dangerous. Soon the agent of every station was a partisan of Kolchak. They organized regional boards either to give Kolchak adherents more jobs, or to see that their political opponents had no chance to use the railways.

The United States had stated that the money put into these railways and the keeping of troops in Siberia were because:

“The population of Siberia, whose resources have almost been exhausted by the long years of war and the chaotic conditions which have existed there, can be protected from a further period of chaos and anarchy, only by the restoration and maintenance of traffic on the Siberian railway.”

These were noble sentiments. The value of the operation of these railways to the great mass of the Russian people was absolutely nil. The majority of the people of Siberia enjoyed about the same value from the operation of these railways as did the people of Liberia. It is not always easy for an ordinary citizen to show by some overt act that he is a Democrat or a Republican, nor is it easy for a Russian to show that he is a Bolshevik or an anti-Bolshevik. Before a Russian could ride on the railways or ship a sack of flour on them, his credentials had to be beyond question.

After the big questions of financing and operating the railways were settled, then the smaller question of guarding the railroads, as provided in

section 2, had to be taken up. This should have been easily settled. Ambassador Morris, at Tokyo, had asked me to take up the question informally with Japanese Headquarters at Vladivostok with a view to expediting the agreement.

The Japanese would discuss for a certain distance then stop and refuse to move further. I had nothing to conceal from them, but it was evident they had some scheme that I was not to know. They would ask what I thought, and when they got my ideas they would have to defer further consideration for this, that, or some other reason. I finally wrote them a letter saying it was futile for us to discuss the question any further and withdrawing all I had said to them, and stated we would start from scratch when the Inter-Allied Committee asked the Allied Commanders to take up the question of guarding the railways. The question of this guard was not settled until the middle of April.

When the question of guarding the railway was taken up, I expected controversy over the Chinese Eastern, which is in Manchuria. We, however, had no trouble in settling the sectors we were to guard. The British and French said that they were unable to guard any of the railroad as they did not have sufficient troops. I proposed that the Chinese and Russians be permitted to select the part of the railroad within their country they desired to guard, and the Americans, Japanese, Chinese, and Czechs would do what they could with the rest. This was approved.

The Russians stated that they were not in a position to guard any of the railways, but the Chinese at once agreed to guard all of the Chinese Eastern, which amounted to almost one thousand miles. I expected the Japanese to object, but this request was unanimously approved. The Americans were assigned some of the railroad in Eastern Siberia and some just east of Lake Baikal.

That evening the Chinese High Commissioner came to see me and told me as soon as the meeting of the Allied Commanders had adjourned, the Japanese Chief of Staff had called the attention of the Chinese member to the agreement entered into by Japan and China at the time Japan made the "Military Demands" on China and, pursuant to that agreement, both the Japanese and the Chinese would guard the Chinese Eastern. The High

Commissioner said the Chinese wanted to guard it alone and asked me for suggestions. I told him that I could tell him that the majority of the Allied Commanders had in mind that China would guard the Chinese Eastern without the aid of Japan, and we made the distribution of the guard on that basis. This was cabled to the Chinese Government and they decided that China alone would guard the Chinese Eastern.

Japan apparently acceded to the decision but soon found it was necessary to build a field telephone line along the Chinese Eastern Railroad. This telephone line required guards where the Chinese had soldiers guarding the railroad.

The British, French, and Japanese thought the guarding of the railways gave them an opportunity to deprive me of any independence of action. The British and the French could not help guard the railways, but they could do more than their part in giving the rest of us unsolicited advice. The British could not guard a single mile of the railroad, but they could tell you how every mile should be guarded. The first proposition was to put the direction of the railway guards east of Lake Baikal under the Japanese Commander, and west of Lake Baikal under General Janin, French. I imagine this proposition was submitted to the United States Government. I find I cabled the War Department, March 28, 1919, as follows:

“I hope no action will be taken putting American troops under any other commander because such course would soon result in using our troops against so-called Bolsheviki and would absolutely nullify everything we have accomplished, and would result, in so far as effect on Russians is concerned, in changing policy of non-interference to one of taking sides.”

I imagine I am indebted to Ambassador Morris for never again hearing from this scheme.

General Knox then suggested that the guards not permit any Bolsheviks within ten kilometers of the railway. This proposition was submitted from somewhere to Ambassador Morris. I finally told the Allied commanders (meant principally for General Knox) that I intended to guard my section of the railway in my own way, and that I did not consider it anyone's business

unless and until I had failed, and then I would be glad to receive suggestions. This proposition never reached me again.

In the guarding of the railway it was necessary for me to move Headquarters and two battalions of the 27th Infantry under Colonel C. H. Morrow to Trans-Baikal, where we came in contact for the first time with the notorious Semenov. This was a ticklish position as it took a particular kind of a man to handle Semenov and not get into serious trouble.

Colonel Morrow proved to be admirably equipped for this particular duty. He could be genial, he could be politic, he could be stern; and, if occasion demanded, he could bluff. It was not long until Morrow and Semenov clashed.

Morrow was carrying out the Railway Agreement to prevent interference with the operation of the railway within the American sector; Semenov came into Morrow's sector and arrested some railway employees on the ground that they were Bolsheviki. Morrow notified him that he would not permit him to arrest these men unless he convinced him they had committed some offense.

Semenov claimed to be horrified at the thought that any foreigner could tell him what he could or could not do in Russia, and he notified Morrow that he was going to repeat his former act.

Morrow told him that if he passed a certain place with his armored train he would blow him to perdition or some similar place, and prepared to carry out his part of the contract by placing his little 37 millimeter pieces on each side of the railroad and piling sandbags around them. I lost some sleep over this clash and feared that Morrow, because of lack of proper weapons, could not make good. I decided, however, not to take any part in the controversy and let Morrow handle it. Morrow's bluff worked and Semenov did not appear.

The Railway Agreement provided that the Military would protect the railways, therefore, it became the duty of all military troops to see that the passengers and freight were not disturbed in passage through their respective sectors.

The Military had nothing to do with the class of freight, or for whom it was destined, and the same rule was to apply to passengers. This rule seemed to be so simple, that I anticipated no difficulty in following it, but it soon developed there were difficulties in the sector guarded by Japanese troops due to their construction of the Agreement.

On May 27, 1919, the Inter-Allied Railway Committee passed, unanimously, the following resolution:

“The execution of every transportation ordered, is to be entrusted to railway agents only. This resolution is in accord with the clear understanding of the Military Commanders.”

On July 25, 1919, the Committee asked the Allied Commanders to see that its resolution, regarding the infraction of rules for train movements, were obeyed and stated that Semenov had violated the order many times. General Otani, the Japanese Commander, replied:

“In view of the fact that the Japanese troops are located in the province, with the aim of maintaining order and political quietness, they must, of course, render assistance to the railway against malefactors tending to harm the railway movement, in case their duty will require it. However, all misunderstandings arising, with regard to the railway, among Allied troops, including Russian and Allied agents which, by their character, are subject to the decision by corresponding governments or diplomatic representatives as well as small incidents which can be liquidated by Russian authorities or military, or incidents of a similar character do not permit of Japanese interference.”

Japan was the only power following this policy, which meant that Japanese troops would not interfere with Semenov and Kalmykov, no matter what they did in sections of the railway guarded by Japan, and as a result of this policy, Semenov was permitted to force indignities upon some members of the American Railway Service Corps, in the sectors guarded by the Japanese. He was also permitted to stop an American train, loaded with rifles destined for Kolchak, and demand fifteen thousand of the rifles,

which he threatened to take by force unless the officer willingly gave them up.

Before the Americans took over their sectors, I issued to the people a proclamation, in Russian, and posted it in our various sectors in all villages and towns. The proclamation was in part:

“Now, therefore, the Russian people are notified and advised, that in the performance of such duty, the sole object and purpose of the armed forces of the United States, on guard between the railroad points above stated, is to protect the railroad and railway property and insure the passage of passenger and freight trains through such sectors without obstruction or interruption.”

“Our aim is to be of real assistance to all Russians in protecting necessary traffic movements within the sectors on the railroad in Siberia assigned to us to safeguard. All will be equally benefited, and all shall be treated alike by our forces irrespective of persons, nationality, religion or politics. Cooperation is requested and warning given to all persons, whomsoever, that interference with traffic will not be tolerated.”

This seemed to me at the time, and seems to me now, a perfectly proper notice. We were guarding the railway, not against the actions of the Whites only; not against the actions of the Reds only; not against Bolshevik or anti-Bolshevik depredations; but we were to see that no one interfered with the railroads.

This proclamation was the occasion for an outburst of abuse and vilification because I had included the Whites with the Bolsheviks. Mr. DeWitt C. Poole, head of the Russian Division of the State Department, later openly criticized me to an officer of the War Department at a conference where my activities in Siberia were being officially discussed, for using the words “irrespective of party” in my proclamation. If I had been as one sided as Mr. Poole in Russian affairs, I undoubtedly would not have used that expression but would have directed the troops to protect the railways against the Bolsheviks. This criticism of me by Mr. Poole shows conclusively the difference in his conception and in my conception of the

meaning of “non-intervention in the internal affairs of the Russian people and non-interference with the political sovereignty of Russia.”

I had been, up to the time of the Railroad Agreement and the assignment of troops to guard the railroads, able to keep clear of the political differences in Siberia. I felt secure in the belief that no one could point to a single act of the American troops as evidence that we had violated the United States policy of “non-interference.” As soon as the troops began guarding the railroads, all Kolchak adherents at once came under the protection of Allied troops. His adherents lived in towns along the railroads, and the troops could not permit armed conflicts in those towns.

In practice, these railroads became entirely Kolchak Railroads financed by the Allies. If a Russian, who was not sympathetic to Kolchak, approached a railroad station with the idea of traveling on the railroad or shipping supplies, he was in grave danger of losing his life or liberty. These statements are established by official reports. Soon the anti-Kolchaks began to complain that we were helping Kolchak by guarding his line of communications. My only reply to that was that I was guarding the railroad for them as well as for the other side, and that I had no means of knowing what was in the cars I was protecting while in American sectors. This did not satisfy the anti-Kolchak people and they soon began attacking the American detachments, or property under our charge.

We took vigorous actions against these attacks. The most serious troubles occurred near the Souchan coal mines or on the railroad leading from the mines to the main line of the railroad. The section around the Souchan mines was more pro-Bolshevik than any section with which we came in contact. Ivanoff-Rinoff was anxious to arrest some of the leaders who were working in the mines. It was the job of the Americans there to keep the mines in operation and I told Ivanoff-Rinoff that he could not send his troops to Souchan as that would cause a strike and the mines would be closed. The local pro-Kolchak press claimed I was protecting Bolsheviks. I told Ivanoff-Rinoff if any man in the mines was charged with an offense we would see that the police at the mines would arrest him and turn him over to the civil authorities for trial.



Armored car to meet the needs of the railway patrol.



One result of the railway agreement. Bodies of American soldiers killed in action against anti-Kolchak forces.

This did not satisfy the anti-Bolsheviks, so I proposed to withdraw American troops and let them run the mines. This, they knew they could not do. We finally settled on a certain prescribed area wherein I would not

permit any Bolshevik organizations, and Kolchak troops would not enter this area.

It was fortunate for me that Mr. C. H. Smith was designated as the United States representative on the Inter-Allied Committee as provided in section one of the Agreement. Mr. Smith was a railroad man in the United States, he spoke Russian, and had the confidence of the other men of the Committee.

On March 2, 1919, I received a letter from General Knox, which stated in part:

“I wish we could see more eye to eye in matters here. The objects we wish are undoubtedly very similar but we are falling into different ruts. The policy of our Government is to support Kolchak, and I believe in that policy, for if he goes there will be chaos. I don’t for a moment pretend that Kolchak is the Angel Gabriel, but he has energy, patriotism and honesty and my eight years in Russia has taught me that when you get these qualities combined in one man he is a man to keep.

“There is a widespread propaganda to the effect that your Countrymen are pro-Bolshevik. I think in the interest of Allied solidarity, and of the safety of Allied detachments, you should try to contradict this.”

This letter shows the basic differences in our policies which made it impossible to cooperate.

The British, the French, and the American Consul General Harris in Siberia were all doing everything they could to help Kolchak while I tried to remain neutral. These were my instructions and, in addition to the communication of the Chief of Staff dated March 28, 1919, telling me to follow that course until changed by the President, other quotations will be made which show conclusively that it was the expectation of the War Department that I remain neutral.

I replied to General Knox’s letter, in part as follows:

“I believe it is well known, in fact it has been published, that the United States does not intend to interfere in the internal affairs of the Russians. I have consistently followed this policy.

“As to the support of Kolchak, I do not feel under my orders that I can support or interfere with any individual. From your statement, ‘and no more wants to return to the stupidity of the old regime than you do,’ I fear you think some act of mine is due to the fact that I consider Admiral Kolchak has monarchical tendencies. I consider it none of my affair as to what the tendencies of any of the contending factions in Russian affairs are.

“With reference to your statement that there is a widespread Bolshevik propaganda to the effect that Americans are pro-Bolshevik, this is possibly true, but I am sure that the propaganda is more from the anti-Bolshevik crowd than from the Bolshevik crowd. If you will read the reports in certain local papers, I think you will agree with me that it is hopeless or useless to try to contradict such misrepresentations as appear in these papers. They emanate not from a desire to do justice, but from what they foolishly think they can force Americans to do by such misrepresentations.”

This seemed to be General Knox’s last effort in Siberia to force me to follow the British policy. He now transferred his efforts to London and to representatives of the State Department in Siberia. He soon approached Mr. Caldwell, the American Consul in Vladivostok, and suggested that he send a cable to the United States Government advising that Government that General Graves did not truly interpret America’s policy towards Siberia, and that General Graves did not truly follow the will of the American Government and the American people.

I can not say but I suspect he approached Consul General Harris with the same proposal. If he did not, it is hard to imagine why, as he and Mr. Harris were following the same course in the support of Kolchak.

The reader will naturally ask how is it possible for such conflicting policies to be followed by the agents of different Departments of the United

States Government, on such a vital and far reaching question as the use of troops in a foreign country? I am sorry I am not able to help elucidate this natural query, and I can only surmise. My surmise is, that as practically all accredited agents of all foreign Governments as well as all former Czarist officials were very antagonistic to the Soviet system of Government, and were in fear of the spread of communism, there was a constant and determined effort to bring about intervention in the hope of checking the spread of communism in the Far East. These efforts were successful in inducing the representatives of the State Department to change from the policy, "not to interfere, recognize or become mixed up with any faction or partisan strife in Russia or Siberia" to a policy of giving support to the Russian faction fighting the Soviets. The idea of the formation of an Eastern front was advanced as the real reason behind the desire for Military Intervention, but probably the desire to check the spread of socialistic ideas was equally as prominent, but for some reason none of the Allied or associated powers considered it advisable to even mention, the now admitted fear of the spread of bolshevism in the Far East.

I have no information as to whether the State Department changed the instructions that Consul General Harris said he had, but my instructions which were to the same effect as those first given to him, were never changed.

At best, the means for getting information to and from Siberia were very meager and unsatisfactory and, after the Czechs had taken the Trans-Siberian Railway and Vladivostok, it was practically impossible to get information except such as was designed to foster the idea of military intervention, the only exception being through diplomatic or consular agents. If these agents had a closed mind, which was almost universally the case, it was not difficult for them to accept what information that came to them tending to show a need for intervention, and discard, as propaganda, all information opposed to their view, and this could be done with the most honest intentions and with a sincere conviction that they were advancing the interests of their Governments. As a result, the representatives of the War Department and the State Department were carrying out entirely different policies at the same time and in the same place. There can be no difference of opinion as to the accuracy of this statement, and the results were bitter criticism of all United States agents. All Russian and Allied representatives,

who favored military intervention, bitterly criticized my action, and those who believed in the policy of “non-intervention in the internal affairs of the Russian people,” were equally vehement in their criticism of the State Department representatives. The criticism of both could be justified by pointing to the policy of the United States, that seemed best calculated to uphold their criticism.

It is, in my judgment, unfortunate that the United States had during such an upheaval as occurred in Russia, men handling Russian affairs who had had previous governmental service in the Far East, or Near East, or especially in Russia. These men had contacts with and formed friendships among the class with whom they associated, and if Russians, they were universally pro-Czarist. It is possible the men I have in mind belonged to the class of Americans who have no sympathy with the aspirations and desires of the so called submerged class, whether in Russia or in the United States.

There can be no question that the United States Consul General in Siberia, Mr. Harris, was an ardent supporter of Kolchak, and the principles of Government for Russia espoused by the Kolchak regime. The people put in office by Admiral Kolchak were practically all former Czarist officials and Absolutists, in so far as Russia was concerned, and Mr. MacGowan, American Consul at Irkutsk, and later at Vladivostok, was an extreme partisan and did all he could to advance the interests of the Absolutists, and he was the consul who notified the American Ambassador at Vologda that a train load of German Staff officers passed through Irkutsk with their insignia poorly concealed by Russian overcoats, and that these German officers were on their way to organize the German and Austrian prisoners with a view to taking the Trans-Siberian Railway. It is now known that Mr. MacGowan was imposed upon, and probably by some one interested in getting President Wilson to consent to send American troops to Siberia.

Mr. DeWitt C. Poole, who later had charge of Russian affairs in the State Department, showed by his efforts to espouse the cause of Kolchak, that he did not favor the announced policy of the United States, “not to intervene in the internal affairs of the Russian people.”

The only logical conclusion one, who was present in Siberia during intervention and knew the sidelights, can come to is that the main reason for intervention was not given to the public. The action of the representatives of the Allies, as well as that of the Consul General of the United States, justifies the belief that all Allied and Associated nations had in mind to check the spread of Communism when troops went to Russia. As a further proof of this statement, there was and is a widespread belief, in the United States at least, to this effect. After the Armistice there was no effort made to conceal the fact that Allied troops were trying to destroy Bolshevism. As a matter of fact, this was the only logical reason that can be advanced for keeping foreign troops in Siberia.

There was also great resentment against me and our forces because we followed the policy of non-interference, as ordered, and would not follow the Allied representatives in fighting what they called bolshevism. American soldiers could not have taken part in the horrors of Civil War in Siberia but, by their presence and by guarding the railroad which was used exclusively for the benefit of Kolchak, they contributed to the atrocities which shocked all people with normal sensibilities.

The Chief of Staff told me, after my return from the Far East, that I would never know half the pressure the British brought in Washington to have me relieved. I have other information equally reliable that they did not stop until they reached the President.

Other nationals know the ease with which they can discredit Army officers in the United States. I do not know and never will know what reports General Knox made to London about me and the American troops. I do know, however, that he had in his office a young Captain who was a "Barrister of the Inner Temple" of London, and who was reporting some things about Americans that were absolutely false. A British officer, who was occupying General Knox's office temporarily during his absence, unwittingly told me of some of these reports. General Knox had to send something to London of an unusual tenor before the British Government, through their Ambassador, would feel justified in trying to have an Army officer relieved from command of American troops. General Knox could not afford to make up false reports, but he could afford to cable false reports made to him by that young irresponsible officer. The President naturally

thought something must be radically wrong in Siberia and expressed himself as being much disturbed. This was the effect General Knox hoped to create. He, or his representatives, more than once approached Americans to find out where my influence was and who was behind me in Washington. These efforts were brought direct to me.

No one who knows the American Army officer can imagine an officer even thinking of doing, much less doing, what General Knox did. The British would resent bitterly an American Army military man going to a representative of the British Foreign Office and trying to get him to take steps to relieve a British Army officer. If I had done the same thing that General Knox did, by taking steps to have him relieved because of improper performance of his duties, he probably would have taken my act as an insult that justified redress from the United States Government. If the tables had been turned, the British would have made representations to Washington of my unusual action.

As an example, I one time directed the military representative in Omsk to notify Mr. Soukine, Foreign Minister for Kolchak, that certain steps were going to be taken if certain acts continued. I was notified from Washington that, in future, I would communicate with the Kolchak Government through the State Department. That this was the proper procedure was well known to me, but the question brought to Mr. Soukine's attention was one that could not wait for the delay of the State Department. It is my judgment that I was the only military representative in Siberia who would have been subjected to an intended reproof for communicating on a matter very important to Americans, which required immediate action, with an individual, who claimed to represent a "Supreme Dictator" in Russia, who had never been recognized as the head of any government by any nation.

It is high time the American people realize that foreigners are well aware of the ease with which they can create suspicion in the United States against our own representatives when they refuse to follow the line of action desired by the foreigner.

It is well known that the British and French representatives were constantly trying to have me relieved from command, and the reason was that I followed the orders I had received from the United States

Government, rather than the desires of General Knox. I understood that the Japanese stated to Washington that they would prefer to deal with a diplomat rather than with me. As to whether I was a diplomat or not is a matter of opinion, but certainly I was as diplomatic in my dealings with the representatives of England, France, and Japan as they were in their dealings with me.

Does any one imagine that our Government ever made representations to the British Government about the most unusual procedure of General Knox? I do not.

Another evidence of British unfair methods is shown in a book written by Colonel John Ward, Member of Parliament. As I saw this book in the Congressional Library in Washington, and as it purports to report occurrences relative to the action of the United States military representatives which are so at variance with the facts, I am noting a few extracts. Colonel Ward says:

“While at Nikolsk, a telegram from the Station-Master at Kraevski was received, stating in effect, that he was using a line from his house because a detachment of the Red Guard had entered the station, and in the presence of American soldiers who were guarding the railway, had placed himself and his staff under arrest and had taken possession of the station.”

This statement would appear so ridiculous to people who were in Siberia at the time that no additional comment would be necessary. I can assure those who know nothing of the conditions, that if this operator had been driven from his office he would not have been permitted to go to another telegraph office. It is most improbable that the operator had a line and a telegraphic instrument in his house.

This statement was designed to show that American soldiers were cooperating with Bolsheviks. I can not say that Colonel Ward did not receive the dispatch, but I can say the meaning he intended to convey is not justified by the facts. Colonel Ward again says:

“Out of sixty liaison officers and translators, over fifty were Russian Jews.”

We had no such number of translators and interpreters around American Headquarters. The United States and Great Britain were both glad to have Jews in the service during the War. I never inquired whether a soldier was a Jew or not a Jew and it made absolutely no difference in my attitude to men under my command. I do not know who at my headquarters came of Jewish stock. I do know that my personal interpreter was a British subject, born in Scotland. I might also say that he was a very efficient, faithful, and deserving employee.

Colonel Ward knew that Jews were anathema to the autocracy of Russia, the particular party he was supporting and by this false statement he was trying to curry favor with his associates in Siberia. Colonel Ward's chapter on American Forces in Siberia is filled with misstatements of alleged facts and occurrences, all of which showed bitterness of feeling and resentment against our troops.

I have previously stated enough to show that this bitterness and resentment was due to the fact that I would not permit the British to dictate to me what I should do. This bitterness continued until General Knox boarded the ship to leave Siberia.

During the Spring of 1919, Kolchak was apparently having some success in organizing, arming, and equipping the men drafted into his forces. As all means of communication in the interior as well as at Vladivostok were in the control of Kolchak adherents, and as all foreign representatives were in sympathy with Kolchak's efforts, it is my judgment very few people knew what was going on at the front. It was easy to magnify successes and minimize setbacks. It was easy to make reports that would bolster up their cause. As an example of what is meant, reports in my possession read:

“The figures for rations showed on May 30th, 1919, that Gajda's army did not exceed 120,000 men entitled to draw rations, and on June 9th, but 100,000 men. Figures showed that they were actually drawing rations from Omsk for 275,000 men.

“When asked to explain these figures, Gajda said he was unable to accomplish anything as his entire Staff was concerned in this misrepresentation. Of fighting men, he stated he had less

than 30,000 on June 30th, and on June 1st, he had little more than 60,000 exclusive of reserves who had been in his engagement.”

Some of Gajda’s Generals were claiming that the cause of their failure on the front was due to the dishonesty of the supply service. Gajda sent an officer to check rations shipped from Ekaterinburg with what was received at Perm. Notes of the most important of these are given below:

“The percentage of supplies shipped that failed to reach destination:

Vegetables, canned and fresh	100%
Tobacco, for issue	82%
Sugar, for troops and for sale to officers	78%
Forage for animals	90%
Meat	46%
Clothing	65%
Shoes	35%
Flour	45% ”

The large shortages were for a period of three months, and were shortages between Ekaterinburg and the city of Perm only. Gajda took vigorous action with reference to these dishonest transactions and had some officers court-martialed and dismissed.

One would think that the Russians, especially the higher ranking officers in the Kolchak forces, would have rallied to Gajda’s support for his action in trying to eradicate dishonesty from the Army. It was the general belief in Siberia that the Russian reaction to Gajda’s actions was against Gajda, and had much to do with his final break with Kolchak.

Most of the uniforms for the mobilized Russians were supplied by the British. General Knox stated that one hundred thousand uniforms had been supplied by the British for Kolchak forces. This was partially substantiated by the number of men in the Red Army wearing British uniforms. General Knox was disgusted at the Reds wearing British uniforms and later is reported to have said that the British would supply nothing more to Kolchak

because everything they supplied reached the Bolsheviks. The men found in the Red Army wearing the British uniforms were the same men, generally speaking, to whom these uniforms were issued when they were with the Kolchak forces. The great mass of these men had no heart for fighting for Kolchak.

The methods used by the Kolchak people to mobilize these Siberians created a resentment not easily removed. They went into the service embittered by fear, not of the enemy, but of their own forces. The result was, as soon as they were armed and equipped they deserted by regiments, battalions, and individually to the Bolsheviks.

On April 9, 1919, I reported:

“Numbers of so-called Bolshevik bands in Eastern Siberia increasing as result of mobilization order and extreme methods used in enforcing it. Peasants and working class do not desire to fight for Kolchak Government.”

On April 13, the Japanese prepared a scheme to get me to take sides in the internal conflict. They approached all Allied military representatives claiming that Bolsheviks were threatening the railroad near the town of Skotova, stating that transportation had been stopped and requested all join a force being sent out by Japan to clean out the Bolsheviks. After all had agreed to take part, one Ally sending only one soldier and the others an insignificant force, the Japanese then approached me, through my Chief of Staff, asking me to join.

By this time I knew very well the object of Japan was to either force me to take part in operations against the Bolsheviks or to claim I refused to join all the other Allies in the movement against the Bolsheviks. They proposed to tell the Bolsheviks that they could not come west of a north and south line passing through Skotova.

The investigation of the situation showed that transportation had not been stopped and the only threats were in the form of twenty shots, fired by some unknown person, and no one knew for what purpose the shots were fired. In my judgment, the shots were fired by some Russian at Japanese

instigation for the purpose of trying to force me into an embarrassing position. In reply to this suggestion of the Japanese, I said in writing:

“That the United States and Japan had both solemnly assured the Russian people that we would not interfere with her political sovereignty, not intervene in her internal affairs and, in view of this solemn assurance, I could not see how we could restrict Russians, in their own country, to the east or west, north or south, of any imaginary line Japan might wish to draw. I cannot join in any such proposed movement unless there is need for protecting the railroad.”

This gave an occasion for an outburst in the Japanese press, and the local anti-American press, against the Americans.

Reports were being received from all sections of Eastern Siberia where American troops were stationed, of the killing and whipping of men, women, and children. Reports of similar outrages were coming to American Headquarters from peasant villages. I felt the reports received from American Army officers were true as they had personally investigated enough of the reports to justify them in reporting to Headquarters. The atrocities reported by the peasants were so similar to those reported by the Army officers that I felt justified in believing the peasant reports. I have never been able to understand the psychology of a class of human beings who could think by such actions that they could establish a stable Government in Siberia. The Kolchak adherents, who committed these atrocities, knew they had only a weak structure of Government that would not last a month unless buttressed by foreign bayonets.

These atrocities, coupled with a few aggressive acts of Ivanoff-Rinoff troops, had aroused considerable friction between Ivanoff-Rinoff and myself. On May 9, 1919, I cabled the War Department that:

“Ivanoff-Rinoff ordered to proceed to Omsk at once turning over everything to Horvath. I am informed by reliable sources that the recall followed a demand on the Kolchak Government that he be made Commander-in-Chief in Eastern Siberia with Semenov in command of all troops. Significance not yet known.”

Before he left for Omsk, he came to see me with his interpreter and aide. I brought my interpreter into my office expecting to have an unpleasant call. Much to my surprise, Ivanoff-Rinoff began by telling me he had no feeling in his heart against me and he hoped I had none against him; that he knew of no one he would like to join with in drinking a bottle of wine to the success of our respective countries better than he would with me, and he hoped when they had succeeded in getting rid of bolshevism, he and I could put our knees under the same table and have this bottle of wine.

He was very frank in saying:

“I want to tell you before I leave that we have tried every way in the world to cause you to change your policy. We have tried flattery, we have tried abuse, and we have tried putting you in embarrassing positions, but so far as I can tell, we have not changed you one particle. While I do not like your policy, I do admire your tenacity.”

He remained about one hour and he and I discussed conditions in the Far East in a most amiable manner.

While the British were supplying Kolchak troops with uniforms, the United States, through the American Red Cross, was also supplying Kolchak troops.

As previously stated, Dr. Teusler, head of the American Red Cross, had no sympathy for the aspirations of the Russian people. I am sorry to have to record this fact, but truth demands that I state that the American Red Cross in Siberia was acting as a supply agent for Kolchak.

On April 16, 1919, Major Slaughter, U. S. A. at Omsk, received from Dr. Teusler, at Irkutsk, the following dispatch:

“Please inform Mr. Soukine we are purchasing three hundred thousand suits cotton underwear for Russian Army, in China and Japan. Will inform him later regarding second three hundred thousand suits ordered in America. Deeply regret any delay in this matter.”

In addition to this I had been furnishing guards for Red Cross trains to Omsk thinking these supplies were to be delivered to the Russian people. One young officer in his report after his return in charge of the guard said:

“I did not get to stop at Omsk, as Kolchak troops expected a fight next day and I was rushed to the front to issue the supplies for the expected fight.”

This put the American troops in the position of issuing supplies to Kolchak troops, and I had to notify Dr. Teusler that if this ever happened again he would get no more guards for his trains from me. I wonder what the outburst would have been if Americans had been discovered giving anything to the Bolsheviks.

The American Red Cross ran hospitals exclusively for Kolchak people, and acted in practice as Kolchak's supply agent as long as Dr. Teusler was in Siberia. In my judgment, it was most unfortunate that the head of the American Red Cross should act so directly contrary to the solemn assurance to the Russian people by the President of the United States. While the Red Cross is not a Government agent, its action reflected credit or discredit upon the United States.

On June 12, I cabled the War Department in part:

“Colonel Morrow told Semenov to remove his armored car from American sector or he would remove it. General Yoshe, Japanese, said to Morrow ‘the Japanese will resist by force the removal of Semenov's armored car by American troops from sector.’ Slaughter telegraphs that Soukine (Minister Foreign Affairs, Omsk) informed him that Soukine considers this incident indicative that Japanese wished trouble between Americans and Russians. Prior to receipt of message from Slaughter, Mr. Smith (American Member Inter-Allied Railway Committee) told me that Colonel Robertson, Acting High Commissioner, British, had informed him yesterday, very confidentially, that he thought the Japanese were behind this trouble between Semenov and Americans.”

There was no question the Japanese were behind all of Semenov's serious moves. I had previously notified the War Department that, in considering Far Eastern questions the Cossacks and Japanese should be considered as one force. I had no occasion to change that view.

Some of the Japanese would have been glad to see the United States troops embroiled with the Russians, but others were more cautious, because they knew I had enough information to connect Japan with any hostile act against Americans taken by Semenov or Kalmykov.

On June 24, I received a wire from Major Slaughter telling me of the resignation of Gajda, which had been accepted by the Omsk Government.

VII

“KOLCHAK AND RECOGNITION”

Early in July, 1919, I received notice from Washington stating:

“If the American Ambassador to Japan, Mr. Roland S. Morris, goes to Omsk, you will go with him.”

There had been a great deal of talk concerning the recognition of Kolchak by the United States, so I concluded the Ambassador's trip had something to do with this question. I felt that this was a political matter with which I had nothing to do, and for me to go to Omsk as directed, would give the impression that I had something to do with establishing the policy of the United States in Siberia. I had consistently tried to let the Allies understand that this was not the case.

I cabled to Washington and suggested the inadvisability of my going with the Ambassador. The authorities did not look at the question as I did, and cabled me on July 7:

“Reference your 373: if Morris goes to Omsk, it is desired you accompany him.”

As soon as I knew that Mr. Morris was going, I consulted him and we prepared for the trip. We had to make up our train with American soldiers for guard, and it was not until July 11 that we left Vladivostok.

The Kolchak people had represented to Washington, that my reaction to the Russian question was due to my service in the Far East, which had brought me in contact with the very reactionary Cossacks and, for that reason, I had no conception of conditions west of Irkutsk. As I had to go to Omsk, I decided to find out, if I could, the sentiment of the people toward the Omsk regime. Ambassador Morris had his own interpreter and I had mine, and we decided to have them go separately and talk to the people when our train stopped for any purpose. All sidings at stations were filled

with trains loaded with refugees from some place in Western Siberia. I directed my interpreter to converse generally with the women, as I thought they might be more likely to talk than the men, and I kept notes of what the interpreter reported to me when he returned to the train.

From Vladivostok the railroad runs north along the coast, with Amur Bay on the west, and the hills rising close on the east. After about twenty miles we left the ocean.

The town of Nikolsk, about sixty miles from Vladivostok, is the junction point of the part of the Ussuri Railroad which runs to Habarovsk and the main line to Progranichnaya, where it connects with the Chinese Eastern running through Manchuria. Nikolsk is, for Siberia, a modern city with a normal population of about fifty thousand, and it was the Headquarters of an Army Corps in Czarist time.

Beyond Nikolsk, on the main line, there was a great deal of cultivated land, at least in the vicinity of the railroad, and it was estimated that over 80% of the country was under cultivation, the chief product being wheat.

At Progranichnaya, on the boundary between Siberia and Manchuria, there is a custom house, a railroad station, and only very small buildings. After leaving here, we traveled through Manchuria for nine hundred and twenty miles, and the country was extensively cultivated, to a greater or less extent, all the way to Harbin which is four hundred and eighty miles from Vladivostok.

When we reached Harbin on the 13th of July, we found the heat there very oppressive, but the city was very interesting, with a cosmopolitan normal population of about eighty thousand. The city is on the navigable Sungari River. Every nation is supposed to be represented at Harbin, where there were about thirty thousand Russians, and a portion of the city is occupied exclusively by the Chinese. The importance of Harbin is due, in a great measure, to the fact that it is the junction point between the Chinese Eastern and the Southern Manchuria or Japanese railway to Mukden and Dairen. Due to the cosmopolitan population they have many substantial business houses with extensive commercial connections in the city. Harbin is near the eastern part of a vast plain, extending westward, and this plain becomes much drier as one proceeds to the west. Parts of the plain are

inhabited by nomads who move according to the needs of their stock animals.

Tsitsihar, about one hundred and seventy-five miles west of Harbin, is the principal town in Western Manchuria and has a normal population of about seventy thousand.

Manchuli, sometimes called Manchuria, is the station between Manchuria and Siberia and is four hundred and fifteen miles from Tsitsihar. At this point the Chinese Eastern joins the Trans-Baikal branch of the Trans-Siberian Railway. This junction is the center for caravans carrying merchandise for long distances. The caravans are made up of horses and camels, and the camels are often hitched to large two wheeled carts.

Two hundred and thirty-five miles from Manchuria is Karimskaya, the nearest town to the junction point between the Chinese Eastern and the Amur railway, an all Siberian railway line, which runs northeast and north of the Amur River to Habarovsk and thence south to Vladivostok.

From Nikolsk to Karimskaya the railroad is only a single track but, from this point west, it is double tracked.

The most difficult section of the Trans-Siberian Railway to protect and keep in operation is said to be from Karimskaya to Irkutsk. This difficulty is due to the fact that the railroad must cross the Trans-Baikal plateau and go around the southern part of Lake Baikal. This necessitates passing through thirty-eight tunnels, which makes it difficult and expensive to maintain and protect, but engineers claim there is no alternative route; besides the climate is extremely severe and few people live in this section, as July is the only month on the Trans-Baikal plateau that is free from frost.

Chita, at that time the domain of Semenov, is one hundred and forty miles from Karimskaya and normally had a population of about seventy-five thousand people.

At Verkhne-Udinsk, where the Headquarters and two battalions of the 27th Infantry were located, for the purpose of guarding a sector of the Trans-Baikal Railway assigned to the Americans to protect, we stopped for the day to see Colonel Morrow and to inspect his camp and his troops. The weather was delightful the day we were there and I was much pleased with

the appearance of Colonel Morrow's camp and his command. There is an important caravan route across the great Mongolian desert extending from Kalgan to Verkhne-Udinsk. This route is constantly traveled by camel trains, and about forty days is required to make the trip.

The railroad reaches Lake Baikal about eighty miles from Verkhne-Udinsk and runs close to the shore for about one hundred and eighty miles. The lake is a beautiful body of water about four hundred miles long and varies from twenty to sixty miles in width, with an area of thirteen thousand squares miles. It is said to have the greatest depth of any fresh water lake in the world, and in many places this great depth extends almost to the shore of the lake. The extreme known depth is six thousand five hundred feet. The mountains surrounding the lake rise to a height of four thousand five hundred feet above sea level, while the lake is less than two thousand feet above sea level.

Irkutsk, the metropolis of central Siberia, situated on the Angara River forty miles from where the river leaves the lake, is the most interesting city in Siberia from a historical point of view. The Angara is the only outlet from Lake Baikal. In Czarist times the political and penal prisoners exiled to Siberia were generally assembled at Irkutsk and sent from there to various sections to be confined or to be kept under surveillance. The harsh measures used by the Czarist regime to keep these prisoners from escaping, had not entirely disappeared when I passed through Irkutsk. I saw about twenty prisoners with good sized chains fastened to their ankles and on the end of the chain a large ball was fastened, which it was necessary for the prisoner to carry over his arm, in order that he might walk. The railroad runs along the south side of the river, while the city is on the north side and the station and the city are connected by a pontoon bridge, held in place by strong guy ropes.

After leaving Irkutsk, we passed through a heavily wooded section for about four hundred miles, then emerged on to the great steppes of Siberia which begin soon after leaving Krasnoyarsk, which was established in 1628, on the banks of the Yenesei River. This was where boats started in summer with the produce of that section, for the mouth of the river on the Arctic Ocean, and thence to be transshipped to such countries as considered

it profitable to send their ships to the mouth of the Yenessei to procure and handle this produce.

This town is remembered with great sadness as there was a prison camp for German and Austrian prisoners at Krasnoyarsk. I felt at the time that the treatment of these men was a disgrace to modern civilization, as the Russians could not feed them but would not give them their freedom. There was a young Swedish woman who lived in the town and devoted her entire time and energies to helping these poor unfortunates keep body and soul together.

At Krasnoyarsk I learned something of General S. N. Rozanov with whom I was to try to work in Vladivostok. He was the man who, on March 27, 1919, issued instructions to his troops:

1. "In occupying the villages which have been occupied before by bandits (partisans) to insist upon getting the leaders of the movement, and where you can not get the leaders, but have sufficient evidence as to the presence of such leaders, then shoot one out of every ten of the people."

2. "If, when the troops go through a town, and the population will not inform the troops, after having a chance to do so, of the presence of the enemy, a monetary contribution should be demanded from all, unsparingly."

3. "The villages where the population meet our troops with arms, should be burned down and all the full grown male population should be shot; property, homes, carts, etc. should be taken for the use of the Army."

We learned that Rozanov kept hostages and, for every supporter of his cause that met death, he would kill ten of the people kept as hostages. He spoke of these methods used in Krasnoyarsk as handling the situation with gloves, but declared his intention of taking off his gloves when he came to Vladivostok, and handling the situation without the consideration he had shown the people of Krasnoyarsk.

Such were the acts of Kolchak supporters, while being protected by the Allied military troops.

General Knox had stated to Major Slaughter that Admiral Kolchak wanted to send some man to Vladivostok of whom I would approve, and General Knox suggested that I ask for Rozanov, as he was a “bully fellow.” I told Major Slaughter that I was not interested in individuals, and the only hope I had was that Kolchak would send a man to Vladivostok who would follow the practices of civilized nations.

Rozanov proved to be the third worst character known to me in Siberia, although he could never quite reach the plane occupied by Ataman I. M. Kalmykov and Semenov.

The town of Tomsk is about sixty miles from the main line of the Trans-Siberian Railway, with a spur running from Taiga to Tomsk. I was particularly pleased with the beautiful location of Tomsk. This is called the educational center of Siberia, and there is a well-known university there, with very substantial buildings, but with no equipment in them at that time. The Governor of the province, who was a Kolchak appointee, met us and was very courteous, but when Mr. Morris asked him what the people thought of the Kolchak Government, his reply was, in effect, that the people had no confidence in the officials surrounding Kolchak.

During this entire trip, Mr. Morris and I had been getting, by personal conference and through our interpreters, information as to the attitude of the people toward the Kolchak Government.

On the day we left Tomsk, or the next day, Mr. Morris said to me:

“You and I have been much criticized because of our attitude towards the Kolchak regime; it has been repeatedly said we have the Far Eastern orientation and that if we would come West, we would find an entirely different situation after we left Irkutsk; and with all the people questioned by us and, through the interpreters, we have not found a single individual who spoke a good word for the Kolchak regime.”

Mr. Morris and I, up to this time, had worked together very harmoniously and I felt that he had been very helpful to me and had seen the situation in Siberia exactly as I had.

Just before we got to Omsk, or when we arrived at Omsk, Mr. Morris received a telegram. After reading the telegram he said:

“Now, General, you will have to support Kolchak.”

I replied that I had nothing from the War Department directing me to support Kolchak.

He replied with what appeared to me as some asperity:

“The State Department is running this, not the War Department.”

I replied:

“The State Department is not running me.”

I had felt that Mr. Morris had been remarkably fair and had been neutral in his handling of conditions that were submitted to him for his consideration, but his remark showed clearly that he had received some message indicating to him that the State Department was going to support or was supporting Kolchak. I feared this was going to at least mar the cordial cooperation of our work. By this time it was almost impossible to find a neutral in Siberia, and the sympathy of Mr. Morris in my efforts to be neutral, in a situation where neutrality was very difficult, was very much appreciated by me. Consul General Harris and Consul MacGowan were known to be very strong Kolchak supporters. So was the American Red Cross, but the other representatives of the United States, so far as I could tell, were trying to be neutral and I felt that I had the cordial cooperation of all the United States representatives except the ones mentioned above.

It is sometimes puzzling to one who does not understand our system of Government, to understand how the State Department could be supporting Kolchak and the War Department not support him. I have never been satisfied in my own mind that President Wilson knew of the unneutral

attitude of Consul General Harris in Siberia and approved of his attitude, but the President, as all knew, was fully occupied with the questions arising in the Peace Conference and could not give any of his personal attention to Siberia. It was apparent to me that Consul General Harris had the full support of the Russian section of the State Department, and I believe he had the support one step higher in the hierarchy of the State Department.

Whether this was known or not to the President, the reason for not issuing orders to me, as commander of the United States troops, to support Kolchak is apparent. To have ordered American troops to take sides in this internal conflict, which not only would have implied the use of force, but would have required the use of force, would have been an act of War. The Constitution of the United States provides:

“The Congress shall have power—to declare war; grant letters of marque and reprisal and make rules concerning captures on land and water.”

The Executive was therefore powerless to direct the use of troops, and there can be no question but that President Wilson and the War Department expected me to remain neutral. This is shown by my original orders; by the directions from the Chief of Staff on March 28, 1919, to continue this policy until changed by the President; and by the statement of the President, on June 26, 1919, in response to a Senate resolution concerning the American troops in Siberia, as follows:

“The instructions to General Graves direct him not to interfere in Russian affairs, but to support Mr. Stevens wherever necessary.”

Could the intent of our Government, so far as my action was concerned, be made any clearer than this?

Notwithstanding these instructions, the State Department representatives, or some of them, did not cease their efforts to discredit me and my work in Siberia. These statements are confirmed by the following communication sent to the Chief of Staff on November 22, 1919, and

signed by Brigadier General Marlborough Churchill, Director Military Intelligence:

“After conference with the Russian Division of the State Department I believe the State Department is of the opinion that General Graves’ instructions from the Secretary of War, to steady any efforts at self-government or self-defense in which the Russians themselves may be willing to accept assistance was ample authority for him to do everything practicable to steady the Kolchak Government. Kolchak has not been recognized by this Government, but the notes of May 26 and June 12, clearly indicate the Allied and Associated Powers have agreed to extend to Admiral Kolchak and his associates a certain amount of support. In spite of this, the diplomatic papers signed by the President of United States are of the greatest importance.”

The two notes referred to by General Churchill were never sent to me. I could not have changed my policy if they had been sent to me, because I had specific instructions “not to interfere in Russian affairs” until these orders were changed by the President and I was in touch with the War Department by cable every day.

Why was General Churchill selected as the messenger to convey the supposed opinions of the State Department? He was not the man to whom the State Department should convey their views as to the policy I was following. The facts of the matter are, the State Department, as represented by Mr. DeWitt C. Poole, had found an underling in the War Department who was willing to attempt to help him discredit the work of the Military in Siberia.

As a further justification of my statement, while still in Siberia, I was informed by Mr. Frazier Hunt, a prominent newspaperman who is probably more prominent now, that, when he was in the State Department to see about going to the Far East, a representative of the Department had spoken in a very discreditable way about me and my work in Siberia. Mr. Hunt said he thought I ought to know this and that, as he expressed it, he expected to find that I was a terrible “dub.” In his later articles, he spoke in a very

complimentary way of the attitude and work of the United States troops in Siberia.

Again, a Major General United States Army now retired, told me that he was approached by a representative of the State Department who said they were going to relieve me from command in Siberia, and “how would he like the place?” This State Department representative must have known that as long as Secretary Baker and General March were in office at the War Department, the State Department would not select the Commander of American troops and I can only consider this act as a cheap political effort to try to secure the support of this officer in the attempt to have me relieved.

The objection of the State Department to me could not have been based upon personal grounds, because I did not know them. By elimination, one can only arrive at the conclusion that the representative of the State Department, who was so active in a War Department question, hoped to get a commander in Siberia who would disregard not only his orders but the Constitution of the United States and use the American troops to help Kolchak, some of whose military adherents were committing acts that were a disgrace to civilization.

The memorandum of General Churchill, conveying what he believed to be the views of the State Department, finally was acted upon by the War Department and an officer of the General Staff was ordered to report whether or not I had complied with my orders in Siberia.

Before this report was prepared, an officer of the Army gave a dinner or a luncheon at the Metropolitan Club at which Mr. Poole, some British officers, and the officer who was to write the memorandum were guests. I am not informed as to other guests. One officer of the Army has officially characterized this dinner as a conference. The officer who was to write the memorandum said that at this conference he formed the impression, “that the British officers and our own State Department representatives present at the conference, felt that General Graves had, by his refusal to take sides in the Kolchak-Bolshevik affair, not carried out his instructions.” With this background, the General Staff officer was supposed to be ready to write his report.

As this officer was required to report as to whether or not I had complied with my orders, one would naturally think it would be necessary for him to know what my orders were. The State Department and the War Department did not look at it in that way or, at least, this officer had to write the report as to whether or not I had complied with my orders without ever seeing them.

Based upon this report, Major General Haan, Director War Plans Division, on December 15, 1919, stated in part as follows:

“It should be noted that nothing in all the instructions issued authorizes the Commanding General of the American Forces in Siberia to employ his forces in combat against any Russian force. Even the agreement to support Admiral Kolchak does not imply opposition to his enemies by force of arms. The principle of non-interference in Russian internal affairs, limits the activities of the American forces in Siberia to guarding supplies, to keeping the lines of communication open, and to supporting Mr. Stevens.

“General Graves has apparently carried out these instructions under difficult circumstances and has refrained from interfering in Russian internal affairs. It is believed that he has a clear understanding of his mission.

“There are indications, however, that the State Department feels that the support of Kolchak implied opposition to Kolchak’s enemies in every way except by the use of armed forces on the fighting fronts.

“This would seem to indicate somewhat of a change in policy by the State Department from the policy heretofore mentioned of non-interference in Russian internal affairs.”

After I returned from Siberia and obtained the book, “Russian-American Relations, March 1917—March 1920. Documents and Papers,” I learned for the first time what the notes of May 26 and June 12, 1919, mentioned by General Churchill, referred to. In the note to Admiral Kolchak of May 26, the United States, England, France, Italy, and Japan all stated:

“We are therefore disposed to assist the government of Admiral Kolchak and his associates with munitions, supplies, and food, to establish themselves as the Government of all Russia, provided we receive from them definite guarantees that their policy has the same object in view as the Allied and Associated Powers.”

The note of June 12 was to Admiral Kolchak, notifying him that the United States, England, France, and Japan were willing to extend to him:

“The support set forth in the original letter.”

It will be noticed that this offer of assistance extended only to furnishing Kolchak with, “food, munitions and supplies,” none of which carried with it military support and therefore, I, as Commander of the American troops, was not concerned. Why were these notes mentioned in any criticism of my actions?

General Churchill did not give the contents of the notes, but left the inference that if the contents were known there would exist a cause for criticism. This procedure was unworthy of an officer occupying an important position in the War Department, and a most unusual action for an army officer.

The report of General Haan seems very clear to me, except the part that says the State Department feels that I should have used American troops against Kolchak’s enemies, except on the fighting front. I could not help or harm Kolchak, except by the use of American troops and my only authority or responsibility was with such troops. I had no political or welfare responsibility; I had no financial or economic responsibility except the responsibility imposed upon all commanding officers of American troops by law and regulations of the War Department. All of these facts were known in the State Department.

As conditions were in Siberia, the use of the words, “Fighting front” was indefinite and inappropriate. The fighting that occurred in Eastern Siberia was confined to the efforts of considerable groups of peasants and workers some of whom were probably led by the Bolsheviks and known as

“partisans,” to protect themselves and their families from the atrocities committed by the Kolchak troops.

The next place of interest, after leaving Taiga, was Novo-Nikolaevsk, now called Novo-Sibirsk. This town is on the Obi River and was of small importance except for its river connections with Southern Siberia and the Arctic Ocean. The Soviets have made this town the Capital of this vast agricultural area and it is known as the Chicago of Siberia.

The next city was Omsk, where Kolchak had his Headquarters. This town is on the Irtysh River and was founded in 1717. The Soviets have also made Omsk the economic center of a large district.

When our train arrived at Omsk, Mr. Morris and Mr. Harris walked up and down the platform, evidently discussing the situation, and when Mr. Morris returned to the train he said:

“Harris says no one can get along with you.”

Mr. Harris was at Omsk and I was at Vladivostok, thirty seven hundred miles away. His duties were imposed upon him by the State Department; I had nothing to do with the duties of Mr. Harris and he had nothing to do with my duties and if we ever had any personal differences I knew nothing of it. Mr. Harris would not have made this remark if I had been using American troops as the British, French, and Japanese were using their troops in the support of Admiral Kolchak.

What Consul General Harris meant was to tell the Ambassador, in an offensive way, that no one could force me to support Admiral Kolchak. The resort to the use of abuse and misrepresentation of those who would not follow their bidding, was characteristic of the autocratic Russians surrounding the Admiral and with whom Consul General Harris found his congenial associates.

After the arrival of Ambassador Morris, one of the members of the Kolchak regime said:

“Soukine drew up another receipt for the saving of Russia: we are on the threshold of recognition.”

Soukine was reported as frequently saying to the ministers that Kolchak was now going to be recognized by other Governments, and every evening the Kolchak ministers were meeting to discuss the questions to be discussed at the formal conference of Allied representatives and the Kolchak ministers the next afternoon.

The question of financing and building up the railroads in Siberia was an important question for discussion between the Allied representatives and the Russians. Colonel Emerson was in Omsk at that time and told me the Russians did not know what they had. He told me that one day the Russians asked for some material, I think it was copper, and he knew where there was enough of that material along the Trans-Siberian Railway to meet their needs for 40 years. At this meeting he told the Russians they did not need any of this material, and they assumed their usual attitude of resentment towards him.

Mr. Morris is reported as saying:

“If the Omsk Government will make a stand, we will probably recognize you.”

General Knox knew the morale, strength, and inefficiency of the Kolchak troops much better than Ambassador Morris and said:

“That no form of military assistance would his Government give, and that he would not even communicate with London about it, as what they had been furnishing was falling into the hands of the Reds.”

In order to determine whether the Kolchak troops were able to make a stand in August, 1919, I will try to analyze the official reports made to me. One report read:

“It is estimated that on July 1, outside the office holding and military class, the Omsk Government had less than 1% of followers. It was estimated that the Red followers were about 45%, Social Revolutionists about 40%, with about 10% divided

among other parties, giving 5% to the military, office-holders and Kolchak followers.”

From this period on, even to the fall of the Omsk Government, Kolchak’s Army represented a retreating mob.

It should be remembered that Ambassador Morris did not reach Omsk to begin his conference until three weeks after the report above quoted was made. The Kolchak troops had been defeated before Tchelyabinsk and had reported that they were going to be withdrawn to the Ishim River, and reorganize and reform the line extending along this river, from Ishim on the north, to Petropavlosk on the south, (a distance of one hundred and ten miles) with a view to starting an offensive on September 1, an offensive that had for its objective, “to drive the Bolsheviks into the Volga River.”

The reports handed out for public consumption were that General Pepelaieff had under him in the north, or right of the line, 20,000 men; General Lokvitsky, in the center, had 31,000 men; and General N. P. Sakharov, on the south, the left of the line, had under him 50,000 men.

As I was in Omsk at this time and had nothing to do, I went to General Dietrichs, Commander-in-Chief of the Russian forces, and asked to go to Petropavlosk to witness the mobilization. He informed me that there was great congestion at Petropavlosk due to the mobilization and to the contemplated visit of Kolchak, and he suggested that I go to Ishim on the north and ask the Russian commander for an escort and cars, and go by motor from Ishim to Petropavlosk and I would see the whole thing. This suggestion of General Dietrichs pleased me very much.

As Mr. Morris and I lived in the same car it was necessary for me to make arrangements for my trip to Ishim, about 160 miles from Omsk. I went to Colonel Emerson and asked him to take his private car and go to Ishim with us, which he kindly consented to do. He had a train made up, consisting of cars for the sleeping and feeding of twenty or thirty American soldiers, a flat car with my government Cadillac on it, and his railroad car.

We left about 8 o’clock in the morning and about 11 o’clock were put on a siding and left there. No one could or would give us any information as to why we were held up. Colonel Emerson could not get our train moved

even though he was First Assistant to Mr. Stevens, who was supposed to be in charge of the technical operation of the railroad. About sunset our train started. They kept stopping us, and it resulted in our taking thirty-two hours to go one hundred and sixty miles.

About four hours before we arrived at Ishim, we were stopped at a small town, and a number of Kolchak officers appeared and told a corporal in charge of the train-guard that they had to take our train for military purposes, and were very sorry that we would have to get out. This corporal decided he could handle that situation without reporting to me and, in fulfillment of that idea, he ordered his guard to load their rifles and notified those Russian officers that, "if they started anything there would be more dead Russian officers in that town than they had even seen." This resulted in our moving on toward Ishim. After leaving the town, the interpreter came and reported the conversation between the corporal and the Russian officers, but the corporal never reported the occurrence to me. We finally arrived at Ishim at 4 P.M., on the second day after leaving Omsk.

When I got off the car at Ishim, as I expected, the ubiquitous English officer appeared to tell me what I should and should not do. An English officer seemed to be always present with any Kolchak troops and this particular Englishman, named Captain Murray, said:

"General, I beg of you not to go across there, as the Bolsheviks will capture you, and that will spoil all we have accomplished over here."

This seemed a remarkable statement for two reasons:

First—How and why did Captain Murray know that I contemplated going to Petropavlosk by motor? Manifestly, they had been notified from Omsk and this was the first open attempt to keep me from observing at first hand the reported mobilization.

Second—How was I in danger of capture by Bolsheviks, in going along a line reported to me by General Dietrichs, Kolchak commander, as being occupied by Kolchak troops? We would have been rather stupid if we had not sensed something wrong.

Captain Murray kindly offered to see the Russian commander and see when I could call on him. He returned and said the Russian commander had directed him to tell me that he was taking a nap and he would see me when he had finished his nap. This message was tantamount to a notification to me that he was hostile to me and to my visit. After receiving this message, my natural inclination was to ignore this Russian commander, but I realized that every official representative in Omsk, Russian and Allied, was hostile to my actions in Siberia and unfavorable to me personally and this made it necessary for me to follow every well recognized custom. I decided I had to call on this Russian commander, or I would be put on the defensive.

I started out with Colonel Emerson, Major Slaughter, and my interpreter, to make my official call. The Russian commander was living in a train, which we did not find where Captain Murray had told us it was located. We eventually located the train and were ushered into the presence of the Russian commander. His manner was exceedingly unfriendly. I asked him for an escort, and told him I was directed to do so by General Dietrichs. He replied that he had no soldiers he could trust as an escort for me. I then asked him if he would let me have the motor cars General Dietrichs told me I could have and he replied that he could not let me have any cars. I then asked him if there were any cars in the town of Ishim that we could hire to take us to Petropavlosk. He replied, "Yes, but you will not get them." In the meantime, this Russian had sent for a glass of tea and sat there and drank it in our presence without asking us to join him, so we arose, said "Good-bye", and left him.

The action of this Russian showed conclusively that conditions somewhere were not as represented and we were not to see the real condition, but we had suspected this reported Russian Army was more or less a myth.

On the return to our train, we decided to take my automobile, which was a seven passenger car, and go to Petropavlosk regardless of the grave danger of which Captain Murray had notified us, and Colonel Emerson, Major Slaughter, the interpreter, the chauffeur and one soldier and I left for Petropavlosk at 7 P.M., August 14. We were all armed with pistols except the soldier who had a rifle. The car had the American flag fastened to the radiator as well as the flag carried by a Major General.

The road from Ishim to Petropavlosk was reported as being a highway, but we found the highway differed from other country roads by being marked by two furrows, about eighty feet apart, and these two furrows were only helpful in indicating the road to Petropavlosk. We had gone only sixty-three miles when night began to approach and, as we thought it inadvisable to travel at night, we drove into an oatfield and waited for daylight. This was an uncomfortable night, and rest was impossible, due to the mosquitoes.

About 2 A.M., a Russian appeared mounted on horseback, and asked who we were and what we were doing there. I told the interpreter to tell him everything he wanted to know. The Russian then extended to us an invitation to go to his village and spend the night there, and stated his village would consider it a great honor to entertain an American General. I expressed our thanks to him and through him to the other people of his village, but told him we had to move on as soon as daylight came, which would not be long. He seemed satisfied and left.

As soon as we could safely continue our journey we did so, arriving at the village on the banks of the Ishim River a little after sunrise, where we had been told we would cross the river. We stopped in the village to obtain information about crossing the river and in a few moments the car was surrounded by men, women, and children. Before leaving Ishim, I had filled my pockets with Hershey's chocolate bars, which we had brought along in case we should need them. I distributed this candy to the women and children; which seemed to please them immensely. We could discover no unfriendly attitude, in fact, there were everywhere, the most friendly and cordial expressions. I asked a woman, who seemed to be the representative of the village, how we could get across the river and she directed a man to go with us and show us where we could cross. The river was probably three hundred yards wide at this point. The natives had stretched a cable across the stream, had built a raft that would hold a pony and cart, and by means of the cable they pulled themselves and their produce from one side of the river to the other. There was some anxiety as to whether the raft would hold the automobile, but we decided it would and, after we all got out of the car, the chauffeur drove on, and the car seemed safe. The Russian was told we would return that afternoon and he promised if the raft was on his side of

the river when we returned he would pull it over. We all embarked, took hold of the cable and pulled ourselves to the opposite side of the river.

This village was thirty miles from Petropavlosk, where we arrived about 10 o'clock. We had been looking for the Kolchak Army but had seen only three Russian soldiers on the trip. The Russian Commander at Petropavlosk had not been notified of our expected visit, as they had expected to block us at Ishim. When I met this Russian General, he threw his arms around me and was very hospitable. I asked him where his troops were and he said that he had none. I asked him how they expected to start an offensive in two weeks if they had no troops there. He said that if an offensive was contemplated I knew more about it than he did.

We went to the station at Petropavlosk to see if we could discover the congestion General Dietrichs had told me existed there. There was evidence of some soldier shipments in excess of needs for a small garrison but not enough to be characterized as congestion and, it was evident to me, that a fraud was being practiced in the representations as to the forces of Kolchak. This representation was part of the scheme to get money from the United States to help Kolchak destroy bolshevism.

On our return to Ishim, we found the raft still on our side of the river and by the time we had pulled ourselves across, the majority of the people in the village had assembled to meet us. The priest asked us to go to his house and have some wine and cake in order that the people might have an opportunity to meet us and we accepted the invitation. I asked this priest about the Bolsheviks; he said there were rumors that they were expected, but he did not know. We spent about an hour at the priest's house and there was certainly nothing but the most kindly feeling towards us by the people of that village.

The British captain did not meet us upon our return to Ishim and neither were we delayed on our return trip to Omsk. The day I got back to Omsk, I went to see General Dietrichs and asked for an explanation of this unusual representation to me and he said that I had gone the wrong way as the Kolchak Army was about ten miles to the west of where I had been. I called General Dietrichs' attention to the statement of the Russian Commander at

Petropavlosk that there were no troops in that section. His reply was that this man did not have sense enough to know anything.

That statement would only satisfy a man who wanted to be deceived, and the evidence was of such a nature as to convince everyone, except Consul General Harris, that the fall of the Kolchak Government was imminent.

On August 7, prior to my trip to Ishim, I cabled the War Department from Omsk:

“The Kolchak forces are still retreating and it looks as if the demoralization is such that the hope of reforming the Army and renewing the offensive must be based upon the weakness of the Bolsheviks, and lack of their desire to come to Omsk, which I cannot assume to be the case. Well authenticated reports justify the statement that officers are leaving the troops and fleeing to the rear, staff officers preceding line officers in this flight, soldiers are throwing away their arms and ammunition and in some cases their heavy clothing so as to enable them to move more rapidly to the rear. I have been unable to discover any enthusiasm for the Kolchak Government.”

On August 10, Colonel Sargent, who had command in Vladivostok during my absence in Omsk, cabled the War Department:

“General Gajda arrived Vladivostok from Omsk eighth instant, in an interview he stated substantially as follows:—‘The Kolchak Government cannot possibly stand and if the Allies support him they will make the greatest mistake in history. The Government is divided into two distinct parts, one issues proclamation and propaganda for foreign consumption stating that the Government favors and works for a constituent assembly, other part secretly plans and plots a restoration of monarchy. This is perceptible only to those who are part of the Government. It is a hypocritical government which attempts to convince the peasants that their cause is being fostered and yet looks for the psychological moment to restore monarchy. Kolchak has

surrounded himself with old regime officers whose only salvation for future existence depends on restoration of monarchy.’”

On August 18, after my return from Ishim, I reported by cable as follows:

“Admiral Kolchak had told Ambassador Morris that the Siberian Army was withdrawing to Ishim river and would reform there and make stand against Bolsheviks. On way to Ishim we met approximately thirty trains which had been used for evacuation purposes. All trains had many soldiers on them who were evidently returning from the front. We estimated that we had seen five thousand soldiers. Some few rifles could be seen, but it was evident these soldiers were not organized, but were returning as individuals. Some Semi-palitsk Cossacks arrived at Petropavlosk overland from Ekaterinburg. I talked to them and they said that the Infantry of the Kolchak Army would not fight and the Cossacks were tired of doing all the fighting and were on their way home.”

In a written report made September 26, after my return to Vladivostok, I stated, in part:

“The fact that Kolchak forces had melted away was confirmed by many people later seen at Omsk. Colonel Grey, who commanded a storming brigade of Kolchak troops, told us of the condition in the Russian forces and his description of these conditions, could hardly have been worse. He stated that there had been hardly any fighting for nearly six weeks, that the Army had disintegrated, and the men had become worse in their treatment of the inhabitants than the Bolsheviks had ever been; that practically every soldier had a horse and cart which he had taken from the peasants; that soldiers requisitioned whatever they wanted, some times giving a receipt but more often not.”

This statement referred to the period near August 20, although my report was not made until my return to Vladivostok. In that written report of September 26, I stated:

“As another indication of the belief of the people, General Ivanoff-Rinoff came to see me at Omsk and told me as soon as they checked the Bolsheviks the entire personnel of Kolchak’s ministers would have to be changed; that they had no point of contact with the people; that the people had no confidence in the ministers, and Kolchak would have to get rid of them.”

In this connection I asked Ivanoff-Rinoff if they were going to permit Kolchak to remain in power, and he replied, “Yes, if he is willing to meet the wishes of the people.”

I considered this a most remarkable statement, as Ivanoff-Rinoff was a part of Kolchak’s administration and was head of all Siberian Cossacks. This statement bordered on disloyalty as Ambassador Morris, with whom I came to Omsk, was looking into the power and capacity of the Kolchak Government with a view to recommending to the United States Government as to the advisability of recognizing Kolchak.

The day after Ivanoff-Rinoff’s visit, I witnessed a ceremony in the Russian Church, where Admiral Kolchak promoted Ivanoff-Rinoff to the grade of Lieutenant-General, kissed him on the cheeks, proclaimed him as a Russian patriot and presented him with a gold sword.

These were Russian ways which probably could not be duplicated in any other country in the world. It was not possible for me to see how Kolchak could hope to succeed by the use of military forces, when his adherents were treating as they were the military men fighting for his cause, and the potential military who were being mobilized. The treatment of the peasants who were being mobilized has been previously referred to.



KOLCHAK SICK, NEGLECTED, AND DYING ACROSS THE RIVER
FROM OMSK, KOLCHAK'S HEADQUARTERS



SUPPLIES FOR THE TROOPS OF THE KOLCHAK ARMY

While at Omsk, we heard of a train that had arrived at Kolumzino, just across the river from Omsk. Ambassador Morris, Colonel Emerson, and I went to see the condition of the men from the front who were reported as being typhus patients. We found these sick and wounded had been put into box cars without any accommodations of any kind. Many of these men were too ill to help themselves and there was only one nurse to five or six hundred men. There were no arrangements for food and only a very limited quantity of water carried in canteens. No help was provided for the seriously sick in attending to the calls of nature.

We looked into the first box car and saw two dead men in the car and a third was dying, while a sick comrade held his head and tried to give him a drink of water. Many of the sick had mustered sufficient strength to crawl out of the cars, but this effort exhausted them and they were sprawled on the ground by the train, a helpless mass of humanity.

As these soldiers had practically given their lives fighting for the Kolchak cause, one would have expected that some supporters of Kolchak, men or women, or both, would have been present to give comfort and assistance to those helpless, dying men. It was a pitiful sight to see these unfortunates, with no one trying to help them.

When we returned to Omsk, Colonel Emerson and I walked to the park. There was a band playing and we estimated that there were about a thousand people dancing. This gay crowd was not more than twenty minutes travel from where the soldiers were dying, undoubtedly many from neglect.

During our stay in Omsk, Ambassador Morris seemed to believe that there was some hope of pacifying Siberia by helping Kolchak, but I never saw any practical way of restoring order through the medium of Kolchak supporters. The trip to Omsk had not changed my views, in fact, after the trip I had more confidence in my estimate of Kolchak's strength, than I had before, because I was no longer fooled by the reports as to the attitude of the people west of Lake Baikal.

There were conflicting reports as to the recommendations of Ambassador Morris on the question of recognition. I saw in the public press of the United States that he had recommended recognition.

The information I received from Omsk, which I considered very reliable as it came direct from Soukine, Kolchak's Foreign Minister, was to the effect that Mr. Morris had recommended recognition, but only if the United States was willing to send twenty-five thousand soldiers to Siberia to replace the Czechs and provide financial assistance to Kolchak to the amount of two hundred million dollars. I feel confident that these conditions were attached to the Ambassador's recommendation.

Mr. Soukine told my informant that Kolchak was in no position to enforce the Railway Agreement unless the United States recognized Kolchak, provided financial assistance to the extent of two hundred million dollars, and sent twenty-five thousand American soldiers to replace the Czechs. He further stated that Mr. Morris had agreed not to make an issue of their failure to enforce the Inter-Allied Railway Agreement until the final decision was made in Washington as to recognition, financial assistance, and the sending of American troops. Anyone knowing the sentiment of the Congress of the United States at that time, would consider such a conditional recommendation for recognition as equivalent to a recommendation for non-recognition.

In any event, and fortunately for the United States, Kolchak was not recognized. In my judgment, at no period of Kolchak's regime would recognition have been of any service to him.

The ambassador and I left Omsk for Vladivostok about the 20th of August. We stopped at Novo-Nikolaevsk, Irkutsk, Verkhne-Udinsk, and Harbin. Nothing of interest happened until we reached Semenov's territory. By this time it was well known that Semenov had established what were known as his "killing stations" and had openly boasted that he could not sleep at night when he had not killed some one during the day.

We stopped at a small station and two American Russian Railway Service Corps men got on our train and told us of the killing by Semenov soldiers, two or three days before our arrival, of a trainload of Russians consisting of three hundred and fifty people. I do not remember if there were only men in the train, or if there were men and women. These two Americans stated substantially as follows:

“The trainload of prisoners passed the station and it was generally known in the station that they were to be killed. The Service Corps men started to go to the place of execution but were stopped by Semenov’s soldiers. In one hour and fifty minutes the empty train returned to the station. The following day these two men went out to the killing place, and saw evidences of the wholesale execution and it was evident from the shells on the ground that the prisoners had been killed with machine guns, as the empty shells were in piles just as if they had been ejected from machine guns. The bodies had been placed in two ditches which had been freshly dug. In one ditch the bodies were entirely covered, in the other ditch many arms or legs were left uncovered.”

I was given an affidavit by one of these Service Corps men as to this occurrence but can not locate it in my papers, although what I have stated above is substantially what was in the affidavit.

During my trip to and from Omsk, I had an opportunity to talk to many of Mr. Stevens’ assistants, relative to the operation of the railroad and the railroad agreement. I reported to Washington:

“I formed the impression from talking with American Railway Service Corps representatives that our railway men are accomplishing very little. They are advising the Russian railway people but have no power to see that their suggestions are followed. Mr. Morris thinks they are accomplishing something and that the obstacles can be removed, I, however, do not believe this can be done as long as Kolchak is in power.

“The Russian military practically control the railroads. They do this by station commandants and regional boards. These officials will not let anything go to regions not known to be pro-Kolchak, and justify their actions by the old claim of Bolshevism.

“The railroad agreement contemplates the operation of the railroad by the Technical Board provided in the Allied agreement.”

These military officials were Kolchak appointees, and he would not remove them although the railroad was permeated with scandal and graft. Colonel Emerson told me these station commandants were demanding forty thousand rubles in addition to the regular freight charges for a box car from Vladivostok to Omsk.

A Russian general at Vladivostok gave up a position on the Trans-Baikal Railroad that paid him three thousand rubles per month, on the ground that he and his family could not live on that, and came to Vladivostok and took a position on the regional board without any salary attached to it.

When I was in Irkutsk, I was told by Colonel Lantry, Mr. Stevens' second assistant, that there were thirteen thousand and five hundred tons of merchandise at Irkutsk and twenty-seven thousand tons at Stretinsk, for shipment to various points in Siberia. This merchandise consisted, to a large extent, of pickled fish, put up in kegs, which is a staple food for the poor Russian and is very much desired by them. This regional board refused to let him move a pound of this fish. I was later informed by Colonel Lantry that practically all of this fish spoiled and had to be thrown in the river.

At this same time salmon, canned on the Amur River by Sale & Frazar, a firm doing business in Tokyo, Japan, was shipped through these towns without question. The canned salmon was much more expensive and not so much desired by the poor people. The reason these regional boards at Irkutsk and Stretinsk would not let Colonel Lantry ship this fish was, of course, because no one would bribe them to let it be shipped. The members of these regional boards, who were Kolchak military representatives, were indifferent as to the needs of the poor people.

It is my judgment, the President of the United States would never have entered into the Inter-Allied Railroad Agreement without a belief that this agreement would bring relief to the Russian people, regardless of their political affiliations. This could not be accomplished in Siberia. All Allied representatives and the United States State Department representatives were solidly behind Admiral Kolchak and the more hopeless the cause of Kolchak became the more bitter his supporters became towards everyone who did not assist him.

The United States, England, France, and Japan might have put enough money into Siberia to keep the railroads running and enough soldiers to guard it, all for the benefit of Kolchak, but at this time, after the terrible excesses committed by his supporters, and others who claimed to support him, no power on earth could have driven the peasant to support his cause.

Another great injustice to the workmen on the railroad was due to the fall in the value of the ruble from ten cents, in September, 1918, to almost nothing, without increasing the number of rubles paid them for their service. I estimated the salaries of the trainmen, at one period of Kolchak's power and, including conductors, engineers, and trainmen, it was three dollars and seventy-five cents per month. This was the average, some a little less and some a little more. This was better than nothing, and if they left the railroad they could get no other work. In one case, the men struck for higher wages, the Kolchak management called it bolshevistic, and executed some of the leaders of the strike.

I doubt if history will show any country in the world during the last fifty years where murder could be committed so safely, and with less danger of punishment, than in Siberia during the regime of Admiral Kolchak. As an example of the atrocities and lawlessness in Siberia, there was a typical case in Omsk, Kolchak's Headquarters, on December 22, 1918, just one month and four days after Kolchak assumed power as "Supreme Ruler." On this date, there was an uprising of workmen in Omsk against the Kolchak Government. The revolutionaries were partly successful, opened the jail and permitted two hundred prisoners to escape.

Among these, one hundred and thirty-four were political prisoners including several members of the Constituent Assembly. The day this occurred, the Kolchak Military Commander at Omsk issued an order calling upon all who had been released to return to jail, and stated, that in case of failure to return within twenty-four hours, they would be shot on sight. All members of the Constituent Assembly and some other prominent political prisoners returned to confinement. During the night some Kolchak officers took the members of the Constituent Assembly from the jail, telling them they were taking them to a place of trial for their alleged offenses, and shot and killed all of them. Nothing was done to the officers for this brutal and

illegal murder. As conditions were in Siberia, such atrocities could be easily concealed from the world.

The foreign press was constantly being told that the Bolsheviks were the Russians who were committing these terrible excesses, and propaganda had been used to such an extent that no one ever believed that atrocities were being committed against the Bolsheviks.

Colonel Morrow, in command of American troops in the Trans-Baikal sector, reported a most cruel, heartless, and almost unbelievable murder of an entire village by Semenov. When his troops reached the village, the inhabitants apparently tried to escape by flight from their homes, but the Semenov soldiers shot them down, men, women, and children, as if they were hunting rabbits, and left their bodies where they were killed. They shot, not one, but everyone in the village.

Colonel Morrow induced a Japanese and a Frenchman to go with the American Army officer to investigate this wholesale murder, and what I have just stated is substantially what was contained in a report signed by the American, the Frenchman, and the Japanese. In addition to the above stated executions these officers reported that they found the bodies of four or five men who had evidently been burned alive.

Naturally, people wondered what could be the object of such terrible murders. The object is similar to the reason why men in charge of prison camps keep bloodhounds, and employ other means to terrorize prisoners, with a view to deterring them from trying to escape. In Siberia the people who were victimized were not prisoners, but the people responsible for the terrors were determined that all Russians should, at least, act as if they were wholeheartedly supporting Kolchak's cause. This treatment sometimes succeeds to the extent of temporarily preventing the real sentiment of the people from being known. This was the case in Siberia, and I am convinced that the American people know nothing of these terrible conditions.

VIII

JAPAN, THE COSSACKS AND ANTI-AMERICANISM

Ambassador Morris and I arrived at Vladivostok the evening of September 6, 1919, and I soon had my first experience with the new Japanese puppet in the person of General Rozanov, who had been sent by Kolchak from Krasnoyarsk to Vladivostok to command the Russian troops of the Far East.

I had on my desk a report that the Russians, on September 2, in the presence of Japanese troops, had arrested an American captain and a corporal at Iman, two hundred and fifty miles north of Vladivostok, for the reported reason that these men had no passports. As they wore the uniform of the American Army, and as there was no recognized government in Siberia, and further, as no military representative in Siberia was called upon for passports, the reason assigned for the arrest of these men was an insult almost on a par with the arrest.

On the morning of the 7th, I sent Colonel Robinson, my Chief of Staff, to General Rozanov's office and demanded the immediate release of the corporal; the captain having been permitted to leave the day they were arrested. General Rozanov told Colonel Robinson that he would investigate and let me know later. This by no means satisfied me, so I directed Colonel Robinson to return and tell General Rozanov it was not a question for him to investigate, and a refusal to order the release of Corporal Spurling would be construed by me as a definite refusal. When General Rozanov got this message, he ordered the corporal's release.

When the corporal returned, we found that he had been beaten unmercifully.

Before his release and as soon as Major Shamatoulski, the local commanding officer, learned the Americans had been arrested, he obtained a train, took some American soldiers and went to Iman. When he arrived there, a Japanese officer notified him that the Japanese would not permit the

Americans to attack the Cossacks and, if he did attack them, they would join the Cossacks and resist the Americans. Major Shamatoulski notified the Japanese Commander that he intended to rescue the corporal, and any resistance by the Japanese would be at their peril.

In the meantime, Major Shamatoulski had arrested three Cossacks in uniform. The Cossacks had built a trench, and occupied it preparatory to resisting the Americans. The Japanese joined the Cossacks in the trench evidently intending to start the trouble that they had for some time hoped for, but they evidently lost their nerve as, before firing started, they notified the American major that the corporal was not in Iman but had been sent to Habarovsk. Major Shamatoulski withdrew his troops and started to return to his station. The Japanese commander then came up and told him that he could not take the three Cossacks he had previously arrested away with him, but Major Shamatoulski said he would take them and hold them until the American was returned. The Japanese threatened to use force, but no force was used and Major Shamatoulski took his prisoners away with him.

The corporal stated on his return to American Command that he was whipped by two Cossack officers while on the train, and for fifteen minutes on the platform after arrival at Habarovsk, when the Japanese took charge of him.

It is often impossible to get definite legal evidence to establish what you know to be a fact, and this is such a case. I am sure this arrest and whipping of the American corporal was not only permitted by the Japanese, but the whole miserable act was engineered by them, although I am unable to charge any Japanese higher in authority than the major at Iman with this cowardly and dastardly act.

I make this charge because Kalmykov and his soldiers formed a part of the Japanese command, and the Japanese commanding officer was in command of these Cossacks when this insult was directed against the United States. As Iman was not in the sector of the railroad assigned to Japan to guard, the Japanese troops had no responsibility at this town. They were there for some purpose, and the real purpose is shown by the arrest of the Americans.

On September 3, Colonel Sargent, who was in command during my absence in Omsk, cabled the War Department, in part:

“Semenov and Kalmykov left Vladivostok for Habarovsk today.”

These two Japanese puppets were going to Habarovsk together for some purpose. This purpose was to plan to attack American soldiers.

General Horvath, who was opposed to my policy of non-interference, came to me and warned me that Kalmykov was going to kill some American soldiers, and if I did not concentrate the small detachments guarding the railroad, I would lose some of them. He said that Japan had sanctioned this and had given Kalmykov thirty thousand yen and were prepared to send cablegrams throughout the world that the Russians were going to treat all Bolsheviks alike.

Colonel Butenko, Fortress Commander, had access to all telegrams coming through Vladivostok. He came to me about the same time as General Horvath, confirmed what General Horvath had told me, and said that Semenov had telegraphed Kalmykov to go ahead and attack American troops, and if he needed any help, he, Semenov, would send his Cossacks to assist him. The Japanese telegraphed Kalmykov that they could not give him active support but would give him moral support.

In this connection, Major Slaughter at Omsk was told by Mr. Soukine, Minister of Foreign Affairs for the Omsk Government, as follows:

“I can also tell you, if you do not know it already, that the Americans have not enough troops in the Far East to meet the emergency which will be created if you have any trouble with Semenov and Kalmykov because the Japanese have arranged to support Semenov in every way, with troops if it becomes necessary.”

At this time, Mr. Medviedeff, head of the Zemstvos in Primorsk Province, came to me and confirmed what General Horvath had told me. These three men belonged to different social factions, and Medviedeff belonged to a different political party from the other two, consequently,

these three men would never get together for any purpose, much less for the purpose of making up a tale to tell me.

A colonel of the French Army, whose name I remember but do not think it is wise to publish, also came to me and told me the Cossacks were trying to buy some rifles from the French and he felt sure they were planning to attack Americans.

When the corporal who had been beaten by the Cossacks returned, I wrote a letter to General Rozanov, and demanded the names of the Cossacks who arrested the corporal, the names of the two Cossack officers who beat the corporal, and an apology in the local press for the outrage. I received no reply.

One week after the letter was sent, General Rozanov's Chief of Staff came to American Headquarters on some business but I notified him I would have no dealings with Rozanov's Headquarters until my letter was answered. I never heard from this directly, but I saw in the press that it was announced in Washington that suitable apologies had been made for the insult. I have no idea where the apologies were made or by whom, and I never had any dealings with General Rozanov's Headquarters, or with him, after this time. He was overthrown on January 31, 1920.

On my return from Omsk, there was a report on my desk of a brutal and repulsive murder by Japanese. This report was to the effect that on July 27, 1919, a company of Japanese soldiers under the command of a Japanese major, arrested nine Russians in the town of Sviagina which was in the railroad sector assigned to Americans to guard. The Japanese told the American commander that these men were suspected of being Bolsheviks.

These Russians were told if they would give information about Bolsheviks they would let them go. Four of the nine were permitted to go. The other five were "roughly handled and beaten" but refused to talk.

The Japanese again had no responsibility at Sviagina.

The Japanese were beginning to act as if they intended to execute the five Russians who would not give any information to them and, as soon as the purpose of the Japanese was apparent, the American commander protested, but to no avail. The report of this execution is as follows:

“The five Russians were marched to some graves that had been dug in the vicinity of the railroad station; they were blindfolded and forced to kneel at the edge of the graves, bending forward with their hands tied behind them. Two Japanese officers, removing their coats and drawing their sabers, then proceeded to slash the victims on the back of the neck, while as each one fell forward into the grave, three to five Japanese soldiers bayoneted him several times with cries of pleasure. Two were beheaded at once by the saber strokes; the others were apparently alive as the earth was thrown in upon them.”

I regret to say these executions were witnessed by several officers and soldiers of the American Army.

These executions were committed by the Japanese, not because the victims had committed any offense, but because they were suspected of being Bolsheviks.

I felt so strongly about this murder that I brought the commanding officer of Sviagina to American Headquarters at Vladivostok and, in the presence of the Japanese Chief of Staff, told him he should have used force to prevent it. I also told the Japanese Chief of Staff that if such a thing was ever attempted again in American sectors of the railroad, it would bring on a conflict between Japanese and American troops.

He said that he would like to investigate the report. I told him there could be no objection to his making an investigation, but I hoped he would tell me the result of his investigation, which he promised to do. After about five weeks he came to my office and said they would have to admit the truth of the report I had received, but he wanted me to know that was not in accordance with the practice of the Japanese Army.

On June 9, 1919, I received the following from Colonel Morrow at Verkhne-Udinsk:

“Owing to Semenov’s armored cars continual interference with the railroad, seizure of cars, threatening employees, interference with working parties, continued menace to my guard, and firing upon and arresting Russian troops proceeding to the

front, I, yesterday, at 5 P.M., June 8, at a conference between Major General Yoshe, Japanese Army, General Mejak, Military Governor and General Pechinko, Commander of Russian troops in Beresovka, requested them on the grounds stated above to cause the removal of the armored cars out of the American sector and, at the same time, informed them that if my request was not complied with within twenty-four hours I would destroy these cars.”

General Yoshe, in the presence of Colonel Morrow agreed to remain neutral, but later sent the following to Colonel Morrow:

“The Japanese say they will resist by force the removal of Semenov’s armored cars by American troops, and will take the armored cars under Japanese guard to Beresovka and there protect them from American troops.”

As this was in the American sector the only basis for action by the Japanese was that Japanese troops and Semenov’s troops constituted one force. This was well known by everyone in Siberia, but the Japanese repeatedly said they were not responsible for the acts of Semenov and Kalmykov.

By refusing to give consideration to Army reports, the State Department probably did not know of the modern methods being used by our Ally, Japan, in destroying bolshevism. By this time the State Department representatives had joined wholeheartedly in the fight for Kolchak, and they had as their Allies in this work, the British, the French, the Japanese, Atamans Semenov and Kalmykov and General Rozanov.

Apparently, the only ripple on the sea of satisfaction was my refusal to join the State Department and their Allies in their determination to destroy bolshevism, notwithstanding the announced policy of the United States of non-interference.

Mr. August Heid, War Trade Board, operating under the State Department, was careless enough at one time to send information that was apparently defective. At least, Mr. Heid brought a telegram to my office,

and read it to me, and said that it came from the State Department. The telegram said:

“You are not sending the kind of information out of Siberia we want you to send.”

As Mr. Heid was an employee of the State Department, I suppose it was not ethical to ignore his reports, as they did mine.

At this critical period, when the Cossacks in the east were trying to obtain arms for use against American troops, the rifles and ammunition supplied by the United States for Kolchak's fighting forces began arriving on United States Transports. These rifles were sent to Kolchak under the terms of Mr. Wilson's agreement of June 12, 1919: “to assist the Government of Admiral Kolchak and his associates with munitions, supplies, and food.” I had been informed from Washington:

“General Haken, Chief of Ordinance Department of a special commission for the Far East, has been appointed by the Russian Government in Omsk to receive all military supplies sent to Vladivostok for the fighting forces of Admiral Kolchak.”

On September 16, I cabled the War Department:

“The one million gold was offered to me this morning and delivery of rifles requested. On account of anti-American activities of Kolchak agents here I have refused to take the gold, and have refused to give up the rifles. Mr. Morris here and approved.”

My refusal was the occasion for an indignant outburst by General Knox. He stated in the local press that these rifles had been paid for by Russia, and I was holding them up to injure Kolchak. I also saw in the American press the statement that the State Department had said I was interfering in things that did not concern me, although I had reported, fully, to Washington my reasons for refusal to give up the arms.

As to the refusal to give up these arms to Kolchak at Vladivostok, there was an unjust and unfair representation of the situation, if the newspapers

reported correctly what they say was the action of the State Department.

Someone gave out the information that I held up the Kolchak arms because “of the anti-American character of articles in a Vladivostok newspaper.” Another paper, now before me, says I held up the arms, “in retaliation for anti-American articles in a Vladivostok newspaper.” In another paper the statement is made that I held up the arms “because of the publication of violent anti-American articles in a Vladivostok newspaper.” One of these papers said the State Department repudiated my action. One of the other papers maintains the State Department “secured the delivery of the rifles.” The other paper does not mention the State Department, but was very critical of my action.

Two questions come into my mind, with reference to these articles. The first is, “Was this information given to the newspaper correspondents in Washington?” It seems to me the information is of such a nature that it is not unfair to assume that it was. The second thought is, “If given to the newspaper men, by what Department of the Government was this information given out?” No matter where or by whom it was given out, the information was unjust, unfair, and not in accordance with the facts.

The War Department knew my real reasons for refusing to turn these rifles over at Vladivostok.

The reason, printed in the press, for my refusal to turn them over, would certainly not be approved by the people of the United States and, if the people had known the truth, I do not believe a single American would have disapproved. The real reason for the refusal to deliver the arms, at Vladivostok, as reported to the War Department, was:

“Reference to your 357, the one million gold was offered to me this morning and delivery of rifles requested. On account of anti-American actions of Kolchak agents here, Semenov, Kalmykov and Rozanov, I have refused to take the gold and have refused to give up the rifles. Request approval of this action. Mr. Morris here and approved. I have told Slaughter to tell Omsk Government we will not give them any Military supplies, as long as Kolchak agents in the East, are threatening to use Military force against the United States.”

I see nothing about retaliation for newspaper articles in this cable. As a matter of fact, I had an abundance of information which I could not doubt, I did not doubt, and I do not doubt now, that these Russians, above mentioned, had planned to attack American detachments and were, at the time these rifles came, trying to get rifles to arm more Cossacks so as to have a large superiority of strength over any American force I could get together.

The American troops had no field pieces, while the Cossacks did, and the Americans were separated, by nearly two thousand miles, into detachments guarding the railroad. By the destructions of small bridges, I could not have gotten the command together, and the seven thousand men I had would have been divided into not less than four detachments, and probably many more.

I can not think any American would expect me to turn these rifles over to people who wanted to use them against American troops. In fact, I considered the situation so serious that I deliberately and willfully would have refused to turn the rifles over to any Russian in Vladivostok, no matter from whom the order came. If my action was ever repudiated by the State Department, I never heard of it.

Now, why was this erroneous information, as to my action, given out to the public? And by whom was it given out? I can not think it was given out by the War Department, as that Department was not mentioned in the newspaper articles, and, besides, the War Department had my reasons direct from me.

I believe it is not unfair to conclude that the information must have been given out by the State Department. As the State Department was relying entirely upon its own representatives in Siberia for information, and by inference, was ignoring the information furnished by War Department representatives, I am forced to the conclusion that the information came from representatives of the State Department in Siberia.

General Haken came to see me about the rifles, and I agreed to deliver them at Irkutsk, which was outside the Cossack territory. This was satisfactory to him, in fact, he was pleased because he felt more certain of getting them. This arrangement did not satisfy the Russian Military in the

Far East, and they approached me with the proposition that the Americans would guard one train, and the Russians one, but this I refused to do.

Japan and General Knox had succeeded in stirring up such antagonism to the American Military by the Kolchak supporters that, on September 17, I cabled Washington:

“The Cossacks, under the leadership of Kalmykov, are threatening to commence action against Americans, this action is supported by Semenov and I believe instigated by Japan. These Cossacks have armored cars which our present arms will not pierce. I believe this responsible for their insolence. Request one battalion three inch or mountain artillery be sent to report to me. I do not believe anything will happen if this is not sent, and I feel absolutely sure nothing will happen to Americans if sent.”

It should be remembered that Semenov and Kalmykov were brigands and murderers. They had no character which would deter them from committing any kind of offense. Nothing but physical fear, or fear of losing their Japanese support, would deter them from attacking Americans or anyone else.

The first train of rifles and ammunition for delivery by the United States Government “to the fighting forces of Admiral Kolchak” went through to Irkutsk without any mishap. When the second train reached Chita, the headquarters of Semenov, on October 24, it was stopped and Semenov demanded fifteen thousand rifles. Lieutenant Ryan, who had charge of the train with fifty soldiers as guard, said he could not give up the rifles without instructions from Vladivostok. Semenov told the lieutenant that if he did not give up the rifles in thirty hours they would be taken by force. With this statement Semenov brought two of his armored cars and a battalion of Cossacks by the side of the American train.

The American Consul took up the question with Semenov’s Chief of Staff, but was told if they were not delivered they would be taken by force. The consul suggested that the question be submitted to General Graves at Vladivostok, as Semenov was claiming that Kolchak had authorized him to take the rifles, and the Russians provided a wire to reach me. Lieutenant

Ryan's telegram reached me about midnight of the 24th-25th of October. I telegraphed Lieutenant Ryan not to give him a rifle.

I felt safe in giving these instructions because I knew General Oi, Japanese Commander in Siberia, was with Semenov in Chita at the time the demand was made on Lieutenant Ryan for the arms. As this was in the railroad sector assigned to Japan to guard, and as the action of Semenov, without any protest by General Oi or the Japanese Commander at Chita, was a failure of Japan to carry out the railroad agreement, I felt sure Japan would not permit him to go to the extreme of attacking Lieutenant Ryan.

Semenov held Lieutenant Ryan for forty hours and then told him he could go.

As soon as Kolchak was driven out of Omsk and was coming east, I felt his end was in sight, so I refused to send any more rifles to him. Reports I received prior to his leaving Omsk showed that his power had gone, and most of the Kolchak troops had gone over to the Bolsheviks.

The American Consul General, Mr. Harris, was tenacious and would not give up. He telegraphed that the departure of Kolchak from Omsk should not be construed as an indication of weakness, but rather as an indication of strength. General Haken, naturally, wanted me to continue giving him the rifles as this would enable him to dispose of them as best suited to his own interest.

With reference to the rifles I cabled to Washington on October 29:

“In my judgment, if we by inaction or willingly permit American arms to reach Semenov, Kalmykov and Rozanov, we will be helping to arm the worst criminals in Siberia; we will be neglectful of the interest of the people, thereby causing a resentment of the great majority of the people of Siberia against the United States; and we will be helping Japan to delay the settlement of conditions in Siberia, because the domination and exploitation of over ninety percent of the people by such criminals as above named cannot be permanent no matter what assistance is given them.”

Japanese Headquarters later informed me that the arms delivered by Lieutenant Ryan at Irkutsk had been returned to Semenov and the only other incident of interest relative to the rifles I turned over to Kolchak took place only a month or two before I left Vladivostok.

A Russian came to me and stated that four cars, giving me the numbers of the cars, were loaded with American rifles still in the original boxes. He told me the cars were on a certain out-of-the-way siding and in charge of Japanese soldiers. I asked this Russian for details, but instead of replying, he grabbed his cap and left, saying as he went out:

“I cannot tell you any more.”

I felt sure the Russian was telling me the truth although I had no evidence upon which I could take action. In a few days after I received this information about the rifles, the Japanese Chief of Staff came to see me. I entertained him in a way he liked and, when he was feeling rather happy, told him about the cars loaded with American rifles, and told him as they had not been paid for by the Russians, I, therefore, demanded these rifles as American property. I watched the reaction, and decided the Russian report was true. He did not deny that they had the rifles, but said he would have to investigate.

In a short time another Japanese general came to see me, and I told him I had heard nothing from the Chief of Staff and I wanted those rifles. By this time I felt doubly sure the Russian had told me the truth.

In a week or ten days I wrote a letter to the Japanese Commander, stating as a fact that the Japanese had the rifles, and reciting my former efforts to get possession of them, and stating that, failing to receive a reply within forty-eight hours, I would take such steps as I deemed necessary to get possession of the arms. I sent the demand to Japanese Headquarters by a messenger and directed him to get a receipt for the letter on the envelope. I waited twelve, twenty-four, and, after thirty-six hours, a message came from Japanese Headquarters asking for an appointment with me just one half an hour before my specified time expired.

The next day, at the appointed time, the Japanese Chief of Staff came to my office, with sabre and gloves, which indicated he considered his

business as being very official. He had my letter in his hand and said:

“We consider this letter very ‘un-nice,’ you imply Japan steals American property.”

I asked him to take a seat, and then reminded him of my efforts to get this property, and that I had received no response of any kind. I suggested to him that if the tables were turned they would be making an international affair of it. I told him I was sorry they felt badly about it, but I was unable to apologize for the letter or to withdraw it. He then said we had been good friends so long they hated to have such a letter as I had written, a part of their records. I told him I took no pride in the letter, but I was going to have those rifles. He replied, I could have the rifles any time I sent for them. I told him troops would be at the train at 3:30 in the afternoon and would take possession of the rifles. I then agreed to withdraw my letter.

I sent for the rifles and found they had five thousand and nine hundred still in the original boxes. These were part of the rifles turned over by the United States “for the fighting forces of Admiral Kolchak.”

At times Consul General Harris let his enthusiasm for the Omsk Government lead him into what appeared to be efforts to keep certain information from reaching the United States. As an example:

Mr. Morris and I were notified by an Englishman, when in Omsk, that Annankoff, head of the Semipalatinsk Cossacks, had killed three thousand Jews at Ekaterinburg. Annankoff was known as a Cossack murderer, and the appropriate insignia which were on his cap and blouse, consisted of skull and cross-bones. Dr. Rosenblatt, who had been sent by the Jews in New York to do what he could for the Jews in Siberia, had also heard of this pogrom. Dr. Rosenblatt reported same, through my office, as he had been reproved by the Consul General for a former report and Mr. Harris evidently complained because I permitted Dr. Rosenblatt to report this pogrom. Mr. Harris telegraphed Dr. Rosenblatt as follows:

“While in Ekaterinburg you reported the Cossacks as having injured or killed three thousand Jews. Such false and irresponsible reports as these coming from you cannot help but have a tendency to embitter the Omsk Government against the Jews, therefore, I

would suggest that in your future telegrams you state only the actual facts.”



ANNANKOFF, LEADER OF THE SEMIPALATINSK COSSACKS, AND
HIS ADJUTANT

Consul General Harris was quibbling. The exact number killed was unimportant compared to the fact that there was a pogrom of the Jews in Ekaterinburg. This was well known and Mr. Harris knew it, or he did not

want to know it. The military report I received of this pogrom was that thirty-five hundred had been killed by Annankov-Cossacks. It further stated:

“When questioned, the Staff at Omsk would make no direct admission, but did not deny it, and hinted that something had occurred at Ekaterinburg that would give the Jews something to think about.”

I received a cable from Washington saying Consul General Harris “states that Rosenblatt’s report of Jewish pogrom is absolutely false. Do not transmit any news dispatches which have not been checked for accuracy.”

Even Kolchak representatives would not go as far as the American Consul General and deny the truth of the report that there was a pogrom of the Jews. How did Consul General Harris get his information? He did not go to Ekaterinburg. He let his enthusiasm for the Kolchak Government run away with his discretion. With more justification than the Consul General had, Dr. Rosenblatt could have characterized Mr. Harris’ statement “as false.” If Consul General Harris meant the number reported killed by Dr. Rosenblatt was too large or too small, he could probably justify his statement, as no one was in a position to give the exact number killed. If Mr. Harris meant to say there were no Jews killed, he was woefully misinformed.

Dr. Rosenblatt was not the only American maligned by Kolchak supporters because they would not close their eyes to facts. The Y.M.C.A. in Siberia was conducted in a manner worthy of the best traditions of that organization. Mr. G. W. Phelps, head of the Y.M.C.A., was a man of character, a man of principles, a man with high ideals of duty, and a man who could not be swerved from his conception of duty by the desire to receive the plaudits of self-appointed rulers. On October 20, 1919, the Consul General telegraphed Mr. Phelps as follows:

“With regard to your difficulties with the Vladivostok custom authorities, I am informed by the Minister of Finance that he is in possession of definite information that hides have been purchased by the Y.M.C.A. with a view to exporting same, and that they are

being kept in storage at Vladivostok. As the exportation of heavy hides is forbidden, they, therefore, regard the Y.M.C.A. as they would any other exporters and importers.”

This charge had no foundation in fact, and it was an excuse to annoy the Y.M.C.A. As a matter of fact, the Kolchak Government tried to force the American Y.M.C.A. to become a supply agent for the Kolchak Military, as was the American Red Cross, and when this could not be done, they resorted to annoyances in every way they could. The only way the Y.M.C.A., or any other American agency, could get along amicably with Kolchak adherents was, not only to work for them, but to submit to dictation as to how they should support them.

It should be remembered that the Kolchak entourage had been a part of the ruling class in Russia. History will show that such a class will always, in any country, fight to the last ditch to retain their privileges, and this particular class was very near the last ditch in Siberia. The only objective the typical Czarist Russian officer class had, was the restoration of conditions as they were before the revolution.

On October 21, I cabled to Washington:

“A British officer just returned from over three months service with Siberian Army describes military situation as follows: ‘Stories of fighting and victories much exaggerated; there was nothing to prevent the Bolsheviki from taking Omsk a short time ago if their plan of campaign had so allowed; a rabble dressed in British uniforms is sent to the front and at the first opportunity they desert to the Bolsheviki.’”

If General Knox had known of this statement by this British officer, he would have taken as drastic action as the British Government took with Mr. O'Reilly, who was sent to Siberia to replace Sir Charles Eliot, as British High Commissioner, when Sir Charles went to Japan as Ambassador.

About a month after Mr. O'Reilly arrived in Vladivostok, I was surprised when he came to my office and said to me:

“You are the only foreign representative in Siberia carrying out the announced purpose of their government. I have investigated the conditions here the best that I could, and I am convinced the policy of ‘non-interference’ is the only policy that can give any hope of success. From today, the British are with you and will follow the same policy you are following.”

I was, of course, much gratified at Mr. O'Reilly's statement, and thanked him profusely as I had heard very few kind words since the signing of the Armistice, when I considered the time for the use of American troops in hostile action had passed.

Imagine my surprise, when, after about four days, Mr. O'Reilly again came to my office and showed me a cablegram from London which read:

“You get out of Siberia on the first ship leaving Vladivostok, do not wait for a British ship.”

As a United States transport was leaving soon for San Francisco, I give my only British friend, with any authority, transportation to San Francisco on an Army transport.

The nearer the Kolchak Government approached complete collapse, the more bitter his adherents, Russian and Allied, seemed to become against the American Military, whom they thought to be in a position to help Kolchak and would not. As a matter of fact, we were supporting Kolchak by helping to keep the railroad open for his exclusive use.

Almost daily reports were printed about American arms captured in the possession of Bolsheviks. Rozanov's Headquarters issued a summary of information stating that:

“Cossacks openly declare that Americans are helping the Bolsheviks; that according to a Red prisoner his detachment had a whole box of bombs supplied to them by Americans; also they have a box of Colt revolvers supplied to them by Americans.”

These false statements were made so that papers in the Far East could copy them, and such statements might have some desired result if cabled to

London and Tokyo. It was impossible to combat these false statements. People in the United States can have no conception of the conditions in Eastern Siberia where there was no law, except the law of the jungle, which the Japanese and Kolchak supporters were using, and they knew Americans could not use.

A thing that hurt me as much as anything that took place in Siberia occurred at the railroad station in Vladivostok. An American soldier had been drinking, and was waiting for a train. A Russian military officer observed him and went to this soldier and called him "a blank Bolshevik." The American soldier hit at the Russian with his fist, but did not strike him. The Russian pulled a pistol and killed the soldier and, to make the scene more effective, some Japanese officers, who were at the station and saw the murder, congratulated the Russian by shaking hands with him over the American's body. The Russian went at once to the fake civil court, gave himself up, was tried, and in one hour acquitted. This Russian was a part of Kolchak's fighting forces to whom the United States was turning over arms and ammunition.

At another time a report was started that the leader of the Bolsheviks in the Far East was in American Headquarters. The Japanese Chief of Staff came to see me and said he had heard it. I told him I was determined to run that lie to its source and if anyone refused to tell me where he got his information I was going to question his integrity. I said to him:

"You are the first. Who told you?"

He told me a Czech officer. I sent an aide to follow this story and finally reached Russian Headquarters.

These false statements have been continued by the Russian Absolutists since the American troops left Siberia. In a Russian book, published in 1923 in Germany by General Sakharov one of the Kolchak generals, called "Belaia Sibir," meaning "White Siberia," it was stated that General Ivanoff-Rinoff arrested a number of dangerous persons who were in contact with the Bolsheviks, Medveidev, and Ogarev . . . and carried on propaganda among the population calling on them to revolt. General Sakharov said General Graves notified Ivanoff-Rinoff that he would not permit this arrest, and insisted on their liberation.

There was not a scintilla of fact in this statement: Mr. Medveidev and Mr. Ogarev were never arrested while I was in Siberia.

Many times Russians and General Knox had said to me, “you are helping the Bolsheviks” or, “people are accusing the Americans of helping the Bolsheviks.” My invariable reply was that if any American military representative had taken sides they had violated the orders of the United States Government, and if they could cite any act of an American Military that did not accord with these orders, I would apologize to the Russians and disavow the act. Their invariable reply was, “by not supporting Kolchak you are encouraging the Bolsheviks to think the United States is supporting them.” There were some truths in this claim.



GENERAL KNOX, GENERAL GRAVES, AND AMERICAN CONSUL,
J. K. CALDWELL

When the Americans first reached Siberia, naturally most of us expected to find the experiences of the War and the Revolution would have changed the ideas of Government of the former official class, but as soon as this official class began to commit the terrible atrocities that were committed in

Siberia, or supinely permitted or condoned these atrocities, then it was clear they had learned nothing.

I tried to keep in touch, as best I could, with what the United States Military was doing. I watched for tangible, as well as intangible evidence, so as to form an opinion of the different officers at the various stations. There was only one commander in the many different stations that appeared to me as having a personal bias but otherwise this was an excellent officer who did good work.

By the middle of October, 1919, the influence of Kolchak in the Far East was almost negligible. The Russian "Monarchist" was naturally trying to keep up the idea that Kolchak was still of some importance because foreign support was built around him. The scene, so far as Americans were concerned, had shifted to the Cossacks and Japanese.

There was evidently some maneuvering with the object of declaring Semenov dictator in the Far East when Kolchak fell. So far as Japan was concerned, such a step would have been, in effect, throwing off their mask of working for Russia, and bringing into bold relief their real intent from the first. Even General Knox could not have gone with them on such a bold scheme.

On October 16, I cabled the War Department that:

"There was now no danger of Cossack aggression except against very small organizations. The Czechs are now all along the railroad in the East and the Japanese know it will be difficult to control the conflagration if once started."

There was beginning to appear evidence of a general disintegration of all the Kolchak regime. I received a letter from Colonel Emerson, dated October 22, from Harbin, in which he said Soukine had told him:

"The Siberian Government was not able to enforce the Inter-Allied Agreement because of antagonism between railroad officials and military officers, who considered Allied efforts to reorganize the railroad was for the purpose of gaining control for Allied Governments."

The Kolchak Government had never carried out the intent behind the Inter-Allied Agreement. It was always a military road controlled and operated by Russian military officials. The guarding of such a one-sided railroad caused a great deal of resentment against the United States by the democratic class, and resulted in loss of prestige for the United States.

My Intelligence Officer reported on November 16, as follows:

“Local Russians evidence little real loyalty to Kolchak government, some now speaking of it as the ‘Knox Government.’”

IX

THE Gajda REVOLUTION

General Gajda, after breaking with the Kolchak leaders, came east, arriving in Vladivostok August 8, 1919. He not only announced publicly that the Kolchak Government could not stand, but took other provocative measures, and why some steps were not taken by Kolchak adherents in the Far East to check Gajda's moves I am unable to say. He had submitted a long report to Kolchak, and had permitted the contents of his report to become public. After calling attention to the defects, he said in part:

“The acuteness of the situation demands special precautions. It is imperative to trace a clear and democratic course of state policy, follow it with unswerving strictness, in the assurance that you can then count upon the majority of the people and on the Army. The Government must clear away doubts as to its democracy and its desire to establish civil law and order. The Government must cut away from its own agents who do not hesitate to profit by their own position. The Government must declare that its final aim is to call a Constituent Assembly, on the basis of universal, equal, direct, and secret suffrage. A meeting of the representatives of the Government and district Zemstvos and municipal Dumas, as well as representatives of social organizations. It is necessary to take steps to prevent such defects as shooting without trial in all Russian territory. It is necessary, also to work out a system of freedom of assembly as in European countries.

“Measures should be taken to restore the authority of Zemstvos and municipal Dumas, and start investigation as to administrative punishments inflicted upon members.

“Steps must be taken to arouse the sympathy of the peasant masses, and the development of agriculture.”

These might have been excellent suggestions for helping the situation in Siberia, but the unfortunate fact was that General Gajda did not follow these principles of government when he had command of the Kolchak forces; he then announced his belief in the use of the whip and bayonet on recalcitrant Russians, and his statements were belated and not entirely free from revenge.

The Russian military situation was becoming worse very fast. The Military Intelligence officer, Colonel Eichelberger, reported as early as August 22, that:

“Reliable information from many sources indicate that there is practically no front maintained by the Siberian Army.”

This report of Colonel Eichelberger was made in Vladivostok while I was in Omsk, and just one week after I had been looking along the Ishim River for the one hundred thousand Kolchak troops which I had been led to believe I would find if I went along that river. The farther one was from Omsk, Kolchak's Headquarters, the more freely information was given as to the disintegration of the Kolchak forces. To get the United States to recognize Kolchak and give him financial aid was the last hope of the Russian Monarchists and their Allied supporters.

At this time Gajda's probable *coup d'état* was a live subject of discussion in the east, and the general opinion was held that the Czechs would support Gajda.

Gajda's preparation for his *coup d'état* was being built around the Social Revolutionists. The Czechs, including Gajda, at this time were neither Monarchists nor Bolsheviks. They believed in a parliamentary government and could see no hope of getting it from either of the extreme classes in Russia.

The Czechs announced their feeling and policy on November 16, 1919, as follows:

“The intolerable position in which our Army is placed, forces us to address ourselves to the Allied powers to ask them for counsel as to how the Czech Army can be assured of its own

security and of a free return to its own Country, which was decided with the assent of all the Allied Powers.

“The Army was ready to protect the railway in the sector which was assigned to it and it has fulfilled its task conscientiously. But now the presence of our Army on the railway to protect it has become impossible because the activities of the Army are contrary to its aspirations in the cause of humanity and justice.

“In protecting the railway and maintaining order in the country, our Army is forced to act contrary to its convictions when it supports and maintains an arbitrary, absolute power which at present rules.

“The burning of villages, the murder of peaceable Russian inhabitants by the hundreds, and the shooting without reason, of democratic men solely because they are suspected of holding political views are daily facts; and the responsibility for them, before the Courts of Nations of the entire world, will fall upon us because being an armed force, we have not prevented these injustices. This passiveness is the direct result of our neutrality and non-intervention in Russian internal affairs, and, thanks to our being loyal to this idea, we have become, in spite of ourselves, accomplices to a crime.

“In communicating this fact to the representatives of the Allied Powers to whom the Czech Nation has been and will be a faithful Ally, we deem it necessary to take every measure to inform the nations of the whole world in what a moral and tragic position the Czech Army is placed and what are the causes of it.

“As to ourselves, we see no other way out of this situation than to evacuate immediately the sector which was given us to guard, or else to obtain the right to prevent the injustices and crimes cited above.

“V. Girsu.”

This was as accurate a portrayal of the real conditions as could be made by words. I had often stressed, in my reports, the fact that the United States could not escape responsibility for the conditions, because the atrocities committed against the people would not have been possible if Allied troops had not been in Siberia. Everyone who had knowledge of the facts, and had no prejudices one way or the other, knew that Girsu reported the true conditions.

Gajda was not working with the Czechs during the preparation for his revolution. I could see no evidence of great enthusiasm for him exhibited by members of the Zemstvo, nor did he show evidence of making any great attempt to secure the support of the Zemstvo.

Early in September, when Semenov was in Vladivostok, he tried to make friends with Gajda, claiming that he, too, was a democrat, but Gajda did not take kindly to the offer of Semenov's support.

After General Rozanov was overthrown, January 31, 1920, among his papers was found a report of the Gajda revolution. In this report Rozanov stated:

“During the first month of Gajda's residence in Vladivostok, the result of his work showed complete unification with the local right wing of the Social Revolutionists and the Zemstvos, and was headed by the former President of the Siberian Provisional Duma, Mr. Yakusheff. The 18th, of September, was set for the coup d'état.”

General Rozanov was the responsible Kolchak representative in Eastern Siberia and, according to his own statement, he knew the plans of Gajda being formulated in a train located not more than three hundred yards from his Headquarters, and still he made no move to check or to prevent these plans. How can such a failure to act be accounted for? It was an open secret in Vladivostok that Gajda was going to try to drive Rozanov from power. Some reports I received said that Rozanov was afraid to act, and hoped something would happen to prevent Gajda from taking his apparent intended step. Other reports were to the effect that an effort was being made to force some combination, to take effect when Kolchak was overthrown.

Rozanov further states in his report: "Gajda's convoy, numbering fifty men, had increased to three hundred. The fall of Omsk, on the night of the 15th, of November, seems to inspire hope."

Then Rozanov speaks of the feverish and hurried preparations, for the attack which was to begin on the night of November 17, and which were in sight of his Headquarters and well known to him. At this time he began preparing to resist.

Gajda apparently let Rozanov get ready and then began his attack, at 12 o'clock the night of November 16-17. This attack commenced at Okeanskaya, twenty-two miles from Vladivostok. Rozanov says that at 8 o'clock in the morning of the 17th, Gajda was issuing arms to all who came to his train, and still Rozanov remained passive.

In the afternoon of the 17th, the Allied Commanders held a meeting with a view to formulating some plans to prevent murder and pillage, as well as damage to the Allies who were in town. They concluded it was a political fight, and decided to remain neutral. The city was divided into sections and the Allies were to give protection in the section allotted to them by the Allied Commanders. General Rozanov states that after the Allied Commanders decided to remain neutral, the Japanese sent him a message wishing him "a speedy and successful elimination of the rebellion before the morning of November the 18th." I do not know whether this report has any truth in it or not.

There were many rumors that the Japanese posted their troops so that no one was permitted to go to the assistance of Gajda, and that they would not permit his troops to leave the railroad station where they were trapped like rats. I never obtained any information, worthy of credence, to justify me in charging that Japanese troops were not neutral.

Rozanov could not resist the charge that the Americans were not neutral and he says:

"Twice during the night the Americans opened machine-gun fire on the government troops."

That part of his statement I know was untrue.

By 1 or 2 A.M., on the morning of the 18th, it was known that Rozanov was successful and that Gajda had been defeated, although he and his supporters remained in the railroad station which Rozanov bombarded with his small destroyers and field artillery.

During this fight I witnessed a remarkable exhibition of courage by some Russian soldiers. The Russians had placed a machine gun at an intersection of two streets without any protection whatever. The enemy evidently had the range and very soon after a man would take his place to operate the gun, he was killed. Without any effort to remove the machine gun or to protect it, man after man was killed at that one place. I could see this from my bedroom window and, as far as I could see, the men, without any excitement, willingly went to what was almost certain death.

About 4 or 5 o'clock in the morning, General Cecek, a Czech, came to my Headquarters and told me the Rozanov forces had Gajda and his men cornered in the railroad station, and asked me to join him in demanding that Gajda be turned over to the Czechs. I felt sorry for Gajda, but told Cecek that I could take no part in the fight except to protect life and property, in accordance with the agreement of the Allied Commanders at the conference the afternoon before.

In the early morning Gajda and his troops at the station surrendered, Gajda being slightly wounded. The presence of the Czechs undoubtedly had a restraining influence on Rozanov in the disposition of Gajda, as they would not have permitted Gajda and the few Czechs with him, to be brutally murdered as were the Russians, or many of them that fell into Rozanov's hands. There were eighteen or twenty young Russians captured at the station who had belonged to some organization in Vladivostok. The Rozanov troops took these particular young men out in front of the station and offered them an opportunity to join the Rozanov forces. All of them replied they would die a thousand deaths before they would join such a band of robbers. They were then marched into the station and ordered to descend the circular stone stairs leading to the basement where, as they were going down the steps, they were all shot and killed. This was in the presence of several people, among whom were some Americans.

I cabled to Washington on November 21:

“I have evidence of American Railway Service Corps which establishes the fact that Rozanov’s troops refused to handle anti-Rozanov wounded, but left them for several hours in the cold snow and rain, and that they went into a warehouse where there were wounded and killed the wounded. There are other reports of killings but I cannot verify the accuracy of these latter reports. I have been assured by Rozanov’s representative that women and children will not be molested.

“This movement was inaugurated by the Social Revolutionists under the title of Siberian National Directorate with the ultimate object of the establishment of a Constituent Assembly; with Mr. Yakusheff as President, General Gajda as Commander of Troops, and Mr. Morovsky and Colonel Krakovetsky, Members of the Directorate. None of these men were classed as Bolsheviks and it cannot be called a Bolshevik movement.”

During the fight, Colonel Krakovetsky and four other Gajda supporters escaped to American Headquarters, rushed by the sentinel at the door, and asked for protection. This placed me in a very embarrassing position, as we all knew that to put them out of Headquarters would have been equivalent to a sentence of death. I felt confident my Headquarters could not be considered as American territory and, therefore, I was not justified in protecting them.

Admiral Rodgers, who was in command of the Asiatic Fleet, was in Vladivostok at the time, and said he would consider them as being entitled to asylum and suggested that I cable to Washington. I gladly adopted the Admiral’s suggestion and turned the men over to Colonel F. W. Bugbee, 31st Infantry, for safekeeping, until I could receive a reply from Washington. I sent my cablegram on the 18th, and it was answered on the 19th, as follows:

“Secretaries of State and War agree, not possible constitute your headquarters American territory.”

I sent a second cable to Washington, before I received the reply to the first, saying:

“Rozanov is having prisoners shot. The prisoners in my headquarters or some of them, will be shot if turned over to Rozanov. If it can legally be done it is very desirable for American prestige to constitute my headquarters as American territory.”

I felt if I turned these prisoners over to Rozanov, I would be almost committing murder as Kolchak Russians were not following the practice of civilized nations and I knew these men would not be accorded the rights of prisoners, according to the laws of War. I was seizing any opportunity for delay and convinced myself I was justified in waiting for a reply to my second cable, which I knew would not come.

Colonel Bugbee, to whom I had turned these prisoners over for safekeeping, was a very earnest, conscientious officer, with high ideals, and a world of common sense. I was in my office one evening worrying about the prisoners, when he entered, saluted, and said:

“General, the prisoners have escaped.”

I could not say to him that I was glad, as a matter of fact, I could not say anything, but I know of nothing in my whole life that removed such a load from my conscience as did that report of Colonel Bugbee, and I decided I would not report this to Washington, as nothing could be done about it. I was very much amused to receive on December 10, twenty days after I had been told I could not legally hold these prisoners, the following cable from Washington:

“State Department advises that you cause refugees to leave your headquarters as soon as consistent with general principles of humanity and before question of surrender arises.”

This looked like preparation for an alibi in case embarrassing questions should be propounded later. If it had not been for Colonel Bugbee's good sense, and if I had turned these prisoners over to Rozanov, and I really don't know what I would have done, they would have been dead at least twenty days before I got this cable.

Several years later after I was retired, Colonel Bugbee told me the story of the escape of these men. He had an officer whom he felt he could trust “not to talk,” so about dusk he instructed him to take these prisoners from where they were confined to a safer place, and if they escaped it would be too bad. I never told Washington what became of the prisoners.

I later found out how fortunate I was in declining to join General Cecek in demanding that the Russians turn Gajda over to the Czechs. The Kolchak supporters had to charge everyone who was not helping Kolchak as being a party to Gajda’s futile efforts to overthrow Rozanov. I first was charged with organizing the movement and in a few days I was charged with financing the movement. How little they knew about the accounting system of the United States Government! As an indication of the extent such a foolish report will go, on December 20, 1920, my interpreter in Siberia wrote me in part as follows:

“During my service with the Naval Intelligence Department, under Captain Larimer, Lieutenant Martinek confronted me with the question ‘if it was true that you had promised the Vladivostok government assistance and recognition?’ I told Martinek that this was a pure fabrication and I would swear, on oath, that you had never promised any Russian either singly or collectively, either support or recognition.”

The downfall of Gajda had no appreciable effect on the political situation in Siberia. Kolchak was on his way east, and everyone except the American Consul General, seemed to know that he was almost a negligible factor. On November 25, I cabled to Washington:

“Three Japanese transports arrived with troops and more expected. Supply of food stuffs very low and no relief in sight. Following from British sources: ‘Bolshevik radio intercepted reported capture ten generals, one hundred and ten guns and thirty thousand prisoners at Omsk. Council of Ministers poorly received Irkutsk, Zemstvo and city council refused to meet them.’”

On November 22, Soukine, Minister of Foreign Affairs, stated that Kolchak was issuing a manifesto expressing contrition for faults of the past

and giving assurance of good conduct in the future. Kolchak was, at this late date, promising to abolish the reign of military terror. This indicates that Kolchak not only knew of the terrible atrocities being committed by his Military but, by promising to stop these atrocities at this late date, he implies he could have stopped them at any time while in power, although no evidence came to me in Siberia that Kolchak turned his hand to relieve these terrible conditions in the Far East.

Ivanoff-Rinoff's troops were beating women as well as men and torturing and killing men, because their sons were not at home and yet Kolchak took Ivanoff-Rinoff to Omsk and promoted him to Lieutenant-General, and personally gave him a gold sword. This did not look like disapproval of Ivanoff-Rinoff's acts. The last act of Kolchak was to designate Semenov as his successor and, as stated, in the whole of Siberia, there was only one worse criminal than Semenov and that was Kalmykov. This last act did not look as though Kolchak had much contrition because of the "treatment inflicted upon his fellow-Russians" during his regime.

On the 25th of March, 1919, Mr. Harris, the American Consul General, who Kolchak said had shown him the greatest feeling of friendship and extraordinary sympathy, cabled to the United States, as coming from the Omsk Government:

"The Military, the Political and particularly the international situation in the Far East are such that the Russian Government, although having administration in that region is practically unable to exercise power and authority over this part of the country."

Kolchak not only asked that this be kept confidential, but "extremely confidential as no similar statement has been given to other Allies." Why couldn't Kolchak tell this to his mentor, General Knox? If they were all friends, working together for a common purpose, why should only one friend be told this secret? At this very time, Ivanoff-Rinoff was in command in the Far East, and in the hey-day of his atrocities.

This statement of Kolchak was undoubtedly not entirely disconnected from the suggestion of Mr. Ughet, Financial Agent of the former Russian Government in Washington, that the Supreme Ruler make a declaration of

liberal policies in order to win the United States public opinion. Kolchak was in an embarrassing position; he could not appear liberal enough to win public opinion in the United States without running great risk of alienating his Russian and Allied support. Hence the extreme secrecy.

In a situation such as existed in Siberia, one is very frequently confronted with statements designed to deceive, and the facts are unimportant when such efforts are undertaken. Falsehoods can often be detected by the people on the ground, but could not be by those seven or eight thousand miles away; especially when such statements have attached to them a tag calling for “extreme secrecy.”

There is no doubt in my mind that the so-called Russian Embassy in Washington suggested to Kolchak that some statement be given to Bakmetieff so that he could satisfy the State Department concerning the atrocities being committed in Siberia, but I personally doubt if Kolchak lost one moment's sleep over the conditions in the Far East, and his subsequent treatment of Semenov and Ivanoff-Rinoff clearly shows his conscience was not disturbed by their acts. One of the most difficult tasks confronting me was to determine when words and acts were sincere, or were designed to deceive.

As illustrating the Far Eastern psychology, while in Siberia I saw an article in the *Kokumin*, a Japanese newspaper, with the heading, “Observations of Marquis Okuma on International Relations.” The observation was as follows:

“International relations are quite unlike relations subsisting between individuals. Morality and sincerity do not govern a country's diplomacy, which is guided by selfishness, pure and simple. It is considered the secret of diplomacy to forestall rivals by every crafty means available.”

This statement can at least be approved for its frankness and apparent sincerity if not for its moral philosophy.

Early in November, there was a change in the attitude of some of the Allied representatives in Vladivostok. Some appeared to be looking for a new orientation when Kolchak fell, and his fall was then imminent. On

November 7, Colonel Eichelberger, my Intelligence officer, stated in a report that “probably 97% of the people of Siberia today are anti-Kolchak.”

On November 13, I was informed by General Semenov-Merlin, who was Rozanov’s principal assistant, that “the Cossacks desired to let the past die in so far as Americans were concerned and establish friendly relations with the Americans.” He said Semenov was sending a man to me if I would see him with the idea of conferring with me in the hope that I could be induced to consider them with reference to their future action, rather than with reference to their past. I told him I would see Semenov’s representative, but they might just as well know that I would have nothing to do with murderers.

Semenov’s representative came and stated that the men around Semenov had committed acts of which Semenov did not approve and, in fact, was not aware until recently that his officers had been guilty of such terrible murders. He, in the next breath, said Semenov had recently killed some of his officers because of their crimes, that Semenov would like my advice as to his course of procedure in the future, and that he would follow my advice. I replied as follows:

“My only advice to Semenov was to follow the well-known moral laws as to right and wrong. Semenov and all his people knew that acts had been committed by Semenov and his troops of which the United States would not approve, and while we did not care to say what Russians should do, we did claim the right to have no dealings with Russians who committed acts opposed to all moral laws.”

In addition to this man, General Romanovsky and other reactionaries came to tell me that Semenov was a much bigger man than they thought and, after a personal investigation, they found he was not such a bad character. My reaction to these reports was that the reactionaries, the Cossacks, and the Japanese had decided to join and declare Semenov Dictator of the portion of Siberia east of Lake Baikal, as I knew that such action, to have any chance of success, would require the support of Japan.

In a day or two I went to see General Oi, the Japanese Commander, and had a long and very pleasant talk with him about conditions. I knew that General Oi typified Marquis Okuma's philosophy of "forestalling rivals by any crafty means available," yet I was impressed by the sincerity of what he told me. He said:

"I know the people of Japan are not in favor of the Japanese supporting any monarchistic government in Siberia. My policy in future will be to guard the railway, and get economic help to all the people. I feel sure economic help could not be gotten to the people by using Russian officials."

Mr. Matsudaira, Japanese representative on the Inter-Allied Railway Committee and later Ambassador to the United States, had spoken to Mr. Smith, American representative on the Committee along the same lines General Oi had talked to me. Mr. Matsudaira had impressed me as not being favorable to all the acts of the Japanese Military in Siberia. He had approached me previously and expressed his regret at some act of the Military and said he hoped Americans would not think such acts were approved by the Japanese people, but he said if foreigners made a public criticism of the Japanese Military, the people would resent it, and it would work out to the benefit of the Military.

There was no question but that the Military was the controlling factor in Siberia so far as the Japanese were concerned.

On the 13th of November, Mr. Zumoto, a Member of Parliament, and owner of the *Herald of Asia*, an influential Japanese magazine, came to see me. He brought me two articles he had written, which had been published in the *Shimbun* a Tokyo newspaper—these articles were very liberal and openly opposed the policy of the Japanese in Siberia.

In my report to Ambassador Morris at Tokyo, of the interview I said:

"He said he had not talked with General Oi about the matter but some of the Army were beginning to change their views and state that they believed the Japanese had made a mistake in supporting the reactionary and ruthless leaders of the East and it was necessary to change their plans and now support

representative bodies as typified by the Zemstvos and Cooperatives. He stated many Japanese opposed this proposed plan because it would give America a great advantage in Siberia, as we had consistently followed that course since we arrived here. Mr. Zumoto said this was true but he had no reason to believe that Americans would be unfair and that he felt it was right and, therefore, Japan must follow that course.”

He expressed the hope that Japan and the United States could work together in Siberia. Mr. Zumoto also visited Mr. Smith, and talked to him along the same lines as to me, and further stated that since speaking to me he had seen General Oi, who felt as he did.

Mr. Smith and I got together and discussed these statements made by the three most influential Japanese in Siberia, to see if we could come to any conclusion as to their significance, but there were so many contingencies to be considered that we could come to no conclusion as to what was contemplated. It soon developed, in so far as the Military was concerned, no change in their policy and practice was contemplated, and the statements meant absolutely nothing.

The United States seemed to be the last country to lose hope in Admiral Kolchak, as the Secretary of State of the United States on December 7, 1919, expressed the desire that Admiral Kolchak should continue as the head of any Government in Siberia. The Secretary of State also said this would maintain the validity and force of democratic assurances which had been given by Admiral Kolchak.

Democratic assurances, as has been previously noted, were freely given; but democratic actions by Kolchak were never observed by me, or reported to me by military observers. Evidently Japan had been talking to the State Department about her democratic ideas in the Far East along the same lines the Japanese representatives had approached me, as the Secretary of State was happy to respond to Japan's ideas that local self-government should rest “upon the consent of the bulk of the people.” Another application of Marquis Okuma's philosophy.

This statement, coupled with the support of Kolchak by the State Department, implies that the State Department considered that Kolchak's

power rested upon the consent of the bulk of the people. My observation, taken in connection with reports I received, led me to the conclusion that at no time of Kolchak's power did he have more than 7 percent of the Russian people back of him. From the time Kolchak assumed power, November 18, 1918, until his mobilization order was issued, and Ivanoff-Rinoff began to put this into execution, the peasants were non-committal as to Kolchak.

After Ivanoff-Rinoff began his unconscionable acts upon the people in his efforts to mobilize them for military service, at no period from that date could Kolchak have lasted one month without the support he received from foreign troops in Siberia. This is not a judgment arrived at after the fact, and my reports when in Siberia repeatedly called attention to this situation.

The Secretary of State of the United States, on December 7, 1919, cabled the American Ambassador in Tokyo, in part:

“This Government does not propose to depart in any way from its principles of non-interference in Russian internal affairs.”

I was not able when in Siberia, nor have I been able since, to understand the system of reasoning used by the State Department in concluding that the Government of the United States could send arms and ammunition to Kolchak; could suggest to the War Department that my attention be called to the support given by the United States to Kolchak; could, on two occasions through a representative of the State Department, call attention to representatives of the War Department as to my lapses by failure to support Kolchak, and still claim “non-interference in Russian internal affairs.”

I know as a reply to at least one of these representations made to the War Department, the representative of the State Department was informed that the War Department construed my orders as I did, and suggested that if the State Department did not so construe my orders the question should be taken up by the Secretary of State with the Secretary of War and have the difference in the interpretation definitely settled. I do not know, and my informant did not know, if any further steps were taken.

I know that not one word in my original instructions was changed during my entire stay in Siberia.

On December 12, an American Army officer arrived in Vladivostok with orders to report to Consul General Harris. This was not only unusual but was almost unprecedented under conditions as they existed in Siberia, and I could not help feeling it was a reflection upon me. I did not believe General March knew this order had been issued and, as this officer belonged to the Military Intelligence Division, I came to the conclusion that the State Department, through General Churchill, head of the Military Intelligence Division, had gotten the order issued. I, of course, knew there was some object in asking that an Army officer with the rank of Colonel or Lieutenant Colonel, I do not remember which, report to the Consul General. I had been informed that my reports differed materially from the reports made by the Consul General and I came to the conclusion that the object of the move was to get an Army officer in Siberia who would make reports that differed from mine. This officer had in his possession a monograph, prepared in the Military Intelligence Division, which he unwittingly showed to Colonel Eichelberger, my Intelligence officer. In this monograph appeared the following:

“The American troops are in Siberia primarily to support Kolchak against Bolsheviks by keeping his line of communications open along the Trans-Siberian railroad.”

This was an official document from the War Department that discredited my repeated statements in Siberia that I was to keep my hands off the internal conflicts of the Russian people. This document was of such importance to me that I cabled to General March and asked that this officer be directed to report to me, tear out this part of the monograph and burn it in my presence. My request was approved and the objectionable sentence was torn out and disposed of as I suggested.

Where did General Churchill get the information to base such a statement? I do not believe General Churchill ever saw my orders and I do not believe he would manufacture such a statement and try to discredit my well-known construction of my orders. If he had gone to the proper authority in the War Department, where he should have gone for information, before making a statement not in accordance with facts, he would have been told that my construction of my orders was the same as that of the War Department. I am of the opinion that General Churchill went

to Mr. De Witt C. Poole, State Department, for an interpretation of my orders.

In a few days after the officer had left Vladivostok for Chita, to report to Consul General Harris, I received a cable from General March saying this officer needed discipline and he would not send anything out of Siberia except through me. That made it plain to me that my surmise as to the origin of this officer's order was correct.

As the ostensible reason for keeping United States troops in Siberia was to keep the railroads open for the benefit of the Russian people, I consider the following letter received from Colonel G. H. Emerson, Mr. Stevens' First Assistant, as the best evidence obtainable as to the working of the Inter-Allied Railroad Agreement. Colonel Emerson was traveling along the railroads practically all the time, and had a better opportunity to observe the working of the agreement than any other man in Siberia. The letter, dated December 13, was as follows:

“My resignation has been accepted. In severing my connection with the Russian Railway Service Corps, I wish to thank you for the many courtesies that you have extended to me personally and the officers of the corps.

“The Russian Railways Service Corps, assigned as technical inspectors under the terms of the Inter-Allied Agreement, have made every effort to assist in connection with the operation of the railroad. We have been opposed in every way by the Russian Military faction and the Russian technical railroad officials, regardless of the fact that we have made every effort to assist in an advisory capacity after I was officially informed that the Omsk Government was unable to carry out the terms of the agreement, and all suggestions made by the technical inspectors were ignored.

“In every case where there has been any interference in that portion of the line guarded by troops under your command that conflicted with the agreement, prompt action has been taken by your officers assigned to the various sectors, as a result, the railroad employees have made an honest effort to cooperate with

the technical inspectors, so, what little has been accomplished in the way of improving railroad transportation has been confined entirely to that sector under the protection of the American and Chinese troops.

“Our officers assigned to the district, Manchuria to Verkhne-Udinsk, that is supposed to be under Japanese protection, have been subjected to insult, and on two different occasions have been ejected from cars by the troops under command of Semenov, and were it not for the firm stand taken by Colonel Morrow to protect our officers assigned in that district, I am satisfied they would have been annihilated by the renegade bands operating under Semenov.

“In conclusion, I firmly believe, had the Commanders of the other Allied forces, assigned to guarding the railroad, taken as strong a stand as you have, the Inter-Allied Agreement would have been successfully carried out.”

Kolchak was no longer of any consequence in considering the Siberian situation. The British Mission reported Evacuation of Novo-Nikolaevsk at midnight, the 13th and 14th of December, and Kolchak was as far east as Marinsk on the 14th. The congestion on the railroad was great and embarrassing and was causing charges and counter-charges as to unfairness in the assignment of locomotives where the worst shortage occurred.

On December 23, Colonel Eichelberger gave me the following information, as coming from the Polish Mission:

“At Tartarskaya, Admiral Kolchak appealed to Poles for protection from arrest by his own soldiers and was escorted out of the district by Polish armored car.

“Kolchak has protested to Russian and Allied officials against the Czechs taking precedence in their Eastward movement. Also claims he has been subjected to threats and insults by Czechs.

“Semenov has sent a telegram to Czechs, demanding that the train carrying High Russian Command, the sick, wounded and

their families, as well as the last remnant of the National wealth, be allowed to pass to Irkutsk.”

The last demand was by no means least important in Semenov’s mind.

On the 24th of December, General Knox informed me the Czechs were going to escort Kolchak from Krasnoyarsk to Irkutsk.

On January 18, Dr. Girska, Czech civilian representative in the Far East, said he had talked with the Czech Chief of Staff, by direct wire, in Irkutsk, and was informed that Kolchak was a prisoner in the hands of Social Revolutionists.

It was very difficult to get any direct news from Irkutsk.

We were later informed that the Allied representatives, including Consul General Harris, left Irkutsk for Chita four or five days before Kolchak arrived, under Czech protection in that City.

The Social Revolutionists demanded Kolchak and notified the Czechs in case of refusal, they would try to take him by force. Considering the abuse heaped upon the Czechs by Kolchak and his supporters, one could not reasonably expect them to fight for him. The Social Revolutionists in Irkutsk were very much incensed at the action of one of Semenov’s generals who, when he was driven out of Irkutsk before Kolchak’s arrival, had taken about twenty of the most prominent men in Irkutsk with him, on the plea that they would stir up trouble if left there. This General assured the people of Irkutsk that he was going to send them east, but led the people to believe that he did not intend to injure them. He took them to Lake Baikal, had them killed, and their bodies thrown into the lake.

Of course Kolchak had nothing to do with this, but the resentment of the people extended to him and in such cases, outraged humanity reaches for the top. Kolchak was tried by a military court, convicted, and shot on the morning of February 7, 1920.

One hundred thousand men clothed, armed, and equipped by the British had joined the anti-Kolchak forces by December, 1919, and the Bolsheviks wired General Knox thanking him for supplying clothing and equipment for the Soviet forces. These people now had sufficient force to demand fair

treatment by the foreigners in Siberia, and they did not propose to longer submit to the railroads being operated, under the protection of foreign troops, for the sole benefit of their enemies.

The Americans were doing the best they could to protect the railroad sectors assigned to them to guard, and it had always been necessary to divide the organizations into small detachments in order to guard the extensive sectors. This was becoming very dangerous as these small detachments would have no chance against the overwhelming numbers that were threatening to attack us.

In December, one of the anti-Kolchak leaders came to see Major Melaski, 31st Infantry, who was on duty guarding the Suchan line, and told him they did not desire any conflict with Americans, but by guarding the railroad, we were helping the reactionary crowd and delaying the final settlement of their difficulties, and as it was his duty to prevent coal and military supplies from going to Kolchak, he would have to engage in conflict with us to accomplish his object. He said they would not disturb the movement of any other class of trains.

Who could blame these people? The Kolchak Government was only a shell, with practically no Russian military support, except a few former Czarist officers.

On December 27, I cabled the War Department, in part:

“Safety of American troops demands concentration which results in abandoning parts of our sector. We are fast arriving at the place where we join Kalmykov, Semenov and Rozanov in fighting the Russians who claim they are trying to establish a representative government in the East. These men are not Bolsheviks as that word is understood in the United States.”

On December 29, I received the following cablegram:

“You are informed very confidentially that it is expected that within a few days you will receive orders for the withdrawal of your entire command. Keep matter very secret until orders are received by you.”

I was told to concentrate my command but to assign some reason, other than the real one, until the time came to announce our withdrawal. Undoubtedly the great secrecy was due to an effort to get Japan to consider her mission over, and to carry out the following part of Japan's assurance to the Russian people when she entered Siberia, viz:

“They (Japan) further declare that upon the realization of the objects above indicated, they will immediately withdraw all Japanese troops from Russian Territory and will leave wholly unimpaired the sovereignty of Russia in all its phases, whether political or military.”

The object, Japan refers to, was to relieve the Czechs who were reported as being opposed by German and Austro-Hungarian prisoners. As the Czechs in Eastern Siberia, where Japan operated, never needed any military assistance, it would seem reasonable to expect Japan to withdraw.

The Japanese Government issued a statement on March 31, 1920, the day before I left Siberia, although I did not see this statement while there. It was as follows:

“The Imperial Government hereby takes occasion to declare its intention that, when political conditions in the countries, contiguous to, or neighboring on Japan, have been established on the stable, assuring status and all menace to Manchuria and Korea has been removed; when the life and property of the Imperial subjects in Siberia have been secured, and when the freedom of traffic and communication has been guaranteed, it will withdraw its Military forces, from all parts of Siberia, at the earliest opportune moment after the conclusion of the repatriation of the Czechoslovak army.”

Japan did not intend to permit any other nation to determine when “political conditions in countries contiguous to Japan have become stable,” nor to determine when all menace, “to Manchuria and Korea has been removed,” and it is not unfair to say that the statement of Japan, above quoted, means that Japan would not get out of Siberia until she was ready to leave, or until she was forced out.

This statement of Japan, on March 31, 1920, was tantamount to a repudiation of her statement on August 3, 1918, just before sending troops to Siberia. I arrived in Vladivostok September 2, 1918, just one month after the statement was made, and was still there when the second one was made. I never saw, or had reported to me, a single aggressive act of the Russians towards the Japanese.

The order to concentrate American troops relieved me of considerable embarrassment, and was received by all soldiers with great joy.

It soon became evident that the Japanese were planning to stay in Siberia, and were giving as a reason that they had an obligation to see that the Czechs were all evacuated before they left. At the same time their puppet, Semenov, began trying to prevent the evacuation. This is shown by resolutions of the Inter-Allied Railway Committee, and the Technical Board. On April 14, 1920, this Resolution of the Technical Board was passed:

“Whereas two Russian railway employees at Imyanop, Manchuria, were suddenly arrested and summarily shot on April 6th, by some Japanese soldiers, without trial.” “Whereas on the evening of April 8th, two Russians were refused passage over the Sungari bridge at Harbin, by Japanese soldiers in spite of their passes entitling them to such passage, one of them was thrown over the bridge and the other had his head badly cut by Japanese soldiers. Both were badly injured.” “Whereas on April 8th, railway employees were suddenly arrested at Harbin, by some Japanese soldiers, and were locked in a Japanese Military car to be transported to some unknown destination.” “Whereas, three Russian railway men were arrested at Manchuria railway station, April 10th, by Japanese soldiers.” “Whereas, these violent acts have created a widespread excitement and indignation among the railway employees and are most liable to precipitate grave trouble leading to the interruption of communication and the disturbance of the whole region, and the delay to the Czech evacuation, all of which tend to defeat the purpose and function of the Technical Board.” “Whereas, these acts are regarded as bringing direct contravention to the Inter-Allied Agreement covering the

guarding of the Chinese Eastern Railway which duty was assigned to the Chinese Government, by the Inter-Allied Powers, and that the Military forces of no other Nation have any authority in the guarding of the railway.” “Whereas, the Technical Board protests, in the strongest possible manner, against the interference and the high handed actions of the Japanese troops, in these and similar instances, and ask them for an assurance, from the Japanese authorities, that such acts will not be repeated.”

It should be remembered that the Japanese announced, at the time the Americans were withdrawn from Siberia, that their obligations to the Czechs had not been fulfilled and that they could not leave until they had been evacuated.

I have before me now, ten pages of letter paper of closely typewritten matter, all of which refer to the actions of the Japanese, or their puppet, Semenov, in interfering with the operation of the railroads according to the Inter-Allied Railway Agreement. No sincere person could come to any conclusion other than that the Japanese and Semenov were trying to block the Technical Board in the operation of the railway, and thereby delay the evacuation of the Czechs, which would give an excuse for Japanese troops to remain in Siberia.

On April 24, 1920, a cable signed by the representatives on the Inter-Allied Committee of China, France, and the United States, Czecho-Slovakia and Great Britain was sent to interested Allied Governments, in part as follows:

“The Japanese Military authorities have acquiesced in Colonel Medy’s attitude, have themselves usurped functions, by right belonging to the Technical and Transportation Boards and have used them in such a manner as to add to the confusion on the railway, and actually to delay the progress of the Czecho-Slovaks.”

Mr. Smith was sent to the Trans-Baikal section by the Inter-Allied Committee to represent it in the evacuation of the Czechs, and it was his conclusion, in which the Committee agreed, that there was deliberate

interference with the railroad to delay Czech evacuation. Dr. Girska also stated officially to the Inter-Allied Committee that the Japanese were not needed to help the Czechs in their evacuation.

The Japanese Foreign Office represented to Mr. Morris, the American Ambassador to Japan, that the announcement of the United States that we were going to withdraw our troops from Siberia before Japan was ready to make a similar announcement, was an act which showed a lack of proper cooperation with Japan and tried to create the impression that, if it had not been for this announcement, Japan possibly would have withdrawn her troops. Mr. Morris was induced to put at least some reliance in this suggestion.

In a book written by K. K. Kawakami, a Japanese newspaper man, entitled "Japan's Pacific Policy," on page 250, appears this statement with reference to the withdrawal of American troops:

"Had the Washington Government taken Japan into confidence, and conferred with her frankly and earnestly, as it did in the Summer of 1918, a complete and simultaneous evacuation, in the Spring of 1920, might have been possible."

To my mind, these suggestions constitute a strong indictment of Japan as to her sincerity of purpose in Siberia, and I do not believe the manner of withdrawal of American troops had any influence in shaping the determination of Japan to remain in Siberia. The suggestion that Japan might have withdrawn her troops, if the United States had consulted her, was undoubtedly referred to in Tokyo by some Japanese authority, as both Mr. Morris and Mr. Kawakami referred to the question, and Mr. Morris spoke to a member of my Staff about the time the Americans were withdrawn, and seemed to blame me for hasty announcement. This attitude of Japan was undoubtedly taken with the idea of lessening the criticism that she expected from other nations for her continued occupation of Siberia, contrary to her announced purpose August 3, 1918.

Baron Shidehara, in his statement made at the Limitation of Arms Conference in Washington in 1921-22, said that Japanese troops remained in Siberia because, "in the first place, there is a considerable number

Japanese residents, who had lawfully, and under guarantees of treaty, established themselves in Siberia, long before the Bolshevik eruption and were there entirely welcome . . . and that those residents can hardly be expected to look for protection of their lives and property, to any other authorities than Japanese troops.”

Baron Shidehara also said, at the same time:

“There is another difficulty by which Japan is faced in proceeding to recall her troops from the Maritime Province. Due to the geographical propinquity, the general situation around Vladivostok and Nikolsk is bound to affect the security of the Korean frontier.”

Neither of these reasons was mentioned by Japan in her statement of August 3, 1918, announcing her reasons for, and objectives to be attained by, intervention in Siberia.^[1] What caused the Japanese Government to believe the lives and property of the Japanese residents in Siberia, and on the Korean frontiers, required protection in 1920, when American troops left, and did not require protection in August, 1918? There was more resentment against the Japanese in 1920 than in 1918, but this resentment was against the Japanese Military because of their actions during intervention. In my judgment, the real objectives of Japan in Siberia have never been made public.

When the American soldiers began returning to the United States, or as soon as it was known that they would soon return, it was brought to my attention that some of them were getting married to Russian women. Entirely too many of these women would not, under the law, be permitted to enter the United States, and I felt that some steps should be taken to keep them out. I felt that it was un-American and exceeded my authority to tell a soldier he may not get married so, to meet the situation, I issued orders stating that if any soldier married, without the consent of his immediate Commanding Officer, I would not give his wife transportation to the United States. At the same time I instructed all Commanding Officers to have an investigation made, with a view of determining whether the woman the soldier wanted to marry would be permitted to enter the United States, under the laws, if she were not married. If she proved of good moral

character, to grant permission to marry but if not of good character to refuse permission. This step was in the interest of the soldier as well as of the United States. Evidently my order did not meet the hearty approval of the authorities in Washington, where the real situation could not be realized and, at the instigation of someone in the Red Cross, I was ordered to give transportation to a most dissolute woman, who had married a soldier. I protested at this order, and was finally told to let the soldier's wife come to the United States, if I was convinced the soldier married her with the idea of rehabilitating her in society. I had to admit my inability to determine the real intent of the soldier, so I turned the matter over to my Chief of Staff, class-mate and room-mate at West Point, Colonel J. D. Leitch, to handle according to his best judgment. I asked the head of the Y.W.C.A. to assist in looking up the character of these women who lived in Vladivostok. I felt that my order accomplished something, but fell far short of my expectations.

It seems very difficult to keep off the subject of Semenov and Kalmykov in writing of occurrences that happened in Eastern Siberia, and I must ask the indulgence of the reader, while I once more turn to Semenov.

On January 9, 1920, Semenov's armored car came to Verkhne-Udinsk, which was in the sector of the railroad guarded by Americans, and arrested the station-master. The armored car was in command of General Bogomoletz, one of Semenov's generals. Colonel Morrow went to General Bogomoletz and asked him if he knew he, Colonel Morrow, had charge of that sector, and he would not permit him or anyone else to come into his sector and arrest railroad employees. General Bogomoletz said:

“I am not supposed to give any account to you of our actions. I will not converse with you any more in regard to such.”

Colonel Morrow replied:

“Let me tell you this, I do not want to cause any trouble for you, however, I have twenty-five hundred men here to carry out my orders. I must know why this man was arrested, he is under my protection.”

General Bogomoletz replied:

“I was told he was a Bolshevik and I wanted to kill him tonight, but if you insist, I shall release him. It is immaterial, if the station-master is guilty we will get him sooner or later.”

The station-master was released. The armored car continued west, and about midnight arrived at Posolskaya, where American soldiers under the command of Lieutenant Paul Kendall were on duty guarding the railroad. At 1 A.M., when the American detachment was asleep, the armored car fired into the car in which the American troops were quartered. Colonel Morrow telegraphed as follows:

“Semenov armored car attacked detachment thirty-eight men in their cars at Posolskaya at one A.M. January 10th. Detachment fought and captured armored car. One general, six officers and forty-eight men held here. American casualties; one died of wounds, one seriously wounded. Detailed reports of casualties follows; Russian casualties;—five killed and several wounded.”

I was sorry that Lieutenant Kendall, who first got hold of Bogomoletz, did not hang him to a telegraph pole, but he acted within the law and really exhibited better soldierly qualities in doing as he did. This young officer is entitled to great credit for his leadership in resisting this unwarranted attack, and in capturing a force with vastly superior armament.

There were no courts for the trial of these people and Semenov began clamoring for his armored car, and assured Colonel Morrow that if he would turn the prisoners over to him they would all be punished. Colonel Morrow was to leave Verkhne-Udinsk on January 23, and he kept his prisoners until he left, when he had to turn them over to Semenov's representatives. He took the evidence of all these men, separately, and their statements as to what had happened, on this one armored car, were remarkably uniform. It was established, beyond any doubt, that this one car had, between January 1 and 10, “robbed and brutally murdered over forty men and three women were raped and brutally killed.”

This is the same Semenov who, in 1919, had robbed a New York company of a train load of furs, reported as being worth one half a million dollars; this is the same Semenov who took three Americans, who had taken their discharge from the Army, and remained in Siberia, and brutally murdered them for no reason except that they were wearing the uniform of the American Army. This murder was after I left Siberia, but I was informed of this by Mr. John F. Stevens, and I sent a report of the same to the War Department. This is the same Semenov who later came to the United States through the port of Vancouver, B. C., and went direct to Washington and I know conferred with one American official, and I imagine he conferred with others.

Colonel Morrow found, as he was coming out of Siberia, that the officer who had been sent to Siberia to report to Consul General Harris, previously referred to, had, according to the officer's own statement, attached himself to Semenov's headquarters. Colonel Morrow said to this officer, when he told him that he was with Semenov:

“Do you know what a murderer he is? Do you know he has killed some of my men?”

The officer replied:

“Semenov is the only thing standing between civilization and Bolshevism, and I do not intend to listen to anything against Semenov.”

The idea that Semenov could add to the benefits of present day civilization was carrying absurdity to the extreme.

Why was an American Army officer directed, or permitted by the American Consul General, to join the headquarters of this notorious scoundrel and murderer? It is not even possible that Semenov's record and reputation were unknown to Mr. Harris and if Semenov had committed, in the United States, one one-hundredth of the offenses that he committed in Siberia, he would have been legally or illegally killed, for such a character could not exist in this country.

Colonel Morrow wished to show this officer the testimony taken after the firing into the train, and killing two American soldiers, but he replied:

“You have nothing to do with me, and General Graves has nothing to do with me.”

Colonel Morrow then told him he was going to take him to Vladivostok to report to General Graves. He protested at this, but was told if he caused any trouble he would be taken by force. Consul General Harris protested to me that this officer was under his control and Colonel Morrow had nothing to do with him, and he demanded that I order Colonel Morrow to release him. This I refused to do and Consul General Harris took the question up with the State Department. I got a telegram from General March saying:

“Some row between Morrow and ——, settle it.”

When Colonel Morrow arrived at Vladivostok, about two weeks later, he turned in a report of a medical officer, whom he had directed to stay with this officer on the trip to Vladivostok, and to make a report on him. This report was to the effect that the officer was not mentally balanced.

I was not satisfied that an injustice had not been done this officer, and I ordered a board composed of three senior medical officers in Vladivostok to examine him in connection with the report turned in by Colonel Morrow. This board reported to the effect that they could not agree with the report of the doctor made to Colonel Morrow, but it was their opinion that the officer was of a very nervous temperament and they thought it unwise and unsafe to leave him in Siberia. I approved the report and kept the officer in Vladivostok until I had an opportunity to send him to the United States.

As to the arrival of Semenov in the United States in 1922, I have reason for thinking his trip was not unexpected by the Immigration Officials of the United States, notwithstanding the fact that he had brutally murdered Americans.

I was informed by Mr. C. H. Smith, the United States representative on the Inter-Allied Railroad Committee, that, prior to the arrival of Semenov, he, Mr. Smith, went to the telegraph office in the McAlpin Hotel in New York City, to send a telegram to his wife in California, and in this telegram

said something about Siberia. The telegraph operator, a woman, said to Mr. Smith, that a very influential man was coming to the United States from Siberia. Mr. Smith asked who it was, and the operator told him it was Semenov. Mr. Smith asked how she knew; and she said that she had sent a message saying if he would come through the Port of Vancouver, B. C., about such a time, there would be no objection to his entry into the United States. Semenov came through Vancouver, at approximately the time the operator had told Mr. Smith he would come.

While Colonel Morrow was in Chita, Semenov's headquarters, he saw an American Red Cross train, with the doors of the cars open and Semenov's soldiers helping themselves to the Red Cross supplies. Colonel Morrow made an official report of this to American Headquarters in Vladivostok, signed by himself and four other officers. This report said the officers were unable to find any Red Cross representatives superintending the issue of these supplies. I sent the report to Dr. Teusler, requesting comment. He said a representative of the Red Cross was present, and watching the issue. He did not deny that this vile murderer of Russians and of American soldiers, whose actions had placed him beyond the pale of civilization, was being given American Red Cross supplies, for the use of his troops, such supplies having been purchased by money contributed by the generous people of the United States.

[1]

(Russian-American Relations, 1917-1920, page 239.)

X

THE DEBACLE

General Rozanov, in Vladivostok, was driven from power on January 31, 1920. There was no fighting in this turnover, and, as I remember, there was only one shot fired, and that was from a piece of field Artillery at the house occupied by General Rozanov. That shot missed its mark, but the sound seemed to be sufficient for Rozanov and his supporters, the Japanese, to lose their nerve, as the Japanese clothed Rozanov in a Japanese officer's long cape, and Japanese military cap, and conducted him to Japanese Headquarters, which ended his crooked career in Siberia.

At the time of this *coup d'état*, Mr. MacGowan was American Consul at Vladivostok, and as soon as it was certain that Rozanov was to be overthrown, he rushed to Major Johnson, who was the American in charge of the military police in Vladivostok, and requested him to place a guard of American soldiers at the home of a certain Russian, in order to prevent any of the new regime from entering the house.

Major Johnson, unfortunately, complied with the request, without consulting me. Later, when Mr. MacGowan wanted the guard increased, Major Johnson then suggested that they see me about it and I not only refused to increase the guard, but directed Major Johnson to remove it from the house.

It was later reported to me that Mr. MacGowan went from my office to the Russian's house and that he and the Russian put some papers in a sheet and took them to the American Consulate, before the guard could be removed. I never knew and could never understand why Mr. MacGowan was so solicitous about the premises and papers of this particular Russian, as he was noted as being one of the most violent anti-American unofficial Russians in Vladivostok. It was stated frequently that he was in the habit, at weekly luncheons of a certain anti-American Russian group, of making the most immoderate talks about the Americans.

In October, 1920, when en route to Nagasaki, Japan, from Manila, I was told by the captain of the transport, that this same Russian was to board the transport at Nagasaki for San Francisco.

I immediately wirelessly to General Kernan in Manila, protesting against this man's going to the United States, and suggested that he confer with Major Eichelberger, and Major T. W. King at his Headquarters, as to the anti-American attitude taken by this Russian while we were in Siberia. General Kernan revoked his permit to go on the transport, and we left him in Nagasaki.

I was later informed, however, that he did get to the United States. Something is wrong with our immigration laws or the application of our laws, when such Russians as the one under consideration and Semenov be picked out as of the favored few to receive a permit to enter the United States.

I naturally supposed that Consul MacGowan was behind permitting this Russian to enter the United States, and I have often wondered what his object was. The circumstances connected with this whole case were such as to cause unfortunate conjecture.

Major P. R. Faymonville, U. S. Army, on duty on board the U.S.A. T. Mount Vernon, used in transporting Czechs from Vladivostok to their home, informed me of the following communication received by him upon his arrival in Panama, May 24, 1920:

“Reliable report indicates presence on board Mount Vernon, due Panama shortly, of two dangerous Bolshevik officials, natives of Vladivostok, Krakovetsky and Telucheff. These men refused admittance to United States at San Francisco. Will probably try to leave ship at Panama.

(Signed) Churchill,
Director Military Intelligence.”

Major Faymonville replied to this communication:

“These two men are aboard but they are neither Bolsheviks nor dangerous. They were from January until their departure the best friends America had in Siberia. So far as known they were not refused admittance in San Francisco, as they did not apply. There is not the faintest chance of their trying to leave the ship at Panama.”

Major Faymonville wrote me a personal letter about this incident in which he said: “the Bolsheviks have been ashore, and the Gatun Dam has not yet been blown up!” As the MacGowans left the ship at San Francisco, I think they must be the “reliable authorities” on which General Churchill depended.

This and other Russian cases were the outcropping of Mr. MacGowan’s bitterness at the American Military in Siberia, and the only foundation for this bitterness was the refusal of the Army to follow the lead of Consul General Harris, and himself, in supporting the autocratic class of Russians.

By this time, the Americans had ceased guarding the railroad, except where it was necessary for Americans and Czechs to reach Vladivostok to embark for their homes.

The Japanese acted as if they had some idea of offering resistance when Rozanov was deposed at Vladivostok, although they evidently did not expect the anti-Rozanov troops to arrive from the country district away from the railroad, and were, therefore, very much surprised when they marched into Vladivostok early in the morning. Some American officers heard of their approach and hurried out to witness the entry into the city. They reported to me that the Japanese Military were at sea as they had expected troops to enter by the railroad, and had posted troops along the line to Nikolsk. They did not like to give up, even after Vladivostok had been taken, and it seems incredible that they had no plan of action, but it certainly looked that way. I was sick in bed with tonsillitis and could not leave my bedroom with safety.

About 10 o’clock in the morning of the 31st, three or four hours after the overthrow, a message came to my Headquarters that the Japanese had posted their troops on the American sector of the railroad, endangering the safety of the road in case of hostilities. I resented the action of the Japanese,

as they were interfering with the operation of the Railroad Agreement, which interference might result in destroying a tunnel between Vladivostok and Nikolsk and frustrate the plans of evacuation of the Americans and Czechs.

I knew I had to see General Oi, tonsillitis or not, so I ordered my car, and went to Japanese Headquarters. I found General Oi in a very ugly mood but I at once told him my business, and demanded the removal of his troops from my sector. He replied that he ranked me, and by reason of that fact he commanded me and all American troops in Siberia. I told him he knew he did not command American troops and I knew he never would command American troops. He then said that I was a military man and knew there could not be two heads to any military expedition. I replied, that might be his opinion and it might be mine, but he knew that I could not release command of American troops without instructions from my Government, and he could not give up command of the Japanese troops without instructions from the Japanese Government. He said, almost immediately:

“I must admit the logic of your statement, the Japanese troops will be removed.”

I returned to my Headquarters, and in order that the record would be straight, I wrote him the following letter:

“1. Referring to our conversation this forenoon, I desire to notify you that I formally and officially protest against the interference with the operation of the railroad this morning when an echelon of partisan troops was stopped by Japanese troops at Station Okeanskaya, on a sector guarded by American troops.

“2. My duty in connection with the guarding of this sector of the railroad is in accordance with the Inter-Allied Railway Agreement, with which the Japanese representative was a party.”

When Rozanov was driven out of office, the incoming forces did not establish a new Government but supported the existing Zemstvos, who had been ready and willing to function, but since the advent of Kolchak, they not only could not regularly function but were forbidden to discuss

questions concerning Kolchak's government. The question as to whether the Partisans desired the Zemstvo as a government or the Soviets is perhaps best answered by events subsequent to the withdrawal of foreign troops, but the fact remains that they requested the Zemstvo to take charge as the only legal authority in the district.

By virtue of this action, Mr. Medviedeff became head of the Primorsk district, which included Vladivostok. This was a very difficult and trying position for the Zemstvo representatives, as there were foreign troops and Russian troops still in the Province and they knew well Japan's resentment at their temporary elimination from "the power behind the throne." Other Allied national representatives, as well as Consul General Harris, showed by their actions that the Zemstvo could not expect the same treatment as had been extended to Kolchak. For instance, Consul General Harris failed to respond to an invitation to a dinner, given by the new Provincial representatives. This was a clear indication of his attitude.

I received no further complaints from the State Department at my failure "to steady any efforts at self-government or self-defense in which the Russians may be willing to accept assistance." The State Department, through General Churchill, charged me with failure to carry out my instructions because I did not help to "steady the effort of self-government" of Kolchak. If it had been logical for me, without specific instructions, to help Kolchak, it would have been equally logical for me to help the new Zemstvo Government, because all Russians were willing to accept assistance, which was the only condition stated in my orders before assistance could be given. Of course, the President, or whoever wrote my instructions, could not logically expect that the Military, without specific instructions from Washington, should help any contending faction in Siberia.

The Zemstvo representatives took their new duties very seriously. Mr. Medviedeff came to see me and, without doubt, went to see other foreign representatives, and made the following statement:

"Russia has already spilt too much blood. As long as I am the head of this Government, no person will be deprived of life, liberty, or property except by decree of our civil courts. We will

no longer permit the military to decide to kill some one, and then convene a military tribunal so as to make this murder legal in the eyes of the civilized world.

“I want to call your attention to the fact that we have not changed a single judge, and we do not intend to make any changes. The Chief Justice here was appointed by the Czar, and has been on the bench for eighteen years, and the Zemstvo is willing to abide by the decrees of the civil court.”

I was very much impressed by this statement, as it indicated a tendency towards justice which I had not seen since my arrival in Siberia. I have no means of knowing for certain that this policy was followed, during the two months I was in Vladivostok while the Zemstvos were in power, but I do know that no one ever complained to me of unjust treatment by the Zemstvo officials. If anyone had been killed, I am sure word of the killing would have been brought to me at once, as there were too many people in Vladivostok looking for a chance to criticize this new regime.

I observed these Zemstvo officials carefully for the two months I remained in Siberia, and I never saw anyone try harder to be fair and just to everyone than did these people. I was very much surprised to receive newspapers in which it was stated, in effect, that the streets of Vladivostok were flowing in blood; the Bolsheviks were killing everyone with money or an education. These reports were so unjust I could not help wondering where they originated.

It was well known in Vladivostok that from November 18, 1919, to January 31, 1920, Rozanov had killed between five and six hundred men, without any comment relative to his murders. The method to decide to execute and then convene a military tribunal to legalize the intended murder, was the method used by Rozanov. This procedure was well known in Vladivostok, and I tested the accuracy of the information in one case, at the request of a Russian woman who had lived in New York at one time.

The Japanese remained quiescent, in the Primorsk province, during the remainder of my stay in Siberia, but Mr. Smith, American representative on the Inter-Allied Committee, telegraphed from Trans-Baikal that they were doing everything they could to retard the evacuation of the Czechs. They

refused to let the Czechs go into the railroad shops to repair engines that were to be used in hauling them to Vladivostok. Mr. Smith stated:

“The Czechs will not permit this state of affairs to continue much longer, but will take matters into their own hands.”

The Japanese, however, as was characteristic of them during the entire intervention, never went quite to the extent of having a clash, and the Czechs continued to come east.

The Americans had a very uneventful two months, from the overthrow of Rozanov to the departure of the last “echelon” on April 1, 1920, with which I left Siberia.

It was evident that the Russians in Vladivostok hated to see the Americans leave, with the Japanese remaining.

The Japanese and the Russians both requested me to inspect a battalion of their troops, as my last official act on Russian soil. The Japanese had been the first to extend the invitation to me, and I agreed to accept, so I inspected the Russian troops an hour before boarding the transport, and the Japanese troops just before going on board.

Just before sailing, a representative of the Associated Press, whose permanent assignment was in Tokyo, rushed on board to tell me that something was planned by the Japanese, but he did not know just what was contemplated. I asked him how he knew, and he replied that a Japanese official representative, whom he had known in Tokyo, had just said to him that he hoped the Americans would not think the Japanese people approved of what the Japanese Military contemplated doing as soon as I had gone.

This seemed to me to be of enough importance to cable to Washington, and I wrote the following:

“I have just been informed, by a reliable American, that a Japanese representative has just told my informant not to be surprised at anything that may happen. He said he did not personally approve of the contemplated action of the Japanese Military, nor did he believe the Japanese people approved. When

asked if the Japanese would declare war, he said Japan belonged to the League of Nations, and could not declare war without authority of the League, but the Japanese Military would act independently in Siberia. He also said that the Russian Staff had not exaggerated, when it stated that the Japanese had concluded an armistice with the Russian troops, at Nikolaevsk; had professed friendship and then had treacherously attacked the Russian Headquarters at one o'clock in the morning, with incendiary bombs and machine guns. In these two days fighting the Japanese were forced to surrender, after heavy losses."

I left the message with Colonel Eichelberger, who had been ordered to go to Tokyo, before going to Manila, and directed him to code, and send it that day. This was done and the message must have been in Washington not later than the second of April.

This comment of the Japanese representative undoubtedly referred to the action taken by the Japanese, on the night of April 4, in Vladivostok.

I received a complete account of the occurrence, and have it before me now, and there can be no doubt, in the mind of any fair-minded man, that it was a hostile occupation of Vladivostok, accompanied by reckless firing in the streets, resulting in the loss of human lives. The Zemstvo representatives had agreed to the demands of the Japanese, and as far as Mr. Medviedeff knew, there was no friction between them and the Japanese.

There are sufficient details in the report I have, which was made by an American official, to show conclusively that the Japanese started the firing, and the signal for the firing to commence was two red flashes, which were seen by the naval officer on watch on the U. S. S. "Albany." The Japanese justified the attack by claiming they had been attacked. Two days before I left Vladivostok, I went in my car around the outskirts of the city. I had Colonel Eichelberger with me, and near First River we saw the Japanese digging trenches and filling sandbags as if they were preparing for a strong defense.

My personal relations with the Japanese left nothing to be desired, but, as the United States and Japan went to Siberia with the same announced

purpose, and our paths of procedure went in opposite directions, official clashes were inevitable.

General Oi kindly sent a band to the dock to furnish music before the sailing of the “Great Northern,” the transport on which I left for Manila, and as the boat backed away from the dock the Japanese band began playing the good old American tune, “Hard Times Come Again no More.” Some looked upon this tune as amusing, others as indicative of past official relations.



GENERAL OI, JAPANESE COMMANDER

I feel that this statement of my experiences in Siberia would be incomplete without mentioning the American organizations, and individuals cooperating with me in my work. I also believe the reader would get a clearer picture of Siberian intervention, if I give a short summary of my conclusion as to the intention of the various Governments with troops in

Siberia. The conclusions were formed from the actions of the representatives of these Governments.

As to the American troops in Siberia, I can not sufficiently express my gratitude for their loyal support. In guarding the railways, the organizations had to be broken up into very small detachments, of sometimes only eight or ten men, and they all performed their duties in a manner worthy of the best traditions of the American soldier. They knew what was right and they did the right thing, regardless of the calumny and abuse heaped upon them by the press and people interested in misrepresenting them.

I was not surprised, but none the less gratified, that the American officers and enlisted men were, almost to a man, firm believers in the traditional policy of the United States, as old as the Government itself, that all Countries should settle their own differences, without interference of the United States soldier. Misrepresentations of the American troops, as well as the cry of "bolshevism" did not swerve the American officer or soldier from his conception of what was right and just.

The Military were indebted to the Navy for very cordial cooperation, support and helpfulness, and I, personally, am particularly indebted to Admiral Knight and Admiral Rodgers for helpful suggestions as to procedure in times of stress.

The Y.M.C.A. carried out the traditional policy of that organization of giving succor and assistance where needed, regardless of politics or strata of society, and they rendered help to Americans as well as to all other Nationals. The fact that the Y.M.C.A. was giving assistance direct to Russians, rather than through the Russian official class, was the cause of unjust charges of improper and unethical activities.

The Knights of Columbus gave most of their time, attention, and funds to providing recreation and entertainment, as well as some small articles for the American soldiers and sailors. The service furnished by this organization was very helpful.

As far as I could see, all American welfare organizations, excepting the Red Cross, were not only in favor of, but followed the policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of the Russian people.

The American Red Cross was used in supplying the Kolchak military forces. In a report made by the Red Cross in Vladivostok, of the work of the American Red Cross in Siberia, appears the following:

“The present work of the Red Cross is divided into two main lines of activity—military and refugee relief. The military relief, that is, the establishing, equipping, and operating of hospitals; the supplying of the All-Siberian Army with clothing, underwear, and other necessities, and the providing of drugs, medicine, and hospital supplies for Russian hospitals.”

These hospitals were military hospitals, which accorded with my observations. Again the report continues:

“The second activity is being taken in cooperation with the Government at Omsk. It is the ordering of medical supplies, through the Red Cross, and for the Kolchak Government of drugs and medicines to the value of at least two million dollars. This huge order, the largest, it is said, that has ever been sent to Siberia from America, is being filled as fast as possible. In the line of immediate service to the Russian troops, is the sending West of three hundred thousand suits of light underwear. The first shipment of these suits to Vladivostok was due to arrive about May 15, and will be immediately shipped West. Other big underwear shipments are to follow.”

This reported aid to Kolchak was given, judging from the last statement, prior to May 15, 1919. I have no means of knowing what amount was expended by the Red Cross to assist the military forces of Kolchak, but I heard, while in Siberia, that it amounted to several million dollars. I hope this is excessive.

I personally thought it most unfortunate that such a pronounced action, against the announced policy of the United States, should be taken by a welfare agency of the United States because it was not possible to separate, in the minds of the Russian people, the acts of the Red Cross from the responsibility of the United States Government.

It does not seem possible to reconcile the actions of the various Governments in Siberia with the announced objects of intervention.

On August 8, 1918, the British made the following statement:

“We are coming as friends to help you save yourself from dismemberment and destruction at the hands of Germany, which is trying to enslave your people and use the great resources of your country to its own ends. We wish to solemnly assure you that we shall not retain one foot of your territory. The destinies of Russia are in the hands of the Russian people. It is for them, and them alone, to decide their forms of Government, and to find a solution for their social problems.”

I am unable to find any similar statement made by the French Government.

On August 3, 1918, the United States made this announcement, relative to sending troops to Russia:

“As the Government of the United States sees the present circumstances, therefore, military action is admissible in Russia now, only to render such protection and help, as is possible to the Czecho-Slovaks, against the armed Austrian and German prisoners who are attacking them, and to steady any efforts at self-government or self-defense in which the Russians themselves may be willing to accept assistance. Whether from Vladivostok or from Murmansk and Archangel, the only present object for which American troops will be employed, will be to guard Military stores which may subsequently be needed by Russian forces.”

The complete policy of the United States, which the troops were to follow, will be found in Chapter One.

The Japanese also made an announcement on August 3, 1918, in part, as follows:

“In adopting this course, (intervention) the Japanese Government remains constant in their desire to promote relations

of enduring friendship, and they reaffirm their avowed policy of respecting the territorial integrity of Russia, and of abstaining from all interferences in her national politics.”

The Czecho-Slovak National Council at Washington made this statement on July 27, 1918:

“The Czecho-Slovak Army in Russia was created in order to fight the Germans and Austrians, and when Russia deserted the cause of the Allies, arrangements were made by Professor T. G. Masaryk, president of the Czecho-Slovak National Council, and Commander-in-Chief of the Czecho-Slovak forces with the Allied representatives in Russia, and also with the Bolsheviks, to march the Czecho-Slovaks out of Russia and take them to the Western front. It should be kept clearly in mind that the occupation of Russian territory or the restoration of an Eastern Front was not thought of when these arrangements were made, in February, 1918. It was due to one of those German blunders, like the one that brought America into the War, that the Czecho-Slovaks, instead of withdrawing from Russia, are now in control of Siberia and a considerable territory west of the Urals. . . . A week ago (July 20th), professor Masaryk received a lengthy cable report from the leader of the Czecho-Slovak forces in which the following words are found, indicative of the present desires of the men; ‘In my opinion, it is most desirable and also possible to reconstruct a Russia-Germany front in the East. We ask for instructions as to whether we should leave for France or whether we should stay here to fight in Russia by the side of the Allies, and of Russia.’ Professor Masaryk has since then instructed the forces in Siberia to remain there for the present.”

All these statements are taken from Russian-American Relations, 1917-1920, Documents and Papers. The complete statements will be found on pages 243, 237, 239, and 235. The dates these statements were made should be kept in mind.

In considering the British statement it will be observed that they did not make a definite statement that they would not interfere in the internal affairs

of Russia, but the statement was so worded as to give the impression that their contemplated action in Russia was wholly altruistic.

In the discussion of the causes for intervention, one must now realize that one of the main reasons, if not *the* main reason, was carefully and designedly kept concealed.

The Allies were much disturbed because the Soviets had extended their authority throughout Siberia long before the decision to intervene, and it is evident England, France, and Japan went to Siberia with the distinct idea of fighting bolshevism but, for some reason, they tried to cover up this design by advocating the formation of an Eastern front, which they also hoped could be accomplished. It is very significant that all the Governments taking part in intervention in Siberia considered it unwise to let the world know that they intended to try to destroy the Soviets. Definite reasons for concealing this objective are, generally speaking, still unrevealed to the public.

In Russian-American Relations, under the heading, "Notes on Conversations held in the office of M. Pinchon, at the Quai d'Orsay, on January 16, 1919, page 285," appears:

"Mr. Lloyd George stated that there seemed to be three possible policies, I.—Military intervention. It is true that the Bolshevik movement is as dangerous to civilization as German Militarism, but as to putting it down by the sword, is there any one who proposes it? If he now proposed to send a thousand British troops to Russia for that purpose, the armies would mutiny. The same applies to United States troops in Siberia; also the Canadians and the French as well."

Mr. Lloyd George also said, at this same time:

"Moreover, from information received, it would appear that Kolchak had been collecting members of the old regime around him, and would seem to be at heart a monarchist." Kolchak had then been in power less than two months.

With reference to this same discussion, on page 287, Mr. Wilson is reported as saying in reply to the observation of Mr. Lloyd George: "He did not see how it was possible to controvert the statement of Mr. Lloyd George. . . . He did not believe that there would be sympathy anywhere, with the brutal aspect of bolshevism, if it were not for the fact of the domination of large vested interests in the political and economic world. . . ."

President Wilson stated that he would not be surprised to find that the reason why British and United States troops would not be ready to enter Russia to fight the Bolsheviks was explained by the fact that the troops were not at all sure that if they put down bolshevism, they would not bring about a reestablishment of the ancient order.

This was a remarkable statement for the President to have made, as the history of the United States does not disclose an incident where troops hesitated to obey the orders of the Government, regardless of their own personal views.

These statements are very significant as to why no mention of Soviets or Bolsheviks were made when the announcements to the world were published in August, 1918.

As to the attitude of the British in Siberia, General Knox, who had more to do with shaping the British policy than any other Britisher, did not share the views of Lloyd George, but considered Kolchak a liberal Russian, and felt that after the British had put Kolchak in power as Supreme Ruler, bolshevism would soon disappear. The definite statement, that the British put Kolchak in power, is based upon the following statement of Mr. Winston Churchill in the House of Commons, with reference to the Kolchak Government:

"The British Government had called it into being, for our own aid, at a time when necessity demanded it."

This statement, coupled with the action of the British troops in Omsk, the night the Directorate was overthrown and Kolchak was announced "Supreme Ruler," seems indicative of British intent.

General Knox had served in Russia as Military Attaché during the Czarist regime. He could speak the Russian language, and undoubtedly thought he understood the Russian people. He probably did understand the character and the peculiarities of the Russian People with whom he associated in Petrograd, but I can not believe he understood the aspirations of the great mass of the Russian people. If he had understood these people, he could not have thought, as he apparently did, that the Russian peasants and workmen would take up arms and fight to put in power the Kolchak supporters, who were committing such atrocities against the people to whom they looked for military support. General Knox expressed to me the thought that “the poor Russians were only swine.”

I, personally, never thought that Kolchak had any chance of establishing a Government in Siberia, but the belief of Knox and others like him, that the mass of the people were swine, and could be treated as such, hastened the downfall of Kolchak.

General Knox was disillusioned by the time he left Siberia. He came to see me and said that he had completely failed, that he had done nothing for Russia, his own country or himself. He might have gone further and stated that, in addition to accomplishing nothing, he had brought the resentment of the great mass of Russians upon himself and his country.

No Government engaging in intervention in Siberia could have escaped the resentment of the Russian people, but General Knox was so pronounced and so persistent in his interference in their internal affairs that the resentment was stronger against him than it was against any other foreigner in Russia.

It should be of record that all British representatives had, by no means, the same ideas as to the situation in Siberia as did Sir Charles Eliot and General Knox. When General Knox left, Colonel Wickham was, by virtue of seniority, in charge of the British Mission. In a few days he came to see me and told me he did not expect to last, as he was not willing to let his Government remain in ignorance of the real condition, and he had submitted a report, which he believed the British Government would not like, and he thought he would be relieved. He also told me that he had found, in his office, a report from a British officer, who was with Denikin,

and this report showed that the conditions under Denikin were similar to conditions in Siberia; that by changing names of places and individuals the atrocities committed in Siberia could be made to apply in the country dominated by Denikin.

The French attitude in Siberia, as exemplified by General Janin, was identical, as far as I could see, with that of the British.

The Czechs, as represented in Siberia, believed in a Parliamentary Government as opposed to an Absolutist form of Government. Notwithstanding their democratic ideas, and their aversion to the treatment accorded by the Kolchak adherents to the masses, under the protection of the Czechs and other foreign troops, the Czech leaders were very desirous of working in harmony with the Allies, because of gratitude for what the Allies had done for the Czech people.

The statement of Dr. Girska, Czech representative, in November, 1919, previously quoted in Chapter IX, expressed the real sentiment of the Czechs, as to the atrocities being committed against the mass of the Russian people, by a small fraction of the Russians who were being protected against punishment for their offenses, by foreign troops. When the Czechs, in May and June, 1918, drove the Soviets out of the towns along the Trans-Siberian Railway, and established a Government in accordance with their views, they did not realize that they were taking part in a Russian conflict that was predestined to establish either an Autocratic Government or an extreme Socialistic Government in Russia.

I certainly did not realize, and I imagine few foreigners did, how deep seated the factional feeling was in the Russian classes. We all knew there were many times the number of Bolsheviks in Siberia, at the downfall of Kolchak, as when we first went to Siberia. My Intelligence officer, after considering reports, from all parts of the Trans-Siberian Railway, concluded the bolsheviks had increased ten fold. I think his estimate was very conservative.

It is difficult to understand how Japan could make the solemn statement to the Russian people in August, 1918, that they intended to refrain from all interference in the internal politics of Russia, and then take action which I imagine no Japanese authority will now claim did not constitute

interference in the internal affairs of the Russian people. In fact, Baron Kato, head of the Japanese delegation to the Limitation of Arms Conference, in Washington, in 1921-22, officially stated that the Japanese, about the time the Allied contingents were sent to Siberia in 1918, decided to give Semenov material support in order to aid him in checking the Bolshevik influence from permeating the Far East.

Baron Shidehara, a member of the Japanese delegation to the Limitation of Arms Conference, officially said to the Conference:

“The Military expedition of Japan to Siberia was originally undertaken in common accord and in cooperation with the United States in 1918. It was primarily intended to render assistance to the Czechoslovak troops, who, in their homeward journey across Siberia from European Russia, found themselves in grave and pressing danger, at the hands of hostile forces under German command.”

The first official statement given out by the Japanese Government as to intervention in Siberia, was on August 3, 1918.

The Czecho-Slovak National Council at Washington, D. C., on July 27, 1918, one week before the Japanese and Americans decided to go to Siberia to relieve the Czechs, stated, as previously noted:

“That the Czecho-Slovaks, instead of withdrawing from Russia, are now in control of Siberia and of considerable territory West of the Urals.”

As a matter of fact, the Czechs had taken control of the Trans-Siberian Railway, and most of the towns on this line and had definitely decided not to leave, TWO MONTHS BEFORE JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES DECIDED TO GO TO THEIR RELIEF, AND HELP THEM TO GET OUT OF SIBERIA.

This is established by the very complete stenographic report of Colonel Emerson, previously quoted, and confirmed by Professor Masaryk's statement, as president of the Czecho-Slovak National Council, that he had instructed the Czech “forces in Siberia to remain there for the present.”

These instructions were given in response to a cable report from the Czech leader in Siberia, received in Washington July 20, 1918.

In my judgment, the Japanese, without cessation, and in the most obnoxious way, interfered in Russian affairs from the day I entered Siberia until the day I left. They did not deny supporting Semenov and Kalmykov, whose actions under the protection and support of Japan, were sure to cause resentment by the Siberian people, not only against Japan, but against all other nations taking part in intervention. The Siberian people were sure to reason that the presence of foreign soldiers made it possible for the Cossacks to murder, beat, and rob men, women and children. They are sure to come to this conclusion, because the stubborn facts justify it. These facts have been, and may continue to be hidden from the American people, but they are not hidden from the Russian people.

The acts of these Cossacks, and other Kolchak leaders under the protection of foreign troops, were the greatest asset to bolshevism that could have been devised by man. The atrocities were of such a nature, that they are sure to be remembered by, and recounted to, the Russian people for fifty years after they were committed.

That the Japanese had some object in giving financial, moral, material, and military aid to the Cossacks, is a self-evident fact. Their statement, made at the Limitation of Arms Conference, as to the objects to be attained by intervention in Siberia, is not convincing to one on the ground with the Japanese Military. All of those not in the inner circle as to the intention of the Japanese, of which I was one, expected Japan to have Semenov declare himself dictator of Siberia, east of Lake Baikal, in order to be in a position to control Eastern Siberia, without being charged with bad faith in failing to carry out her solemn assurance to the Russian people, in August, 1918. The difficulty comes in deciding why this action was not taken, as two or three times the fruit seemed ready for Japan to pluck. I, of course, only saw the action of the Japanese Military, and had no means of knowing if the Japanese Government approved the action of the Military in Siberia, but the failure of the Japanese Military to complete their apparent designs seemed to me to indicate that something interfered; whether the attitude of their own government, or others, including our own.

The Chinese troops in Siberia were very faithful to the obligations they assumed, attended strictly to their own business and did not meddle in the affairs of other people.

It is more difficult to come to a logical conclusion as to the reasons for intervention in Siberia by the United States, than that of any other nation. I can come to a conclusion, satisfactory to myself, as to why other nations took part, but have never been able to come to any satisfying conclusion as to why the United States ever engaged in such intervention.

I must conclude that the reasons for intervention by the United States as given out on August 3, 1918, were not frank and complete, and my instructions, quoted in the first chapter, stated "Military action is admissible in Russia only to help the Czecho-Slovaks consolidate their forces and get into successful cooperation with their Slavic kinsmen." This was dated July 17, 1918, but was not made known to me, or to the public, until August 3, 1918.

It was known to Consul General Harris, in Siberia, and to Mr. DeWitt C. Poole, Consul General in European Russia, at least one month before I received my orders, that the Czechs were not in need of help; that they had taken the Trans-Siberian Railway and had driven the Soviets out of the towns along the railroad and had organized new Governments for these towns; and that they did not intend to leave Siberia, as confirmed by the Czech National Council in Washington, at least one week before I was ordered to go to Siberia, for the purpose of their relief. It is difficult to believe that Professor Masaryk, who was head of the Czech National Council functioning in Washington, was not consulted as to the move of the United States troops to go to the assistance of the Czechs in far-away Siberia.

Consul General Harris, in Irkutsk, notified Colonel Emerson that, on July 2, 1918, he had received from the "Peking Legation," information that the Czechs were not going to leave Siberia. This is very indefinite, when one tries to reach a specific responsible official.

Mr. Harris did not say the information came from the American Legation, but as he considered it definite enough for him to take action, it must have come from someone in the American Legation in Peking, and I

suppose this information came from Washington, through Peking, because Mr. Harris could be more surely reached that way than through the American Ambassador to Russia, who was at that time at Vologda.

It is known, from Colonel Emerson's report, that the Soviets had been trying to get the Czechs out of Siberia for two months before I received my instructions, and that they would not go. The Soviets had offered to send officials with them, to see that they were not delayed in transit to Vladivostok. My instructions stated that there was immediate necessity for helping the Czechs. As has just been shown, this was an error, or a deliberate misrepresentation. Was it possible, that the facts about the Czechs were not known in Washington, when my instructions were prepared?

The United States had Consular representatives in Siberia at the time. Consul General Harris was in Irkutsk, and to the west, in order to see about aiding the Czechs to get out of Siberia, and knew well, before my instructions were issued, that the Czechs were not going to leave and were not in need of help. Naturally one wonders if the facts were reported by the United States representatives and ignored in Washington, or were my instructions based upon the propaganda relative to the Czechs, and without any information from the consular representatives in Siberia? It has been established that the Czechs had possession of all the Trans-Siberian Railway, and if the condition of the Czechs, still in European Russia, demanded relief, such a situation could have no bearing on my instructions, as I was directed not to go west of Irkutsk, under any circumstances.

The United States was led to believe that the Soviets had released the German and Austrian prisoners, who were confined in Siberia, which was not a fact as shown by reports of United States representatives, who were sent to make an investigation of these reports, as well as by subsequent information which has come to light.

The Americans were also sent to guard the military stores, that might be needed in future by the Russian forces, but the lack of cooperation by the various representatives in Siberia made it impossible to accomplish much in this respect.

The only part of the original policy remaining was "to steady any efforts at self-government or self-defense in which the Russians themselves may

be willing to accept assistance.” This was the peg upon which the State Department hung its complaint by Mr. Poole, through General Churchill, that I failed to comply with this part of my order, because I did not help “steady” Kolchak.

It seems to me very evident that it was never contemplated by the War Department that the Military should pick out a faction of the Russians, and extend help to that faction without any decision in Washington as to the desirability of helping that particular faction. In any case the War Department looked upon my instructions as I did.

I can not escape the conviction that Mr. Poole, in Washington, and Mr. Harris, in Siberia, both State Department officials, were very anxious for me to use American troops in fighting Bolsheviks. Mr. Poole had been Consul General in Archangel before going to Washington, and had seen American troops so used. I also believe these two officials, by criticism and by suggestion, hoped I would use American troops as they wished them used, rather than as ordered by the Secretary of War.

The different policies of the various representatives in Siberia was reflected in the attitude towards propositions coming before the Allied Commanders. It was noticeable that, when differences occurred, the English, French, and Japanese Commanders, almost without exception, were in accord on one side, and the American, Chinese, Canadians, Czechs, and Italians were on the other side.

The United States troops tried, very conscientiously, to carry out the policy of avoiding the conflicts between the Russian factions, and this could be done until the Military was ordered to guard the railroads, which made it necessary for them to take sides, as the railroads were, in practice, operated by Kolchak adherents for the specific benefit of the Kolchak forces.

I was the agent for delivering arms and ammunition to Kolchak, for use by his fighting forces, the President having, on June 12, 1919, agreed to help Kolchak with “munitions, supplies, and food.” I could not reconcile these acts with the principle of non-interference with the internal affairs of the Russian people. Although the State Department seemed able to do so, as on November 7, 1919, after the munitions, at least, had been given to Kolchak, it stated:

“This Government does not propose to depart in any way from its principles of non-interference in Russian internal affairs.”

I doubt if any unbiased person would ever hold that the United States did not interfere in the internal affairs of Russia. By this interference, the United States helped to bolster up, by its military forces, a monarchistically inclined and unpopular Government, of which the great mass of the people did not approve. The United States gained, by this act, the resentment of more than ninety percent of the people of Siberia.

It was known in the Far East that there was a distinct difference in the policy of the American troops from the policy of the troops of other nations, and I believe all Russians, except the autocratic class, were very grateful to the United States for their efforts to avoid taking sides by the Military in their internal conflicts.

To the great mass of Russians who had no personal knowledge of the situation in Siberia, the fact and circumstances of intervention will dominate and obscure every specific act connected with the intervention, and the resulting obloquy will fall almost equally upon all nations taking part.

What was the justification, in international law, for this intervention? There was no question as to the protection of life or property of American citizens involved, nor was there any prospect of future damage to American life or property, nor can the United States plead the act of intervention was a war measure, as it definitely refused to look upon it as such.

I doubt if history will record, in the past century, a more flagrant case of flouting the well-known and approved practice of States in their international relations, and using instead of the accepted principles of international law, the principle of Might makes right.

I think it can not be refuted that there were no beneficial results flowing from intervention in Russia, so far as all foreigners are concerned, and it undoubtedly resulted in placing the mass of Russians even more solidly behind the Soviets. This is shown by the promptness with which the Siberian people accepted the Moscow Government, after the departure of the Allies. I realize it was very hard to learn the real sentiment of the

people, under the conditions I faced in Siberia, but subsequent events have indicated that they were really socialistic.

For a few months after I arrived in Siberia, I thought if England, France, Japan, the United States, and the Czechs could wholeheartedly get behind a more liberal Government, such as the All Russian Provisional Government, overthrown on November 18, 1918, principally by the British because it was too liberal for them, it would have had a chance to succeed. This opinion was formed, after talking to many Russians, of different shades of political thought, but I gradually came to the conclusion that the mass of the Russians had a stronger conviction, as to the kind of Government Russia needed, than I first realized.

It is human nature, and therefore a self-evident fact, that no Government can add to its strength from its people, while being held in power by foreign bayonets. Kolchak realized this, as I heard him tell Mr. Morris that he did not want foreigners to fight for him, as the Russian character was such that the Russians would desert him if he received active military support from foreigners. This is not a characteristic of Russians alone, it is characteristic of all Nationals.

The fact that the Kerensky Government, a liberal and partly socialistic Government, could stand only eight months, clearly indicated that the Russians were foreordained to have an Autocratic or an extreme socialistic Government, and by the time I left Siberia, April 1, 1920, I was convinced that Russia was destined for one or the other.

The complete collapse of the efforts of Kolchak, Denikin, Yudenich, and Wrangle did not look as if the Russian people favored Autocracy.

Situated as I was, I could not determine how much the foolish acts of the supporters of Kolchak influenced the mass of the people against him, but it is interesting to study the conclusions of the different writers on Siberian intervention, as to the results of intervention.

Dr. Schuman, in his "American Policy towards Russia, Since 1917," on page 171 says: "The American expedition to Siberia failed as completely and ingloriously as the force sent to Archangel to achieve the purpose for which it was intended."

Dr. Schuman further states:

“Military intervention was undertaken under the guise of rescuing the Czecho-Slovaks, and assisting Russian efforts at self-government.”

I take this to mean that Dr. Schuman charges the United States with lack of sincerity in announcing the reasons for intervention, and I have come to the same conclusion.

Dr. Schuman again says:

“An attempt has been made to overthrow the Soviet Republic, under the appearance of guarding railways and extending economic assistance to Siberia.”

The results of guarding the railways justified Dr. Schuman's conclusions but I do not believe the United States, as represented by Ambassador Roland S. Morris, had in mind the overthrow of the Soviet Republic when he negotiated the Railway Agreement. He hoped and expected this Agreement to bring relief to the long-suffering Russian people. I personally did not anticipate that the Kolchak adherents would oppose extending assistance to the people as they did, and I do not believe Mr. Morris expected the Railway Agreement to be used for the benefit of the Kolchak adherents only.

Mr. Louis Fisher in his “The Soviets in World Affairs,” Vol. I, page 228, states:

“American intervention in Siberia, was a fruitless, dismal tragedy-comedy. Similarly in North Russia.”

Both Dr. Schuman and Mr. Fisher fail to make it clear whether they consider the failure was due to the policy of the Government, or to the failure of the United States representatives taking part in the intervention, but the “dismal tragedy-comedy” was enacted the moment the United States agreed to take part in military intervention in Siberia.

Despite the fiction of characterizing America's role as "Military Action," the fact remains that such action was intervention and as such was a deliberate interference in the internal affairs of the Russian people prolonging the Civil War and entailing untold loss of life and property.

With reference to the British reaction to intervention, Dr. Strakhovsky, Department of History, Georgetown University, in an article published in *Current History*, March, 1931, says:

"There need be no surprise, then, that the special report of the committee to collect information on Russia, presented to Parliament, by command of the King, should contain the following bitter but frank feeling in 1920-21; 'With regards to the efforts of intervention, the abundant and almost unanimous testimony of our witnesses shows that the Military intervention of the Allies in Russia, assisted to give strength and cohesion to the Soviet Government. . . . There is evidence to show that up to the time of Military Intervention, the majority of the Russian intellectuals were well disposed towards the Allies, and more especially to Great Britain, but that the later attitude of the Russian people towards the Allies, became characterized by indifference, distrust and antipathy.' Such was the reward that Great Britain and France received for their activity in Russia."

As indicating the Japanese view, as to results of intervention, I take the views of Mr. K. K. Kawakami, a Japanese journalist of many years experience. In his book, "Japan's Pacific Policy," page 244, he writes:

"Of course Japan blundered most, but the United States and Great Britain are not free from mistakes. . . . Japan's primary purpose, in the Siberian expedition, was to oppose the spread of Bolshevism and to restore law and order, and she had consistently pursued that policy."

Mr. Kawakami has a different idea from most of us, as to what constitutes law and order. It was customary in Siberia, for the British and the Japanese to refer to the Russians they were supporting as the forces of

law and order. This designation was not justified by the facts and they more nearly represented the forces of lawlessness and disorder.

Mr. Kawakami further says on page 250:

“From the beginning, the American idea of the Siberian undertaking was different from that of the Japanese. The Americans believed that they had nothing to do with the internal political conditions of Russia and that they were not in Siberia to attack Bolshevism or the Bolsheviki. On the contrary, the Japanese soldiers believed, or were made to believe, that the Bolsheviki were their enemies and that they were sent to Siberia to combat Bolshevism. On the whole the American attitude was wise and right.”

On page 236 Mr. Kawakami states:

“The Siberian expedition has been a great fiasco, for which all the Allied Nations must be blamed. It was a great mistake to send any expedition at all. America should have stood firm upon her original stand, refusing to subscribe to any idea of intervention. When the American Government changed its mind, in the summer of 1918, it committed a most deplorable blunder. Of course England blundered just as badly as Japan and the United States. It was British policy which set up the Kolchak government in Omsk. To further that policy, Britain supplied Kolchak with money and munitions.”

I can entirely agree with Mr. Kawakami in his statements, just quoted. The action of foreign representatives was not always entirely unselfish and free from an anticipated future advantage.

Undoubtedly the British expected special considerations, if Kolchak succeeded in establishing a Russian Government, while Japan hoped to be the dominant power with any Government established in Siberia, as was shown by their attitude towards Kolchak for some time after he assumed power.

There seems to be no difference of opinion, that intervention was a fundamental error, and the only possible benefit that can accrue to any of the Allied nations, or to the United States, must come from the realization that there was an inexcusable departure from the generally accepted practice of nations in their dealings with other nations, and the results have not fallen far short of being disastrous.

I was in command of the United States troops sent to Siberia and, I must admit, I do not know what the United States was trying to accomplish by military intervention.

As has been clearly shown, one must discard the statements of the United States, in August, 1918, that troops were being sent to rescue the Czechs from the German and Austrian prisoners, who were reported as having been released from prisons, and were organizing with the object of getting the military supplies at Vladivostok, taking the Trans-Siberian Railroads, and sending the supplies to Germany. These reports were untrue. Major Drysdale, U. S. Army, from Peking, and Mr. Webster from Moscow, were sent to investigate and ascertain if these reports were true, and had reported they had no foundation in fact.

Dr. Schuman, as previously stated, concludes:

“War had been waged under the pretext of showing the Russian people the path to peace and Democracy. An attempt had been made to overthrow the Soviet Republic under the appearance of guarding railways and extending economic assistance to Siberia.”

The action of the State Department representatives in helping Kolchak, whose sole object was the destruction of the Soviets, justifies the conclusion that the United States was a party to the efforts to overthrow the Soviets, as Kolchak was unquestionably fighting them.

The agreement entered into by President Wilson and the Allies on June 12, 1919, “To assist the government of Admiral Kolchak, with munitions, supplies and food, to establish themselves as the government of all Russia” also justifies this conclusion.

It will be noted that President Wilson does not agree that United States troops would be used to help Kolchak destroy the Soviets. In substantiation of the belief that President Wilson did not intend to use United States troops to help Kolchak, he stated on June 26, 1919, just two weeks after he agreed to help him with munitions, supplies, and food, in reply to a Senate resolution:

“The instructions to General Graves direct him not to interfere in Russian affairs.”

There is no question the War Department construed the American policy in Russia, which constituted my orders, as meaning that the American troops were not to take sides in the internal conflicts, as is shown by the cable from General March, Chief of Staff, on March 28, 1919, telling me to follow the policy of non-interference, which I had been following, until my instructions had been changed by the President, which was never done.

It is my personal belief that this policy was followed because no other course could be adopted without the Executive running counter to the provisions of the Constitution of the United States, by making war without a declaration by Congress.

If the American troops were not to be used in support of the policy followed by the State Department, why were they sent to Siberia? If the United States had been deceived, as to the menace from German and Austrian prisoners, and had sent troops to Siberia to block this menace, why were they not sent home after the Armistice, instead of being kept in Siberia with nothing to do from November, 1918, to April, 1919, the date of the Railway Agreement?

The absence of information from the United States and the Allied Governments, about military intervention in Russia, indicates that the various Governments taking part in the intervention take very little pride in this venture.

Who can blame them?

INDEX

- ACKERMAN, [91](#), [167](#)
AIDE MEMOIRE, [4](#), [5](#)
ALEXEYENSK, [162](#)
ALLIED MILITARY ATTACHÉS, [17](#)
ALLIED POWERS, [9](#), [17](#), [58](#)
ALLIES, [11](#), [13](#), [15](#), [17](#), [19](#), [22](#), [60](#),
[68](#), [169](#), [187](#), [235](#), [352](#)
AMBULANCE COMPANY, U. S., [34](#)
AMERICA, [15](#), [20](#), [22](#)
AMERICAN ATTACHÉ IN TOKYO, [152](#)
AMERICAN HEADQUARTERS, [57](#), [77](#), [87](#),
[128](#), [140](#), [153](#), [199](#), [203](#), [283](#),
[316](#)
AMERICAN R. R. SERVICE CORPS, [171](#),
[175](#), [242](#), [283](#)
- BAKER, SECRETARY WAR, [4](#), [122](#), [219](#),
[220](#), [346](#)
BAKMETIEFF, [289](#)
BERESOVKA, [255](#)
BERNSTEIN, [91](#)
BIRA, [64](#), [89](#)
BLAGOVESTCHENSK, [162](#)
BLAIR, [172](#)
BLISS, [1](#), [92](#)
BOGOMOLETZ, [311](#)
- CALDWELL, [25](#), [191](#)
CANADIANS, [82](#)
CECEK, [282](#), [286](#)
CENTRAL POWERS, [11](#), [20](#), [27](#), [102](#),
[148](#)
- AMERICAN RED CROSS, [85](#), [205](#), [217](#),
[268](#), [330](#)
AMERICAN TROOPS, [57](#), [91](#), [96](#), [110](#),
[115](#), [121](#), [124](#), [144](#), [164](#), [206](#),
[218](#), [329](#), [355](#)
AMUR PROVINCE, [143](#), [159](#)
AMUR RIVER, [90](#)
ANDRESKAYA, [162](#)
ANGARA RIVER, [213](#)
ANNANKOV, [265](#)
ARCHANGEL, [2](#), [23](#), [29](#), [73](#), [165](#)
ARMISTICE, [96](#), [144](#)
ASSOCIATED PRESS, [14](#), [326](#)
AUSTRIAN OFFICERS, [31](#)
AUSTRIANS, [82](#)
AVKSENTIEV, [98](#)
- BOLSHEVIKS, [12](#), [16](#), [23](#), [28](#), [48](#), [57](#),
[94](#), [96](#), [103](#), [108](#), [124](#), [150](#), [165](#),
[186](#), [190](#), [202](#), [229](#), [246](#), [270](#)
BREST-LITOVSK TREATY, [17](#)
BRITISH, [20](#), [23](#), [125](#), [171](#), [182](#), [189](#),
[195](#), [269](#), [301](#), [306](#)
BRITISH FOREIGN OFFICE, [21](#)
BRITISH MISSION, [25](#)
BUGBEE, [284](#), [285](#)
BUTENKO, [173](#), [251](#)
- CHANGCHUN, [171](#)
CHELIABINSK, [49](#), [114](#)
CHINA, [168](#), [181](#), [306](#)
CHINESE, [82](#), [181](#), [342](#)

CHINESE EASTERN R. R., [21](#), [38](#), [62](#),
[107](#), [157](#), [209](#), [305](#)

CHITA, [46](#), [64](#), [107](#), [145](#), [150](#), [168](#),
[212](#), [261](#), [316](#)

CHURCHILL, MARLBOROUGH, [118](#), [219](#),
[221](#), [224](#), [296](#), [320](#), [323](#), [346](#)

CHURCHILL, WINSTON, [28](#), [336](#)

CLEMENCEAU, [27](#)

COSSACKS, [130](#), [148](#), [207](#), [221](#), [236](#),
[249](#), [252](#), [259](#), [261](#), [270](#), [290](#),

DAIREN, [210](#)

DENIKIN, [28](#), [338](#), [350](#)

DERBER GOVERNMENT, [117](#)

DEVOL, [35](#)

EICHELBERGER, [153](#), [276](#), [290](#), [296](#),
[299](#), [318](#), [327](#)

EKATERINBURG, [116](#), [150](#), [200](#), [236](#),
[266](#)

ELIOT, SIR CHARLES, [83](#), [170](#), [269](#),
[338](#)

FAYMONVILLE, [319](#)

FISHER, LOUIS, [106](#), [109](#), [125](#), [146](#),
[351](#)

FOCH, MARSHAL, [92](#)

GAJDA, [42](#), [43](#), [46](#), [50](#), [84](#), [113](#), [115](#),
[200](#), [207](#), [235](#), [275](#), [279](#), [280](#)

GAIMAN, [117](#)

GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN PRISONERS,
[26](#), [31](#), [60](#), [63](#), [80](#), [194](#), [214](#),
[303](#), [345](#), [354](#)

GERMAN PRISONERS, [24](#), [40](#), [57](#)

GERMANS, [20](#), [21](#), [24](#), [92](#)

[341](#)

CRONIN, [105](#)

CZAR, [12](#), [100](#), [324](#)

CZAR'S GOVERNMENT, [11](#), [12](#)

CZECHS, [29](#), [37](#), [41](#), [44](#), [61](#), [67](#), [73](#),
[82](#), [115](#), [116](#), [273](#), [277](#), [300](#),
[306](#), [325](#), [338](#), [341](#), [344](#), [354](#)

CZECHO-SLOVAKS, [7](#), [9](#), [10](#), [37](#), [45](#),
[49](#), [323](#), [343](#), [350](#)

DIETRICH, [228](#), [230](#)

DRYSDALE, [24](#), [26](#), [354](#)

DUMAS, [148](#), [276](#)

EMERSON, [37](#), [41](#), [50](#), [52](#), [226](#), [228](#),
[230](#), [238](#), [274](#), [298](#), [341](#), [344](#)

EMPEROR OF JAPAN, [58](#)

ENGLAND, [15](#), [18](#), [20](#), [23](#), [64](#), [69](#), [75](#),
[96](#), [111](#), [116](#), [126](#), [353](#)

FRANCE, [6](#), [15](#), [18](#), [20](#), [23](#), [27](#), [28](#), [67](#),
[69](#), [96](#), [111](#), [126](#)

FRANCIS, AMBASSADOR, [22](#), [24](#), [30](#),
[31](#), [37](#), [40](#)

FRENCH, [19](#), [182](#)

GERMANY, [7](#), [9](#), [22](#), [28](#), [82](#), [332](#), [354](#)

GIRSA, [279](#), [300](#), [307](#), [339](#)

GORDYEVKA, [153](#), [154](#), [156](#)

GRAVES, [58](#), [75](#), [126](#), [163](#), [191](#), [218](#),
[219](#), [221](#), [262](#), [272](#), [314](#), [355](#)

GREAT BRITAIN, [15](#), [20](#), [28](#), [69](#)

GREAT NORTHERN R. R., [52](#), [175](#)

GREY, AMERICAN CONSUL, [70](#), [75](#)

GREY, THORD, [237](#)

HAAN, [222](#), [224](#)

HABAROVSK, [39](#), [60](#), [63](#), [64](#), [88](#), [107](#),
[128](#), [135](#), [150](#), [209](#), [249](#)

HAKEN, [257](#), [260](#), [263](#)

HARBIN, [37](#), [140](#), [176](#), [210](#), [241](#), [274](#),
[305](#)

HARRIS, [40](#), [51](#), [53](#), [70](#), [107](#), [150](#),
[159](#), [162](#), [191](#), [217](#), [225](#), [262](#),

IMAN, [133](#), [248](#)

IMYANOP, [305](#)

INAGAKI, [133](#)

INFANTRY, U. S., 27TH AND 31ST
REGIMENTS, [34](#)

INDIA, [28](#)

INTER-ALLIED R. R. COMMITTEE, [176](#),
[189](#), [240](#), [244](#), [274](#)

IRKUTSK, [25](#), [30](#), [33](#), [40](#), [43](#), [44](#), [46](#),
[50](#), [61](#), [85](#), [115](#), [211](#), [213](#), [241](#),

JANIN, [124](#), [125](#), [182](#), [338](#)

JAPAN, [9](#), [16](#), [19](#), [21](#), [23](#), [64](#), [69](#), [96](#),
[107](#), [111](#), [126](#), [133](#), [144](#), [152](#),
[255](#), [260](#), [262](#), [303](#), [332](#), [341](#)

KALGAN, [212](#)

KALMYKOV, [90](#), [91](#), [107](#), [126](#), [127](#),
[128](#), [135](#), [150](#), [157](#), [169](#), [185](#),
[215](#), [250](#), [255](#), [259](#), [261](#), [287](#),
[310](#), [341](#)

KAMCHATKA PROVINCE, [143](#)

KARGAT, [48](#)

KARIMSKAYA, [211](#)

KATO, BARON, [340](#)

KAWAKAMI, [307](#), [352](#)

GUINET, [49](#), [50](#), [71](#), [115](#)

[265](#), [288](#), [343](#)

HARVEY, [122](#)

HASURAK, [67](#)

HEID, AUGUST, [121](#), [256](#)

HICKS, [24](#), [25](#)

HORVATH, [78](#), [108](#), [130](#), [134](#), [145](#),
[170](#), [204](#), [251](#)

HUNT, FRAZIER, [220](#)

[260](#), [300](#), [344](#)

IRKUTSK PROVINCE, [148](#)

ISHIM, [227](#)

ITALIAN COMMANDER, [84](#)

ITALY, [7](#)

IVANOFF-RINOFF, [134](#), [143](#), [146](#), [150](#),
[169](#), [170](#), [172](#), [188](#), [204](#), [237](#),
[272](#), [287](#), [288](#)

JAPANESE, [135](#), [206](#), [249](#), [253](#), [281](#),
[317](#), [352](#)

JAPANESE TROOPS, [64](#), [108](#), [171](#), [202](#)

JOHNSON, [317](#)

KEDLETS, [42](#)

KENDALL, [312](#)

KERENSKY, [14](#), [15](#), [16](#)

KERENSKY GOVERNMENT, [12](#), [13](#), [29](#),
[80](#), [81](#), [175](#), [176](#), [349](#)

KERNAN, [318](#)

KING, [318](#)

KNIGHT, ADMIRAL, [37](#), [56](#), [84](#), [123](#),
[124](#), [329](#)

KNIGHTS OF COLUMBUS, [330](#)

KNOX, [18](#), [19](#), [80](#), [81](#), [83](#), [84](#), [87](#), [99](#),
[124](#), [125](#), [126](#), [183](#), [189](#), [191](#),
[195](#), [201](#), [215](#), [226](#), [257](#), [260](#),
[269](#), [272](#), [288](#), [300](#), [336](#), [337](#)

KOLA, [8](#)

KOLCHAK, [99](#), [102](#), [106](#), [107](#), [109](#),
[117](#), [130](#), [134](#), [145](#), [151](#), [189](#),
[199](#), [208](#), [215](#), [216](#), [219](#), [236](#),
[245](#), [248](#), [262](#), [287](#), [293](#), [300](#),
[335](#), [347](#), [349](#), [355](#)

LAKE BAIKAL, [19](#), [29](#), [61](#), [67](#), [138](#),
[148](#), [182](#), [221](#), [291](#), [301](#)

LANTRY, [243](#)

LARIMER, [286](#)

LEITCH, [35](#), [310](#)

MACGOWAN, [30](#), [33](#), [40](#), [193](#), [217](#),
[317](#), [320](#)

MIASS, [49](#)

MANCHURIA, [60](#), [181](#), [209](#), [299](#), [304](#)

MANCHULI, [168](#), [211](#)

MARCH, PEYTON C., [1](#), [2](#), [4](#), [119](#), [121](#),
[160](#), [220](#), [296](#), [297](#), [314](#), [356](#)

MARINSK, [40](#), [41](#), [42](#), [47](#), [299](#)

MARTINEK, [286](#)

MASARYK, [46](#), [115](#), [333](#), [341](#), [343](#)

MATSUDAIRA, [292](#)

MEDVIEDEFF, [252](#), [272](#), [322](#), [323](#), [327](#)

MEDY, [307](#)

MEJAK, [255](#)

NAKAJIMA, [166](#), [167](#), [168](#)

NEW PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT, [13](#),
[16](#)

OI, [58](#), [90](#), [135](#), [137](#), [162](#), [164](#), [165](#),

KOLCHAK ADHERENTS, [83](#), [103](#), [122](#),
[157](#), [187](#), [275](#), [351](#)

KOLUMZINO, [238](#)

KOREA, [304](#)

KORFF, [152](#)

KRAEVSKI, [63](#)

KRAKOVETSKY, [283](#), [319](#)

KRASNOYARSK, [40](#), [43](#), [213](#), [248](#), [300](#)

KRESTACHINTSKY, [144](#), [153](#)

KRIZEK, [48](#)

LENIN, [101](#)

LOCKHART, [21](#)

LOKVITSKY, [228](#)

LVOV, [14](#)

MELASKI, [302](#)

MENSHEVIKS, [102](#)

MILITARY ATTACHÉ, [17](#), [167](#)

MILITARY MISSIONS, [17](#)

MOROVSKY, [117](#), [282](#)

MORRIS, AMBASSADOR, [159](#), [180](#),
[183](#), [208](#), [215](#), [225](#), [227](#), [238](#),
[248](#), [257](#), [259](#), [292](#), [307](#), [350](#)

MORROW, [183](#), [246](#), [254](#), [299](#), [311](#),
[315](#), [316](#)

MOSCOW, [21](#), [22](#), [24](#), [25](#), [70](#), [354](#)

MUKDEN, [210](#)

MURMANSK, [8](#), [332](#)

MURRAY, [229](#), [230](#)

NIKOLSK, [39](#), [87](#), [133](#), [173](#), [198](#), [209](#),
[211](#), [309](#), [320](#)

NOVO-NIKOLAEVSK, [42](#), [47](#)

[169](#), [261](#), [291](#), [292](#), [321](#), [328](#)

OLGA, [160](#)
OMSK, [25](#), [48](#), [50](#), [70](#), [145](#), [151](#), [173](#),
[204](#), [208](#), [225](#), [238](#), [280](#)
OMSK GOVERNMENT, [114](#), [115](#), [118](#),
[207](#)

PANAMA, [319](#)
PARIS, [84](#), [86](#)
PARTISANS, [224](#)
PEASANTS, RUSSIAN, [12](#), [100](#)
PECHINKO, [255](#)
PEKING, [24](#), [50](#), [70](#), [344](#)
PENZA, [42](#)
PEPELAIEFF, [228](#)
PERM, [114](#), [200](#)
PERSHING, [23](#)
PETROGRAD, [17](#), [19](#), [175](#)

RAY, [47](#)
RED ARMY, [92](#)
RED GUARD, [198](#)
ROBERTSON, [207](#)
ROBINS, [22](#), [24](#), [30](#)
ROBINSON, [94](#), [95](#), [163](#), [248](#)
RODGERS, [284](#), [329](#)
ROMANOFF DYNASTY, [11](#), [82](#)
ROMANOVSKY, [117](#), [153](#), [158](#), [201](#)

SAKHALIN PROVINCE, [143](#)
SAKHAROV, [228](#), [272](#)
SARGENT, [235](#), [250](#)
SCHUMAN, [69](#), [350](#), [353](#)
SCHUYLER, [150](#), [151](#)
SCOTT, HUGH L., [1](#)
SEMENOV, [32](#), [69](#), [86](#), [91](#), [104](#), [106](#),
[127](#), [145](#), [157](#), [171](#), [174](#), [183](#),
[206](#), [212](#), [215](#), [241](#), [246](#), [251](#),

O'REILLY, [269](#)
OSTROUGOV, [47](#), [178](#)
OTANI, [57](#), [58](#), [62](#), [126](#), [185](#)

PETROPAVLOSK, [227](#), [230](#)
PHELPS, [267](#)
POLOVINA, [50](#)
POOLE, [70](#), [71](#), [73](#), [74](#), [115](#), [187](#), [194](#),
[220](#), [221](#), [297](#), [343](#), [346](#)
PRESIDENT WILSON, [18](#), [48](#), [62](#), [66](#),
[67](#), [73](#), [75](#), [82](#), [84](#), [93](#), [112](#), [194](#),
[196](#), [206](#), [217](#), [219](#), [244](#), [256](#),
[336](#), [347](#), [355](#)
PRIMORSK PROVINCE, [93](#), [143](#)
PROGRANICHNAYA, [128](#), [171](#), [209](#)

ROOT, ELIHU, [13](#)
ROZANOV, [215](#), [248](#), [252](#), [259](#), [279](#),
[280](#), [284](#), [317](#), [325](#)
ROSENBLATT, [266](#)
RUSSIA, [7](#), [9](#), [14](#), [15](#), [17](#), [18](#), [51](#), [175](#)
RUSSIAN COMMANDER, [41](#), [230](#)
RUSSIAN WHITE ARMY, [114](#)
RYAN, [261](#), [263](#)

[254](#), [259](#), [263](#), [287](#), [306](#), [310](#),
[312](#), [314](#), [341](#)
SEMENOFF-MERLIN, [290](#)
SEMIPALATINSK, PROVINCE, [148](#)
SHAMATOULSKI, [249](#)
SHARKEY, [117](#), [146](#), [149](#)
SHIDEHARA, [75](#), [308](#), [340](#)
SIBERIA, [4](#), [9](#), [10](#), [21](#), [23](#), [29](#), [35](#), [43](#),
[69](#), [97](#), [169](#), [179](#)

SIBERIAN GOVERNMENT, [65](#), [102](#)

SKOTOVA, [202](#)

SKRANSKOY, [162](#)

SLAUGHTER, [40](#), [41](#), [43](#), [46](#), [85](#), [150](#),
[205](#), [206](#), [215](#), [230](#), [251](#), [259](#)

SMITH, C. H., [189](#), [207](#), [212](#), [293](#),
[307](#), [315](#), [325](#)

SOCIAL REVOLUTIONISTS, [86](#), [117](#), [300](#)

SOUKINE, [112](#), [196](#), [205](#), [226](#), [240](#),
[251](#), [287](#)

SOVIETS, [16](#), [17](#), [19](#), [25](#), [43](#), [71](#), [95](#),
[106](#), [165](#), [176](#), [191](#), [224](#), [336](#),
[343](#), [355](#)

SOVIET GOVERNMENT, [65](#), [102](#)

SPASSKOE, [156](#)

SPURLING, [249](#)

STATE DEPARTMENT, [22](#), [33](#), [53](#), [54](#),
[58](#), [70](#), [74](#), [97](#), [98](#), [112](#), [120](#),

TAIGA, [215](#)

TARTARSKAYA, [300](#)

TCHANKA, [90](#)

TCHELYABINSK, [227](#)

TELEGRAPH BATTALION, [34](#)

TEUSLER, [85](#), [205](#), [206](#), [316](#)

THOMAS, [46](#)

TOKYO, [107](#), [163](#), [166](#), [215](#)

UFA, GOVERNMENT, [99](#)

UGHET, [146](#), [288](#)

UNITED STATES, [4](#), [6](#), [7](#), [9](#), [13](#), [18](#), [19](#),
[20](#), [23](#), [60](#), [64](#), [106](#), [190](#), [203](#),

VERKHNE-UDINSK, [212](#), [241](#), [254](#), [299](#)

VLADIVOSTOK, [8](#), [9](#), [21](#), [24](#), [29](#), [37](#),
[38](#), [44](#), [65](#), [108](#), [138](#), [225](#), [262](#),

[147](#), [159](#), [192](#), [197](#), [217](#), [222](#),
[356](#)

STEFANIK, [115](#)

STERN, MRS., [35](#)

STERNBERG, [25](#), [30](#)

STEVENS, [37](#), [43](#), [52](#), [175](#), [178](#), [218](#),
[222](#), [228](#), [313](#)

STRAKHOVSKY, [27](#), [28](#), [351](#)

STYER, [55](#), [56](#), [57](#), [58](#), [78](#), [89](#), [130](#),
[136](#), [163](#), [164](#)

SUCHAN COAL MINES, [93](#), [95](#), [188](#)

SUNGARI RIVER, [210](#)

SUPREME WAR COUNCIL, [5](#), [6](#), [22](#), [64](#)

SVIAGANA, [253](#)

SWOPE, [92](#)

SYROVY, [114](#), [115](#)

TOMSK, [47](#)

TRANS-BAIKAL, [107](#), [145](#), [183](#), [211](#),
[212](#), [243](#)

TRANS-SIBERIAN R. R., [24](#), [51](#), [64](#),
[73](#), [113](#), [157](#), [215](#), [341](#)

TROTSKY, [17](#), [22](#), [23](#), [24](#)

TSITSIHAR, [211](#)

TWENTY-SEVENTH INFANTRY, [130](#)

[256](#), [293](#), [345](#), [353](#)

USSURI, COSSACKS, [128](#), [137](#)

USSURI R. R., [157](#), [209](#)

[271](#), [309](#), [332](#)

VOLGA RIVER, [67](#)

VOLOGDA, [37](#), [38](#), [40](#), [194](#), [344](#)

WARD, [198](#)

WAR DEPARTMENT, [51](#), [64](#), [97](#), [98](#),
[119](#), [192](#), [220](#), [222](#), [258](#)

WEBSTER, [24](#), [25](#), [354](#)

YAKUSHEFF, [279](#), [283](#)

YAMADA, [167](#)

YANSON, [25](#)

YENESSEI RIVER, [214](#)

ZABETAYA, [162](#)

ZEMSTVOS, [66](#), [86](#), [103](#), [322](#)

ZEYA, [63](#)

ZUMOTO, [292](#)

WHITE RUSSIANS, [116](#), [160](#), [171](#), [187](#)

WICKHAM, [338](#)

WOOD, LEONARD, [93](#)

WRANGEL, [28](#), [350](#)

Y.M.C.A., [141](#), [267](#), [330](#)

YOSHE, [206](#), [255](#)

YUDENICH, [350](#)

Y.W.C.A., [141](#), [310](#), [330](#)

[https://siberiantimes.com/other/other
s/features/f0246-8000-us-troops-
deploy-in-siberia-the-27th-and-31st-
infantry-regiments-act-to-stabilise-
russia/](https://siberiantimes.com/other/other-s/features/f0246-8000-us-troops-deploy-in-siberia-the-27th-and-31st-infantry-regiments-act-to-stabilise-russia/)